Monopolistic product line competition with ex post consumer heterogeneity

We model monopolistic competition in product lines, assuming that consumer heterogeneity is the result rather than the cause of product variety. Our results contradict some well-known policy implications yielded by the standard monopolistic competition framework.

Trade Liberalization, Heterogeneous Firms and Industrial Dynamics

This master thesis studies how trade liberalization affects the firm-level productivity and industrial evolution. To do so, I built a dynamic model that considers firm-level productivity as endogenous to investigate the influence of trade on firm’s productivity and the market structure. In the framework, heterogeneous firms in the same industry operate differently in equilibrium. Specifically, firms are ex ante identical but heterogeneity arises as an equilibrium outcome. Under the setting of monopolistic competition, this type of model yields an industry that is represented not by a steady-state outcome, but by an evolution that rely on the decisions made by individual firms. I prove that trade liberalization has a general positive impact on technological adoption rates and hence increases the firm-level productivity. Besides, this endogenous technology adoption model also captures the stylized facts: exporting firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting counterparts in the same sector. I assume that the number of firms is endogenous, since, according to the empirical literature, the industrial evolution shows considerably different patterns across countries; some industries experience large scale of firms’ exit in the period of contracting market shares, while some industries display relative stable number of firms or gradually increase quantities. The special word “shakeout” is used to describe the dramatic decrease in the number of firms. In order to explain the causes of shakeout, I construct a model where forward-looking firms decide to enter and exit the market on the basis of their state of technology. In equilibrium, firms choose different dates to adopt innovation which generate a gradual diffusion process. It is exactly this gradual diffusion process that generates the rapid, large-scale exit phenomenon. Specifically, it demonstrates that there is a positive feedback between firm’s exit and adoption, the reduction in the number of firms increases the incentives for remaining firms to adopt innovation. Therefore, in the setting of complete information, this model not only generates a shakeout but also captures the stability of an industry. However, the solely national view of industrial evolution neglects the importance of international trade in determining the shape of market structure. In particular, I show that the higher trade barriers lead to more fragile markets, encouraging the over-entry in the initial stage of industry life cycle and raising the probability of a shakeout. Therefore, more liberalized trade generates more stable market structure from both national and international viewpoints. The main references are Ederington and McCalman(2008,2009).

Estímulos fiscais e a interação entre as políticas monetária e fiscal no Brasil

Este trabalho estima, utilizando dados trimestrais de 1999 a 2011, o impacto dinâmico de um estímulo fiscal no Brasil sobre as principais variáveis macroeconômicas Brasileiras. Na estimativa dos impactos permitiu-se que as expectativas dos agentes econômicas fossem afetadas pela existência e probabilidade de alternância de regimes (foram detectados dois regimes) na política monetária do país. Os parâmetros da regra da política monetária, nos dois regimes detectados, foram estimados através de um modelo - composto apenas pela equação da regra da política monetária - que permite uma mudança de regime Markoviana. Os parâmetros do único regime encontrado para a política fiscal foram estimados por um modelo Vetorial de Correção de Erros (Vector Error Correction Model - VEC), composto apenas pelas variáveis pertencentes à regra da política fiscal. Os parâmetros estimados, para os diversos regimes das políticas monetária e fiscal, foram utilizados como auxiliares na calibragem de um modelo de equilíbrio geral estocástico dinâmico (MEGED), com mudanças de regime, com rigidez nominal de preços e concorrência monopolística (como em Davig e Leeper (2011)). Após a calibragem do MEGED os impactos dinâmicos de um estímulo fiscal foram obtidos através de uma rotina numérica (desenvolvida por Davig e Leeper (2006)) que permite obter o equilíbrio dinâmico do modelo resolvendo um sistema de equações de diferenças de primeira ordem expectacionais dinâmicas não lineares. Obtivemos que a política fiscal foi passiva durante todo o período analisado e que a política monetária foi sempre ativa, porém sendo em determinados momentos menos ativa. Em geral, em ambas as combinações de regimes, um choque não antecipado dos gastos do governo leva ao aumento do hiato do produto, aumento dos juros reais, redução do consumo privado e (em contradição com o resultado convencional) redução da taxa de inflação.

Optimal Front Page Advertising

We consider a model of an on-line software market, where an intermediary distributes products from sellers to buyers. When products of sellers are vertically differentiated, an intermediary, earning a proportion of sales, has an incentive to hide the worse product on the second page, and only keep the better product on the front page: that weakens the competition, allowing the seller with the better product to charge a higher price. With heterogeneous visiting costs to the second page, the platform's revenue might improve, but the outcome will become socially suboptimal.

La gestión de relaciones con clientes (CRM): sector de seguridad privada

Esta tesis pretende describir la situación actual del sector de seguridad privada, al implementar y adoptar estrategias de CRM. Con una revisión confiable y el estudio de casos relacionados con el tema, lo cual permitirá constatar la realidad en cuanto la aplicación del modelo, en el sector de seguridad privada, según lo planteado por diversos autores. Los resultados obtenidos permitirán, de este modo, al sector y a sus gerentes, desarrollar estrategias que ayuden a la satisfacción de sus clientes y a la prestación de un mejor servicio. En el campo académico, este estudio servirá como guía teórico-práctica para estudiantes y profesores, de modo que permitirá afianzar conocimientos en cuanto al CRM, al marketing relacional y su uso en el sector de seguridad privada. Según este modelo la información acerca de los clientes, es una información estratégica vital para las organizaciones que ayuda a la toma de decisiones, pronosticar cambios en cuanto a demanda, además de establecer control sobre procesos en los que se involucre el cliente; de modo que la adopción e implementación de CRM, ayude a la empresa, en este caso a las del sector de seguridad privada, a estar atentos a la manera como se interactúa con el cliente y por ende mejorar el servicio, lo que tendrá repercusión en la percepción que tenga de la organización el cliente. De este modo, se ve como en la actualidad las estrategias de CRM definen el rumbo de una empresa, ayudando atraer nuevos clientes y además de esto, ayuda de igual modo a mantener felices a los clientes actuales; lo cual repercute en la demanda o el requerimiento del servicio, y así en una mejor rentabilidad para las empresas del sector. Razones por las que el sector de vigilancia se verá beneficiado por medio de las estrategias del CRM, lo que lo llevara a ofrecer mejores servicios a sus clientes.

Productivity, demand and the home market effect

The causality between international trade and industrialization is still ambiguous. We consider a model of international trade with the Home Market Effect - with differences in income and productivity between sectors and between countries - in order to identify additional channels for determining the effects of international trade on industrialization. Introducing non-homothetic preferences and differences in productivity aids in the interpretation of any apparent paradoxes within international trade, such as the commercial relations between more populated countries like China and India and large economies such as the U.S. Population size, demand composition and productivity levels constitute the three main channels for determining the effects of international trade. Interactions among these channels define the results obtained in terms of industrialization, while welfare levels are always higher in relation to autarky.

Low expectations, low demand : when should the government intervene?

Este trabalho estuda o impacto de diferentes políticas que procuram mitigar falhas de coordenação em um ambiente macroeconômico. Abordamos questões relativas ao timing dos estímulos econômicos. Quando o governo deveria começar a incentivar a economia? Deveria gastar mais para prevenir crises ou para tirar a economia da recessão quando os fundamentos estão melhorando? Como o estímulo deve alterar a complementaridade estratégica? Para responder a estas perguntas, construímos um modelo macroeconômico dinâmico com concorrência monopolística e decisões de investimento sequenciais. Aplicando resultados da literatura teórica de jogos dinâmicos com fricções, selecionamos um único equilíbrio neste modelo, nos dando um instrumental tratável para a análise de políticas. Nossos resultados sugerem que o governo não deveria viesar incentivos nem para a prevenção de crises nem para resgatar a economia quando esta já está em crise.

Investment coordination failures and the confidence channel of fiscal policy

Este trabalho desenvolve um novo "canal de Confiança" da política fiscal e caracteriza a política ótima quando esse canal é levado em consideração. Para esse objetivo, utilizamos um modelo estático com (i) concorrência monopolística, (ii) custos de ajustamento fixos para investir, (iii) complementaridade estratégica devido a informação imperfeita com respeito a produtividade agregada, e (iv) bens privados como substitutos imperfeitos de bens privados. Este arcabouço acomoda a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação nos investimentos, mas apresenta um equilíbrio único. Mostramos que a política fiscal tem efeitos importantes na coordenação. Um aumento dos gastos do governo leva a uma maior demanda por bens privados. Mais importante, este também afeta as expectativas de ordem superior com relação a demanda das demais firmas, que amplifica os efeitos do aumento inicial da demanda devido a complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de investimento. Como as demais firmas estão se deparam com uma demanda maior, espera-se que estas invistam mais, que por sua vez, aumenta a demanda individual de cada firma, que aumenta os incentivos a investir. Denominamos isto como o "canal de confiança" da política fiscal. Sob a ameaça de falhas de coordenação, a política fiscal ótima prescreve produzir além do ponto em que o benefício marginal resultante do consumo de bens públicos é igual ao custo marginal desses bens. Este benefício adicional vem do fato de que a política fiscal pode ampliar a coordenação dos investimentos.

Comparative advantage, heterogeneous firms and variable mark-ups

We develop a model of comparative advantage with monopolistic competition, that incorporates heterogeneous firms and endogenous mark-ups. We analyse how these features vary across countries with different factor endowments, and across markets of different size. In this model we can obtain trade gains via two channels. First, when we open the economy, most productive firms start to export their product, then, they demand more producing factors and wages rises, thus, those firms that are less productive will be forced to stop to produce. Second channel is via endogenous mark-ups, when we open the economy, the competition gets ``tougher'', then, mark-ups falls, thus, those firms that are less productive will stop to produce. We also show that comparative advantage works as a ``third channel'' of trade gains, because, all trade gains results are magnified in comparative advantage industry of both countries. We also make a numerical exercise to see how endogenous variables of the model vary when trade costs fall.

Firms?: heterogeneity, organizations, power and trade

This paper develops a theory which investigates the two-way relationship between the internaI organization of the firm and market competition.We introduce heterogenous firms with internal hierarchies in a Knlgman (1980) monopolistic competition model of trade. The model simultanously determines firms' organizational choices anel heterogeneity across firms in size and proeluctivity.Ve show that intenlational trade, market size and the toughness of competition in international markets incluce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to a reorganization of firms towards more decentralized corporate hierarchies.We show further that trade triggers produetivity growth through inter-firm reallocations towards more produetive firms in whieh CEOs have power in firms. At the same time, however trade- induced organizational changes towards fiattened corporate hierarchies lead to a softening of lnternat.ional competition which may contribute a eountervailing negative effect on seetoral productivity.

ECLAC and the new growth theories

Includes bibliography

Impacto das tarifas em mercados de concorrência monopolística

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Trade Costs, Quality, and The Skill Premium

We develop a monopolistic competition model with nonhomothetic factor input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a multicountry dataset we test and confirm the findings in Schott (2004) of a positive effect of skill abundance on unit values identified with US data. We extend the core model with per unit trade costs leading to the Washington-apples effect that goods shipped over larger distance are of higher quality. The combination of high-quality goods being relatively skill intensive with the Washington-apples effect implies that countries at a larger distance from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model we find that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises the skill premium in a country by about 2.3 percent.

Calibrating a CGE model with NTBs that Incorporates Standard Models of Modern Trade Theory

We propose a way to incorporate NTBs for the four workhorse models of the modern trade literature in computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGE models feature intermediate linkages and thus allow us to study global value chains (GVCs). We show that the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model, the Melitz firm heterogeneity model and the Eaton and Kortum model can be defined as an Armington model with generalized marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand externality. As already known in the literature in both the Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are a function of the amount of factor input bundles. In the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are also a function of the price of the factor input bundles. Lower factor prices raise the number of firms that can enter the market profitably (extensive margin), reducing generalized marginal costs of a representative firm. For the same reason the Melitz model features a demand externality: in a larger market more firms can enter. We implement the different models in a CGE setting with multiple sectors, intermediate linkages, non-homothetic preferences and detailed data on trade costs. We find the largest welfare effects from trade cost reductions in the Melitz model. We also employ the Melitz model to mimic changes in Non tariff Barriers (NTBs) with a fixed cost-character by analysing the effect of changes in fixed trade costs. While we work here with a model calibrated to the GTAP database, the methods developed can also be applied to CGE models based on the WIOD database.

Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Nonoptimal Unbounded Infinite Horizon Economies

In applied work in macroeconomics and finance, nonoptimal infinite horizon economies are often studied in the the state space is unbounded. Important examples of such economies are single vector growth models with production externalities, valued fiat money, monopolistic competition, and/or distortionary government taxation. Although sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Markovian equilibrium are well known for the compact state space case, no similar sufficient conditions exist for unbounded growth. This paper provides such a set of sufficient conditions, and also present a computational algorithm that will prove asymptotically consistent when computing Markovian equilibrium.