Corruption and Education: Empirical evidence from cross-country micro-data

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy

Free‐riding is often associated with self‐interested behaviour. However if there is a global mixed pollutant, free‐riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self‐interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self‐interested fashion.

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and outlier payment policy

In this article, we analyze the rationale for introducing outlier payments into a prospective payment system for hospitals under adverse selection and moral hazard. The payer has only two instruments: a fixed price for patients whose treatment cost is below a threshold and a cost-sharing rule for outlier patients. We show that a fixed-price policy is optimal when the hospital is sufficiently benevolent. When the hospital is weakly benevolent, a mixed policy solving a trade-off between rent extraction, efficiency, and dumping deterrence must be preferred. We show how the optimal combination of fixed price and partially cost-based payment depends on the degree of benevolence of the hospital, the social cost of public funds, and the distribution of patients severity. [Authors]

Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-Party Moral Enforcement

Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and 'auricular' confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy, exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly. Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

The interest rates and performance of MFIs in the MENA region: is there a moral issue?

Full Text / Article complet

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable

On endogenous cost of altruism

The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Social cost of stray animals

Máster en Economía del Turismo, Transporte y Medio Ambiente

Cost-Effective Force Field Tailored for Solid-Phase Simulations of OLED Materials

A united atom force field is empirically derived by minimizing the difference between experimental and simulated crystal cells and melting temperatures for eight compounds representative of organic electronic materials used in OLEDs and other devices: biphenyl, carbazole, fluorene, 9,9′-(1,3-phenylene)bis(9H-carbazole)-1,3-bis(N-carbazolyl)benzene (mCP), 4,4′-bis(N-carbazolyl)-1,1′-biphenyl (pCBP), phenazine, phenylcarbazole, and triphenylamine. The force field is verified against dispersion-corrected DFT calculations and shown to also successfully reproduce the crystal structure for two larger compounds employed as hosts in phosphorescent and thermally activated delayed fluorescence OLEDs: N,N′-di(1-naphthyl)-N,N′-diphenyl-(1,1′-biphenyl)-4,4′-diamine (NPD), and 1,3,5-tri(1-phenyl-1H-benzo[d]imidazol-2-yl)phenyl (TPBI). The good performances of the force field coupled to the large computational savings granted by the united atom approximation make it an ideal choice for the simulation of the morphology of emissive layers for OLED materials in crystalline or glassy phases.

The moral economic man

Economic behavior is multifaceted and context-dependent. However, the so-called Homo Oeconomicus model states that agents are perfectly rational, self-interest-maximizing beings. This model can be criticized on both empirical and normative grounds. Understanding economic behavior requires a more complex and dynamic framework. In the "I & We" paradigm developed by Amitai Etzioni, economic behavior is co-determined by utility calculations and moral considerations. Two major factors can explain the ethicality of economic behavior; namely, the moral character of the agents and the relative cost of ethical behavior. Economic agents are moral beings, but the ethical fabric of the economy determines which face of the Moral Economic Man predominates.

A formação de personalidades éticas: representações de si e moral

The article presents studies of a current investigation among 75 adolescents from 12 to 15 years old, students of private schools of Campinas city, that have as main objective to notice a possible correspondence among the moral judgments and the representation that individuals have about themselves. From a questionnaire, the studies bring out the representations of these individuals and answer a questioning if they would have an ethical character or not and if these individuals would correspond to their moral judgments. The results point out to a correspondence among those whose self representations are characterized by more evolved ethical contents and judgments related to sensitivity and to the characters feelings involved in the situations described. Such studies validate the intention of this article to discuss the correspondences between ethics (how the individual sees himself/herself) and moral (how he/she judges the situations moral).

Modelos organizadores do pensamento: uma perspectiva de pesquisa sobre o raciocínio moral com adolescentes autores de infração

This article has the aim to expand the perspective of research in the field of morality. We present a proposal of morality study of outlaw teenagers according to Thinking Organizer Models Theory. Through the idea of complexity we search to understand the cognitive process in the elaboration of moral reasoning inside situations of conflict. With this perspective, we developed a research that aimed to identify which organizer models were applied by 20 outlaw male teenagers who abide by social punishment to solve the hypothetical moral conflicts. Through interviews we told them a situation of moral conflict that involved friendship relation, physical aggression and steal. We could identified several models which were joined in three categories. Such models reflected the diversity and regularity that are present inside the elaborated reasoning to solve the conflicts shown by us. We conclude that the diversity of organizer models identified shows the importance of the contents in the construction of moral reasoning.

O jogo e o desenvolvimento moral nas aulas de educação física

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física