Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Stabilization constraints from different-average public debt levels in a Monetary Union with country-size asymmetry

In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cycle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects stabilization welfare. We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to noncooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves directly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation, higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.

Effects of a monetary union on a small peripheral country: Stabilization and competitiveness in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Discretionary Policy in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

Towards economic and monetary union: changing trends in payment systems for new european members

The objective of this paper is preciselyto study the evolution of payment systems within the accession countries between 1996 and 2003 and compare them with those of the E.U. and the Eurozone countries

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

EU-15 sovereign governments’ cost of borrowing after seven years of monetary union

Yield spreads over 10-year German government securities of the EU-15 countries converged dramatically in the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. In this paper, we investigate the relative influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on their behaviour. Our conclusions suggest that in EMU-countries the relative importance of domestic risk factors (both credit and liquidity risk factors) is higher than that of international factors, which appear to play a secondary but significant role in non-EMU countries.

European payment system and monetary union

We make a comparative study of payment systems for E.U. -fifteen countries for the 1996-2002 period. Special attention is paid to the introduction of the new European single currency. The overall trend in payments is for a move from cash to noncash payment instruments, although electronic instruments are not widely used yet. We find a significant impact from the introduction of the new banknotes and coins on card use

Dynamic Hedging with Credit Default Swaps: Empirical Evidence from the European Monetary Union

This thesis investigates the effectiveness of time-varying hedging during the financial crisis of 2007 and the European Debt Crisis of 2010. In addition, the seven test economies are part of the European Monetary Union and these countries are in different economical states. Time-varying hedge ratio was constructed using conditional variances and correlations, which were created by using multivariate GARCH models. Here we have used three different underlying portfolios: national equity markets, government bond markets and the combination of these two. These underlying portfolios were hedged by using credit default swaps. Empirical part includes the in-sample and out-of-sample analysis, which are constructed by using constant and dynamic models. Moreover, almost in every case dynamic models outperform the constant ones in the determination of the hedge ratio. We could not find any statistically significant evidence to support the use of asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model. In addition, our findings are in line with prior literature and support the use of time-varying hedge ratio. Finally, we found that in some cases credit default swaps are not suitable instruments for hedging and they act more as a speculative instrument.

Towards economic and monetary union: changing trends in payment systems for new european members

The objective of this paper is precisely to study the evolution of payment systems within the accession countries between 1996 and 2003 and compare them with those of the E.U. and the Eurozone countries

European payment system and monetary union

We make a comparative study of payment systems for E.U. -fifteen countries for the 1996-2002 period. Special attention is paid to the introduction of the new European single currency. The overall trend in payments is for a move from cash to noncash payment instruments, although electronic instruments are not widely used yet. We find a significant impact from the introduction of the new banknotes and coins on card use