The First privatization : selling SOEs and privatizing public monopolies in fascist Italy, 1922-1925

[cat] El primer govern feixista d’Itàlia va aplicar una política de privatització a gran escala entre 1922 i 1925. El govern va privatitzar el monopoli estatal de llumins, el monopoli estatal d’assegurances de vida, va vendre la major part de la xarxa i serveis de telefònica pública a empreses privades, va reprivatitzar el major productor de productes metàl·lics, i va atorgar concessions a empreses privades per construir i explotar autopistes de peatge. Tot i que algunes consideracions ideològiques van poder tenir alguna influència, la privatització va ser usada sobre tot com un instrument polític per construir confiança amb els grans industrials i per augmentar el suport al govern i al Partito Nazionale Fascista. La privatització també va contribuir a equilibrar el pressupost públic, qüestió aquesta que va ser el principal objectiu de la primera fase de la política econòmica feixista.

The First privatization : selling SOEs and privatizing public monopolies in fascist Italy, 1922-1925

[cat] El primer govern feixista d’Itàlia va aplicar una política de privatització a gran escala entre 1922 i 1925. El govern va privatitzar el monopoli estatal de llumins, el monopoli estatal d’assegurances de vida, va vendre la major part de la xarxa i serveis de telefònica pública a empreses privades, va reprivatitzar el major productor de productes metàl·lics, i va atorgar concessions a empreses privades per construir i explotar autopistes de peatge. Tot i que algunes consideracions ideològiques van poder tenir alguna influència, la privatització va ser usada sobre tot com un instrument polític per construir confiança amb els grans industrials i per augmentar el suport al govern i al Partito Nazionale Fascista. La privatització també va contribuir a equilibrar el pressupost públic, qüestió aquesta que va ser el principal objectiu de la primera fase de la política econòmica feixista.

Controlling regional monopolies in the natural gas industry: the role of transport capacity

This paper analyzes some optimal fiscal, pricing, and capacity investment policies for controlling regional monopoly power in the natural gas industry. By letting the set of control instruments available to the social planner vary, we provide a characterization of the technological and demand conditions under which “excess” capacity in the transport network arises in response to the loss of the two other control instruments, namely, transfers and pricing. Hence, the analysis yields some insights on an economy’s incentives to invest in infrastructures for the purpose of integrating geographically isolated markets.

Investment in transport capacity and regulation of regional monopolies in natural gas commodity markets

This paper develops a model of the regulator-regulated firm relationship in a regional natural gas commodity market which can be linked to a competitive market by a pipeline. We characterize normative policies under which the regulator, in addition to setting the level of the capacity of the pipeline, regulates the price of gas, under asymmetric information on the firm’s technology, and may (or may not) operate (two-way) transfers between consumers and the firm. We then focus on capacity and investigate how its level responds to the regulator’s taking account of the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints. The analysis yields some insights on the role that transport capacity investments may play as an instrument to improve the efficiency of geographically isolated markets.

Monopolies life cycle, bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian growth

This paper analyzes the links between the internaI organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internaI collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, getting more bureaucratized and Iess efficient over time. vVeak creative destruction in the economy facilitates informal collusion inside firms and exacerbates bureaucratization. As bureaucratization affects the firms' profitability and the return to innovation, stationary equilibrium growth depends in turn on the efficiency of collusive side-contracts within firms.

Trading monopolies in West Africa : a protest against territorial concessions

by E. D. M.

Proposed balanced budget constitutional amendments [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, first session ... October 15, November 17, and November 18, 1987.

"Serial no. 85."

Clayton act An act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes.

Caption title.

Omnibus Maritime Regulatory Reform Revitalization and Reorganization Act of 1980 : hearing before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, on H.R. 6899 ... June 5, 1980.

Item 1020.

A sketch of the medical monopolies, with a plan of reform. Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord John Russell ...

Mode of access: Internet.

A glance at New York: embracing the city government, theatres, hotels, churches, mobs, monopolies, learned professions, newspapers, rogues, dandies, fires and firemen, water and other liquids, & c., & c. ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Problems of to-day; a discussion of protective tarriffs, taxation, and monopolies.

Mode of access: Internet.