Equality

Equality is a political and moral ideal that refers to some universal condition thought to be shared by human beings. Since this inherent equality is often thought to have been corrupted by a self-interested secular world, this essay shifts the emphasis from equality as a timeless concept to equalization as a historical process.

Dignity and human rights in correctional practice

Interventions with offenders have a normative layer as well as a scientific basis and therefore it is not possible to quarantine ethical questions from discussions of best practice. My aim in this paper is to provide an expanded ethical canvass from which to approach correctional practice with offenders. The cornerstone of this broader ethical perspective will be the concept of human dignity and its protection by human rights norms and theories. I also explore the relationship between responses to crime and offender rehabilitation based on an enriched theory of punishment that is sensitive to offenders’ moral equality and their attendant rights.

A legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal à luz da premissa liberal republicana: autonomia privada, igualdade e autonomia pública. Estudo de caso sobre as regulações paternalistas

A presente tese tem por objetivo principal estudar a legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal. Trata-se de tema de grande relevância e extrema atualidade em decorrência de dois fatores. Por um lado, desde o fenômeno da virada kantiana e da retomada da preocupação com o estabelecimento de uma teoria da justiça, tornou-se necessária a análise de justificação jurídico-moral de toda e qualquer instituição político-jurídica positivada. Por outro lado, entre as inúmeras instituições político-jurídicas positivadas, cresce cada vez mais a utilização das medidas jurídicas regulatórias, através das quais o Poder Público direciona ou controla a conduta dos agentes com o intuito de atingir determinada finalidade. Instituto econômico que é, ao interferir na alocação de riquezas, bens e serviços no mercado, a regulação estatal há tempos já vem sendo objeto de análise em uma perspectiva de legitimação econômica. Tradicionalmente, ainda dentro do paradigma da racionalidade, os economistas sempre apontaram as falhas de mercado como as razões a justificar as regulações estatais em um viés econômico. Mais recentemente, por sua vez, os adeptos da economia comportamental, rompendo ou relativizando as lições da Rational Choice Theory, têm apontado também as ações irracionais em heurística como razões a justificar as regulações estatais em um viés econômico. Ocorre, entretanto, que a regulação estatal é um instituto interdisciplinar. Ao direcionar ou controlar a conduta dos indivíduos, limitando ou implementando direitos e liberdades, a regulação constitui instituto simultaneamente jurídico e moral. A presente tese, portanto, buscará apresentar as razões a servir de justificação para a regulação estatal em uma perspectiva jurídico-moral. Neste ponto, adotar-se-á como paradigma de aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral das instituições político-jurídicas positivadas (entre as quais as regulações estatais) um liberalismo-republicano, consistente na compatibilização do liberalismo-igualitário com um republicanismo moderado. Desta forma, o estudo buscará defender a possibilidade de a legitimação jurídico-moral das diversas regulações estatais encontrar fundamento em um ou alguns de três valores jurídico-morais: a autonomia individual privada, as condições igualitárias e a autonomia pública. No que diz respeito à implementação da autonomia individual privada e das condições igualitárias, primeiramente, a tese defenderá a possibilidade de ser realizada uma nova leitura jurídico-moral dos institutos econômicos das falhas de mercado e das ações irracionais em heurística. Neste sentido, o conceito de falhas de mercado e o conceito de ações irracionais em heurística, em uma leitura jurídico-moral como razões a justificar a legitimação das regulações estatais, devem ser entendidos como situações em que o atuar livre dos agentes no mercado viole ou deixe de implementar os valores jurídico-morais fundamentais da autonomia individual privada e das condições igualitárias. Ainda no que diz respeito às influências liberal-igualitárias, a tese sustentará que, mesmo na inexistência de falhas de mercado ou de ações irracionais em heurística, será possível o estabelecimento de regulações estatais que encontrem justificação no valor jurídico-moral fundamental da igualdade, desde que tais regulações estejam destinadas a implementar as condições igualitárias mínimas necessárias à manutenção da própria autonomia individual privada e da dignidade humana. Por outro lado, no que diz respeito às influências republicanas, será exposto que as regulações estatais podem encontrar legitimação jurídico-moral também no valor jurídico-moral fundamental da autonomia pública. A saber, as regulações podem se encontrar legitimadas jurídico-moralmente quando da implementação dos projetos e políticas deliberados pelos cidadãos e pela sociedade no exercício da soberania popular, desde que tais projetos coletivos não violem os requisitos mínimos de dignidade humana dos indivíduos. A tese defenderá que os princípios da proporcionalidade e da igualdade podem exercer um papel de destaque na análise de legitimação jurídico-moral das regulações estatais. O princípio da proporcionalidade, neste ponto, será útil instrumental metodológico na aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral de uma medida regulatória em uma perspectiva interna, quando da aferição da relação estabelecida entre os meios e os fins da regulação. O princípio da igualdade, por sua vez, será útil instrumental metodológico na aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral de uma medida regulatória em uma perspectiva comparativa entre as diversas medidas regulatórias existentes. Por fim, uma vez enfrentados os pontos mais sensíveis pertinentes à justificação de toda e qualquer medida regulatória bem como estabelecida uma teoria geral acerca da legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal, a presente tese realizará um estudo de caso acerca da legitimação jurídico-moral especificamente das regulações que utilizam argumentos de natureza paternalista. Trata-se de regulações que, ao direcionar a conduta de agentes com o intuito de zelar por bens, direitos e interesses destes próprios indivíduos cuja liberdade é restringida, apresentam-se extremamente controversas. Será exposto que, desde a clássica obra On Liberty de JONH STUART MILL, o paternalismo jurídico vem sendo tradicionalmente associado a uma conotação pejorativa de violação aos valores jurídico-morais fundamentais. A tese, porém, adotará posição segundo a qual as regulações paternalistas podem eventualmente encontrar legitimação jurídico-moral na promoção ou proteção dos valores jurídico-morais fundamentais da autonomia individual privada e da igualdade. Além disto, defenderá o estudo que os institutos econômicos das falhas de mercado da assimetria de informações e dos problemas de coordenação bem como os institutos econômicos das ações irracionais em heurística, adotados na nova leitura jurídico-moral proposta, servirão de instrumental útil na identificação das situações em que tais regulações paternalistas se encontram legitimadas jurídico-moralmente diante da premissa liberal-republicana.

Social Equality: On what it means to be equals

The first collected volume on social and relational equality.
Addresses a gap in the literature - while many philosophers have pointed to the importance of social equality, it requires much more theoretical development, which this volume aims to provide.
Offers a unique answer to the debate about whether or not equality is valuable.
Features a foreword by eminent political theorist David Miller
Includes new contributions by some of the most well-known contemporary moral and political philosophers, such as Samuel Scheffler and Jonathan Wolff.
Is equality valuable? This question dominates many discussions of social justice, which tend to center on whether certain forms of distributive equality are valuable, such as the equal distribution of primary social goods. But these discussions often neglect what is known as social or relational equality. Social equality suggests that equality is foremost about relationships and interactions between people, rather than being primarily about distribution.

A number of philosophers have written about the significance of social equality, and it has also played an important role in real-life egalitarian movements, such as feminism and civil rights movements. However, as it has been relatively neglected in comparison to the debates about distributive equality, it requires much more theoretical attention. This volume brings together a collection of ten original essays which present new analyses of social and relational equality in philosophy and political theory. The essays analyze the nature of social equality, as well as its relationship to justice and politics.

Readership: The book is primarily aimed at professionals in the field - philosophers (especially in moral, social and political philosophy) and political theorists. It is also aimed at the academic library market. Moreover, the book should be of interest to advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students attending courses on theories of equality and/or social justice.

Exclusão étnica, julgamento moral e emoções morais : estudo em adolescentes

Os pressupostos defendidos na declaração de Salamanca sobre a Educação Inclusiva não são fáceis de concretizar pois as pessoas, por causa de diferenças de sexo, etnia, aparência, etc, têm frequentemente condutas diferenciais. Um dos critérios sociais que mais provoca exclusão social são as diferenças étnicas, um fenómeno mais estudado pela psicologia social. Porém, a atitude de exclusão social pode estar relacionada com a competência moral dos indivíduos, uma relação que foi analisada neste estudo. Para isso recorremos ao suporte da psicologia moral que valoriza o papel das emoções na compreensão das condutas sociais, bem exemplificada nos estudos do vitimizador feliz (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1998). Nas perspectivas mais recentes da psicologia moral tem sido atribuída grande ênfase à necessidade de analisar cognições e emoções nas condutas morais (e.g., Malti & Latzko, 2010; Turiel & Killen, 2010). Apoiados no estudo de Malti, Killen & Gasser (2012) sobre a exclusão social analisámos os julgamentos e as emoções morais de adolescentes em três contextos, etnia africana, etnia cigana e género, numa amostra de 45 adolescentes, com idades entre os 13 e os 19 anos, através da aplicação de uma versão traduzida da Survey Instrument for Measuring Judgments about Emotions about Exclusion (Malti, Killen & Gasser, 2009). Os jovens avaliaram a exclusão étnica como mais incorreta que a exclusão por género mas não foram encontradas diferenças nos juízos e emoções expressas pelos portugueses e estrangeiros. As emoções de culpa, tristeza, vergonha, atribuídas ao excludente confirmam a avaliação negativa da atitude de exclusão. Porém, a emoção normal que revela indiferença expressa que alguns jovens avaliaram positivamente a exclusão. A intensidade emocional intermédia das emoções atribuídas mostra inconsistência com o juízo moral. Relativamente ao excluído existe consenso pois as emoções de tristeza e raiva foram as mais atribuídas. As justificações dos juízos e emoções atribuídos são de tipo diverso, ou seja, argumentos morais de justiça e igualdade, argumentos de inclusão por empatia e argumentos convencionais relativos à coesão intragrupal. A atitude de exclusão não é estritamente moral pois também é vista em função de benefícios para o funcionamento do grupo. A relação complexa entre juízos, emoções e justificações requisita mais investigação de modo a percebermos melhor os processos psicológicos que induzem a conduta social.

The real value of equality

This paper investigates how political theorists and philosophers should understand egalitarian political demands in light of the increasingly important realist critique of much of contemporary political theory and philosophy. It suggests, first, that what Martin O'Neill has called non-intrinsic egalitarianism is, in one form at least, a potentially realistic egalitarian political project and second, that realists may be compelled to impose an egalitarian threshold on state claims to legitimacy under certain circumstances. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological requirements because it does not have to assume an unavailable moral consensus since it can focus on widely acknowledged bads rather than contentious claims about the good. Further, an appropriately formulated non-intrinsic egalitarianism may be a minimum requirement of an appropriately realistic claim by a political order to authoritatively structure some of its members' lives. Without at least a threshold set of egalitarian commitments, a political order seems unable to be transparent to many of its worse off members under a plausible construal of contemporary conditions.

Moving from voluntary euthanasia to non-voluntary euthanasia: equality and compassion

The recent Dutch law legalising active voluntary euthanasia will reignite the euthanasia debate. An illuminating method for evaluating the moral status of a practice is to follow the implications of the practice to its logical conclusion. The argument for compassion is one of the central arguments in favour of voluntary active euthanasia. This argument applies perhaps even more forcefully in relation to incompetent patients. If active voluntary euthanasia is legalised, arguments based on compassion and equality will be directed towards legalising active non-voluntary euthanasia in order to make accelerated termination of death available also to the incompetent. The removal of discrimination against the incompetent has the potential to become as potent a catch-cry as the right to die. However, the legalisation of non-voluntary euthanasia is undesirable. A review of the relevant authorities reveals that there is no coherent and workable "best interests" test which can be invoked to decide whether an incompetent patient is better off dead. This provides a strong reason for not stepping onto the slippery path of permitting active voluntary euthanasia.

Educação Moral e Educação para a Cidadania

A Educação Moral e a Educação para a Cidadania implicam na reflexão sobre qual é a sociedade que queremos. É somente a partir dessa definição que se torna possível discutir a contribuição da instituição escolar no processo de transformação social e, por conseguinte a organização de um ambiente pedagógico visando a formação do cidadão enquanto EU inserido num contexto universal propiciando as condições necessárias ao desenvolvimento de pessoas solidárias, fraternas, com capacidade de discutir, questionar, cooperar e transformar o meio em que vive. Ao estabelecer uma relação entre Educação Moral e Educação para a Cidadania estou priorizando, na ação pedagógica, o trabalho com a construção do conceito de cooperação, igualdade e justiça, conceitos estes que permitirão a compreensão e a construção, pelo sujeito, dos princípios éticos subjacentes aos direitos humanos e ao conceito de democracia enquanto pilares da organização de uma sociedade livre, igualitária e justa.

The unhappy marriage of religion and politics:problems and pitfalls for gender equality

This article explores how religion as a political force shapes and deflects the struggle for gender equality in contexts marked by different histories of nation building and challenges of ethnic diversity, different state–society relations (from the more authoritarian to the more democratic), and different relations between state power and religion (especially in the domain of marriage, family and personal laws). It shows how ‘private’ issues, related to the family, sexuality and reproduction, have become sites of intense public contestation between conservative religious actors wishing to regulate them based on some transcendent moral principle, and feminist and other human rights advocates basing their claims on pluralist and time- and context-specific solutions. Not only are claims of ‘divine truth’ justifying discriminatory practices against women hard to challenge, but the struggle for gender equality is further complicated by the manner in which it is closely tied up with, and inseparable from, struggles for social and economic justice, ethnic/racial recognition, and national self-determination vis-à-vis imperial/global domination.

Negotiating social and moral order in internet relay chat

Although internet chat is a significant aspect of many internet users’ lives, the manner in which participants in quasi-synchronous chat situations orient to issues of social and moral order remains to be studied in depth. The research presented here is therefore at the forefront of a continually developing area of study. This work contributes new insights into how members construct and make accountable the social and moral orders of an adult-oriented Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel by addressing three questions: (1) What conversational resources do participants use in addressing matters of social and moral order? (2) How are these conversational resources deployed within IRC interaction? and (3) What interactional work is locally accomplished through use of these resources? A survey of the literature reveals considerable research in the field of computer-mediated communication, exploring both asynchronous and quasi-synchronous discussion forums. The research discussed represents a range of communication interests including group and collaborative interaction, the linguistic construction of social identity, and the linguistic features of online interaction. It is suggested that the present research differs from previous studies in three ways: (1) it focuses on the interaction itself, rather than the ways in which the medium affects the interaction; (2) it offers turn-by-turn analysis of interaction in situ; and (3) it discusses membership categories only insofar as they are shown to be relevant by participants through their talk. Through consideration of the literature, the present study is firmly situated within the broader computer-mediated communication field. Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and membership categorization analysis were adopted as appropriate methodological approaches to explore the research focus on interaction in situ, and in particular to investigate the ways in which participants negotiate and co-construct social and moral orders in the course of their interaction. IRC logs collected from one chat room were analysed using a two-pass method, based on a modification of the approaches proposed by Pomerantz and Fehr (1997) and ten Have (1999). From this detailed examination of the data corpus three interaction topics are identified by means of which participants clearly orient to issues of social and moral order: challenges to rule violations, ‘trolling’ for cybersex, and experiences regarding the 9/11 attacks. Instances of these interactional topics are subjected to fine-grained analysis, to demonstrate the ways in which participants draw upon various interactional resources in their negotiation and construction of channel social and moral orders. While these analytical topics stand alone in individual focus, together they illustrate different instances in which participants’ talk serves to negotiate social and moral orders or collaboratively construct new orders. Building on the work of Vallis (2001), Chapter 5 illustrates three ways that rule violation is initiated as a channel discussion topic: (1) through a visible violation in open channel, (2) through an official warning or sanction by a channel operator regarding the violation, and (3) through a complaint or announcement of a rule violation by a non-channel operator participant. Once the topic has been initiated, it is shown to become available as a topic for others, including the perceived violator. The fine-grained analysis of challenges to rule violations ultimately demonstrates that channel participants orient to the rules as a resource in developing categorizations of both the rule violation and violator. These categorizations are contextual in that they are locally based and understood within specific contexts and practices. Thus, it is shown that compliance with rules and an orientation to rule violations as inappropriate within the social and moral orders of the channel serves two purposes: (1) to orient the speaker as a group member, and (2) to reinforce the social and moral orders of the group. Chapter 6 explores a particular type of rule violation, solicitations for ‘cybersex’ known in IRC parlance as ‘trolling’. In responding to trolling violations participants are demonstrated to use affiliative and aggressive humour, in particular irony, sarcasm and insults. These conversational resources perform solidarity building within the group, positioning non-Troll respondents as compliant group members. This solidarity work is shown to have three outcomes: (1) consensus building, (2) collaborative construction of group membership, and (3) the continued construction and negotiation of existing social and moral orders. Chapter 7, the final data analysis chapter, offers insight into how participants, in discussing the events of 9/11 on the actual day, collaboratively constructed new social and moral orders, while orienting to issues of appropriate and reasonable emotional responses. This analysis demonstrates how participants go about ‘doing being ordinary’ (Sacks, 1992b) in formulating their ‘first thoughts’ (Jefferson, 2004). Through sharing their initial impressions of the event, participants perform support work within the interaction, in essence working to normalize both the event and their initial misinterpretation of it. Normalising as a support work mechanism is also shown in relation to participants constructing the ‘quiet’ following the event as unusual. Normalising is accomplished by reference to the indexical ‘it’ and location formulations, which participants use both to negotiate who can claim to experience the ‘unnatural quiet’ and to identify the extent of the quiet. Through their talk participants upgrade the quiet from something legitimately experienced by one person in a particular place to something that could be experienced ‘anywhere’, moving the phenomenon from local to global provenance. With its methodological design and detailed analysis and findings, this research contributes to existing knowledge in four ways. First, it shows how rules are used by participants as a resource in negotiating and constructing social and moral orders. Second, it demonstrates that irony, sarcasm and insults are three devices of humour which can be used to perform solidarity work and reinforce existing social and moral orders. Third, it demonstrates how new social and moral orders are collaboratively constructed in relation to extraordinary events, which serve to frame the event and evoke reasonable responses for participants. And last, the detailed analysis and findings further support the use of conversation analysis and membership categorization as valuable methods for approaching quasi-synchronous computer-mediated communication.

"Well, now I'm upset": Moral and social orders in the playground

There is much still to learn about how young children’s membership with peers shapes their constructions of moral and social obligations within everyday activities in the school playground. This paper investigates how a small group of girls, aged four to six years, account for their everyday social interactions in the playground. They were video-recorded as they participated in a pretend game of school. Several days later, a video-recorded excerpt of the interaction was shown to them and invited to comment on what was happening in the video. This conversation was audio-recorded. Drawing on a conversation analysis approach, this chapter shows that, despite their discontent and complaining about playing the game of school, the girls’ actions showed their continued orientation to the particular codes of the game, of ‘no going away’ and ‘no telling’. By making relevant these codes, jointly constructed by the girls during the interview, they managed each other’s continued participation within two arenas of action: the pretend, as a player in a pretend game of school; and the real, as a classroom member of a peer group. Through inferences to explicit and implicit codes of conduct, moral obligations were invoked as the girls attempted to socially exclude or build alliances with others, and enforce their own social position. As well, a shared history that the girls re-constructed has moral implications for present and future relationships. The girls oriented to the history as an interactional resource for accounting for their actions in the pretend game. This paper uncovers how children both participate in, and shape, their everyday social worlds through talk and interaction and the consequences a taken-for-granted activity such as playing school has for their moral and social positions in the peer group.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.