Strategic Delegations in Monetary Unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Monetary unions and the transaction cost savings of a single currency

This paper studies the transaction cost savings of moving froma multi-currency exchange system to a single currency one. Theanalysis concentrates exclusively on the transaction andprecautionary demand for money and abstracts from any othermotives to hold currency. A continuous-time, stochastic Baumol-like model similar to that in Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) isgeneralized to include several currencies and calibrated to fitEuropean data. The analysis implies an upper bound for thesavings associated with reductions of transaction costs derivedfrom the European Monetary Union of approximately 0.6\% of theCommunity GDP. Additionally, the magnitudes of the brokeragefee and the volatility of transactions, whose estimation hastraditionally been difficult to address empirically, areapproximated for Europe.

Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamicsof deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

EU-15 sovereign governments’ cost of borrowing after seven years of monetary union

Yield spreads over 10-year German government securities of the EU-15 countries converged dramatically in the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. In this paper, we investigate the relative influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on their behaviour. Our conclusions suggest that in EMU-countries the relative importance of domestic risk factors (both credit and liquidity risk factors) is higher than that of international factors, which appear to play a secondary but significant role in non-EMU countries.

Specialisation in Europe and asymmetric shocks: potential risks of EMU

Most optimistic views, based on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) literature, have concluded that the probability of asymmetric shocks to occur at anational level will tend to diminish in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)as a result of the intensification of the integration process during the most recent years. Therefore, since Economic Geography Theories predict a higherspecialisation of regions, it is expected that asymmetric shocks will increase.Previous studies have examined to what extent asymmetric shocks have been relevant in the past using, mainly, static measures of asymmetries such as the correlation coefficients between series of shocks previously calculated from astructural VAR model (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992).In this paper, we study the evolution of manufacturing specific asymmetries in Europe from a dynamic point of view (applying the modelproposed by Haldane and Hall, 1991) in order to obtain new evidence about potential risks of EMU.

Efectos regionales de la política monetaria : implicaciones para los países de la zona euro

De acuerdo con la teoría de las áreas monetàrias óptimas,los shocks asimétricos tienen un papel fundamental en la determinación de los beneficios y los costes derivados del establecimiento de una área monetaria. En este sentido, diferentes estudios recientes señalan una importante reducción del grado de asimetría de los shocks en términos reales a lo largo de los últimos años entre los países europeos como consecuencia de la mayor coordinación de las políticas económicas y de la aproximación de las estructuras productivas. De todas maneras, una de las cuestiones clave en el nuevo entorno económico, y que no ha sido demasiado considerada a la literatura reciente, es el posible papel desestabilitzador de la política monetaria común como consecuencia de las diferencias en los mecanismos de transmisión de la política monetaria en los distintos países y regiones de la Zona Euro. En este trabajo se considera la mencionada cuestión desde un punto de vista teórico y se analiza empíricamente la existencia de diferencias regionales en los efectos de la política monetaria llevada a término en España a lo largo de los últimos años con la finalidad d identificar los principales determinantes de esta asimetría en el ámbito europeo

Efectos regionales de la política monetaria : implicaciones para los países de la zona euro

De acuerdo con la teoría de las áreas monetàrias óptimas,los shocks asimétricos tienen un papel fundamental en la determinación de los beneficios y los costes derivados del establecimiento de una área monetaria. En este sentido, diferentes estudios recientes señalan una importante reducción del grado de asimetría de los shocks en términos reales a lo largo de los últimos años entre los países europeos como consecuencia de la mayor coordinación de las políticas económicas y de la aproximación de las estructuras productivas. De todas maneras, una de las cuestiones clave en el nuevo entorno económico, y que no ha sido demasiado considerada a la literatura reciente, es el posible papel desestabilitzador de la política monetaria común como consecuencia de las diferencias en los mecanismos de transmisión de la política monetaria en los distintos países y regiones de la Zona Euro. En este trabajo se considera la mencionada cuestión desde un punto de vista teórico y se analiza empíricamente la existencia de diferencias regionales en los efectos de la política monetaria llevada a término en España a lo largo de los últimos años con la finalidad d identificar los principales determinantes de esta asimetría en el ámbito europeo

Specialisation in Europe and asymmetric shocks: potential risks of EMU

Most optimistic views, based on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) literature, have concluded that the probability of asymmetric shocks to occur at anational level will tend to diminish in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)as a result of the intensification of the integration process during the most recent years. Therefore, since Economic Geography Theories predict a higherspecialisation of regions, it is expected that asymmetric shocks will increase.Previous studies have examined to what extent asymmetric shocks have been relevant in the past using, mainly, static measures of asymmetries such as the correlation coefficients between series of shocks previously calculated from astructural VAR model (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992).In this paper, we study the evolution of manufacturing specific asymmetries in Europe from a dynamic point of view (applying the modelproposed by Haldane and Hall, 1991) in order to obtain new evidence about potential risks of EMU.

International debt deleveraging

I provide a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of financiallyintegrated countries. During an episode of international deleveraging world consumptiondemand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save.If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can depreciate their nominalexchange rate to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associatedwith debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union thischannel of adjustment is shut off, and therefore the falls in consumption demand and inthe world interest rate are amplified. Hence, monetary unions are especially prone tohit the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and enter a liquidity trap duringdeleveraging. In a liquidity trap deleveraging gives rise to a union-wide recession, which isparticularly severe in high-debt countries. The model suggests several policy interventionsthat mitigate the negative impact of deleveraging on output in monetary unions.