Money laundering and FATF compliance by the international community

This paper examines the anti-money laundering systems of Australia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA), the extent to which they have implemented the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and how compliance with these recommendations is affected by local cultural and economic factors. The paper makes use of FATF evaluation reports to compare the countries’ compliance; it examines some of the underlying cultural considerations and culture-specific ethical issues that affect the extent of compliance, and how cultural and ethical considerations may affect good governance. The findings indicate that the UK and the USA are the most advanced with regards to their compliance with the FATF recommendations and Australia and the UAE less so. The UAE is in particular found to be least compliant. We relate this finding to previous work on how a country’s legal and financial systems develop in line with its religion, culture and socio-economic situation, and examine how such local factors have affected the UAE’s financial and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems. This research will be of interest to policy-makers and government agencies involved in addressing money laundering and its successful detection and prosecution.

Match-fixing and Money-laundering

his essay is premised on the following: a conspiracy to fix or otherwise manipulate the outcome of a sporting event for profitable purpose. That conspiracy is in turn predicated on the conspirators’ capacity to: (a) ensure that the fix takes place as pre-determined; (b) manipulate the betting markets that surround the sporting event in question; and (c) collect their winnings undetected by either the betting industry’s security systems or the attention of any national regulatory body or law enforcement agency.

Unlike many essays on this topic, this contribution does not focus on the “fix”– part (a) of the above equation. It does not seek to explain how or why a participant or sports official might facilitate a betting scam through either on-field behaviour that manipulates the outcome of a game or by presenting others with privileged inside information in advance of a game. Neither does this contribution seek to give any real insight into the second part of the above equation: how such conspirators manipulate a sports betting market by playing or laying the handicap or in-play or other offered betting odds. In fact, this contribution is not really about the mechanics of sports betting or match fixing at all; rather it is about the sometimes under explained reason why match fixing has reportedly become increasingly attractive as of late to international crime syndicates. That reason relates to the fact that given the traditional liquidity of gambling markets, sports betting can, and has long been, an attractively accessible conduit for criminal syndicates to launder the proceeds of crime. Accordingly, the term “winnings”, noted in part (c) of the above equation, takes on an altogether more nefarious meaning.

This essay’s attempt to review the possible links between match fixing in sport, gambling-related “winnings” and money laundering is presented in four parts.

First, some context will be given to what is meant by money laundering, how it is currently policed internationally and, most importantly, how the growth of online gambling presents a unique set of vulnerabilities and opportunities to launder the proceeds of crime. The globalisation of organised crime, sports betting and transnational financial services now means that money laundering opportunities have moved well beyond a flutter on the horses at your local racetrack or at the roulette table of your nearest casino. The growth of online gambling platforms means that at a click it is possible for the proceeds of crime in one jurisdiction to be placed on a betting market in another jurisdiction with the winnings drawn down and laundered in a third jurisdiction and thus the internationalisation of gambling-related money laundering threatens the integrity of sport globally.

Second, and referring back to the infamous hearings of the US Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organised Crime in Interstate Commerce of the early 1950s, (“the Kefauver Committee”), this article will begin by illustrating the long standing interest of organised crime gangs – in this instance, various Mafia families in the United States – in money laundering via sports gambling-related means.

Third, and using the seminal 2009 report “Money Laundering through the Football Sector” by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, an inter-governmental body established in 1989 to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system), this essay seeks to assess the vulnerabilities of international sport to match fixing, as motivated in part by the associated secondary criminality of tax evasion and transnational economic crime.

The fourth and concluding parts of the essay spin from problems to possible solutions. The underlying premise here is that heretofore there has been an insularity to the way that sports organisations have both conceptualised and sought to address the match fixing threat e.g., if we (in sport) initiate player education programmes; establish integrity units; enforce codes of conduct and sanctions strictly; then our integrity or brand should be protected. This essay argues that, although these initiatives are important, the source and process of match fixing is beyond sport’s current capacity, as are the possible solutions.

Money laundering and the shadow economy in Kazakhstan

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to assess and highlight the approach taken towards the legal control of illicit money laundering taken in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in particular, the role played by an amnesty on the legalisation of illicit funds. This is particularly important as a basis for a wider discussion about the proper limits of the “criminalising” approaches commonly taken in anti-money laundering regulations. Design/methodology/approach The discussion and evaluation in the paper is based upon a conceptual analysis of the money laundering regime in Kazakhstan, in particular, the legal framework and policies of implementation adopted. Findings The paper demonstrates that the problems that are posed by the shadow economy in post-Soviet transition societies can make the blanket criminalisation of money laundering a self-defeating approach, unless accompanied by measures which allow for the achievement of “market-constituting” effects. Research limitations/implications The paper draws on experience and practice in one jurisdiction only (Kazakhstan); it also limits its focus to one particular example of a money laundering amnesty policy. Both of these limitations, therefore, suggest avenues for further comparative research. Originality/value The paper’s conclusions about the interactions between the shadow economies of transitional societies and the global anti-money laundering agenda have wider application in assessments of international law in this area.

Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism : some thoughts on the impact of customer due diligence measures on financial exclusion

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between anti-money laundering (“AML”) and combating of financing of terrorism (“CFT”) customer due diligence (“CDD”) measures in the financial services industry, and exclusion from financial services.
Design/methodology/approach – An introduction to the concept of financial exclusion is provided as well as an overview of international AML/CFT CDD standards. The paper highlights a softening of national CDD measures in South Africa and the UK to lessen the impact on financial exclusion.
Findings – Countries should consider the impact that CDD requirements may have on financial exclusion when they design their AML/CFT systems.
Research limitations/implications – Multi-discilinary research is required to improve the understanding of the broader interaction between AML/CFT objectives, financial exclusion and economic development, especially in countries with a large informal economy.
Practical implications – CDD requirements may unnecessarily exacerbate financial exclusion if they are not formulated with care to reflect the reality of the particular country setting.
Originality/value – The paper offers insights into the international standards resulting to the identification of clients and the experiences in the UK and South Africa regarding the implementation of these standards on financial exclusion.

Client identification and money laundering control : perspectives on the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001

The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA) compels certain persons and institutions (defined as "accountable institutions'') to identify and verify the identity of a new client before any transaction may be concluded or any business relationship is established.1 Accountable institutions are listed in schedule ¹ to FICA and include banks, brokers, financial advisers, insurance companies, attorneys and estate agents. This duty to identify new clients came into effect on 30 June 2003. However, FICA also requires a similar procedure to be followed in respect of all current clients. Current clients are those with whom an accountable institution had business relationships on 30 June 2003.² After 30 June 2004 an institution may not conclude a transaction in the course of its business relationship with an unidentified current client, until it has established and verified that client's identity as prescribed. An institution that concludes any transaction in contravention of this prohibition, commits an offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding R10 million or to imprisonment of up to 15 years.³

The majority of accountable institutions and their clients failed to meet the June 2004 current client identification deadline.4 This failure posed serious economic and legal risks. With a few days to spare, the minister of finance granted a partial and temporary exemption in respect of these requirements. This article explores the statutory scheme for identification and re-identification of clients and some of the practical problems that were encountered. The June 2004 exemptions from these requirements are also considered and proposals for law reform are made.

The discussion of the FICA identification scheme necessitates the following brief overview of the international and South African money laundering control framework.

1 s 21(1) of FICA.
2 s 21(2) of FICA. See also s 82(2)(b).
3 s 46(2) of FICA read with s 68(1) of FICA.

Money laundering trends in South Africa

Reports a study by the Centre for the Study of Economic Crime at Rand Afrikaans University into the characteristics of money laundering schemes in South Africa; these were discussed at a workshop on December 5 2001. Outlines the 1998 Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), the 1992 Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act and their general money laundering provisions, including negligence and intent, defence and penalties; also the racketeering provisions of POCA. Moves on to the reporting of suspicious transactions, where the POCA provisions will be repealed by the new Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA); this covers general obligations, secrecy and confidentiality, penalties, preventing tipping-off, and reporting statistics. Gives examples of the schemes themselves, which fall into broad themes: purchase of goods and properties, abuse of businesses and financial institutions, cash and currency, and the informal sector; case studies include S v Dustigar, Motsepe v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, S v Van Zyl, S v Caswell, and Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate.

Money laundering : of watchdogs, bloodhounds and guide dogs

June 2003 was a very important month from the perspective of money laundering control. The main administrative money laundering control duties took effect on 30 June 2003, thereby changing many of the business practices that were part of the South African business landscape. In the same month, South Africa gained membership of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which is the main international standard-setting body in respect of money laundering control. At the meeting where South Africa’s membership was endorsed, the FATF also adopted a new and more stringent set of money laundering control standards that all countries will have to meet. As South Africa is implementing its money laundering control legislation, thought must therefore be given to amendments that may be required to comply with the new set of international standards. In this state of flux, accountants and auditors have a very important role to play. Not only do they have to comply with the legislation but they will also be required to provide guidance to those clients who are bewildered by the new requirements. Obviously auditors will also have to consider non-compliance with these laws when planning and carrying out an audit.

The money laundering risk posed by low-risk financial products in South Africa : findings and guidelines

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level and nature of criminal abuse of financial products that are classified as posing a low anti-money laundering/combating of financing of terrorists (AML/CFT) risk in South Africa to determine the effectiveness of the simplified due diligence measures that apply to these products.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents empirical research on the views of bank officials and law enforcement officials regarding the criminal abuse of South African financial products that are subject to simplified customer due diligence controls.

Findings – South Africa's AML/CFT laws allow certain deposit-taking institutions and money remitters to implement simplified customer due diligence measures in relation to specific low-risk products that are mainly designed to allow previously unbanked persons to access financial services. The paper finds that the products have been abused by criminals but that the incidence of such abuse and the amounts involved are low. The paper investigates possible weaknesses in the current system that allow limited criminal abuse to occur. It concludes with a number of guidelines that emerge from the study and are of value to regulators that wish to implement a similar system.

Originality/value – The South African AML/CFT scheme in relation to low-risk products is of interest to many international regulators that are grappling with the interplay between effective AML/CFT controls and the impact of strict controls on the ability of socially and economically excluded persons to access appropriate financial services. This paper provides evidence that appropriately designed controls can facilitate financial inclusion while limiting the risk of criminal abuse.

Identifying and managing low money laundering risk : perspectives on FATF's risk-based guidance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate Financial Action Task Force (FATF)'s risk-based guidance to combat money laundering and terrorist financing to determine its approach to the identification and management of low-risk providers, products and transactions.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper analyses the relevant FATF recommendations and its guidance notes and reflects on key questions for regulators and financial institutions.

Findings – FATF has not defined “risk” for purposes of the risk-based approach. The absence of a clear definition complicates the identification of low-risk products. FATF do provide an example of a risk matrix that can be used to identify low-risk banks, but the example is based on assumptions and generalisations that are not sustainable. In addition, it identifies certain low-value transactions as “low risk” transactions. The paper reflects on the role of value as an indicator of risk and concludes with a number of suggestions to clarify the conceptual framework.

Originality/value – Low-risk products and transactions are often overlooked because the risk-based approach focuses attention on high-risk matters. Low-risk products are however crucial to the efforts to increase financial inclusion. The paper identifies gaps in the current conceptual framework and indicates ways in which they can be addressed.