Representing "Recursive" Default Logic in Modal Logic

The "recursive" definition of Default Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the "recursive" fixed-point equation of Default Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning of the fixed-point is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original "recursive" definition of Default Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults.

Representing Reflective Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Reflective Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Reflective Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Reflective Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such defaults to produce quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since all the laws of First Order Logic hold and since both the Barcan Formula and its converse hold.

Representing Default Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Default Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Default Logic with an initial set of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Default Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such defaults to produce quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan Formula and its converse hold.

Representing Autoepistemic Logic in Modal Logic

The nonmonotonic logic called Autoepistemic Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5. Specifically, it is proven that a set of sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Autoepistemic Logic with an initial set of axioms if and only if the meaning or rather disquotation of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular modal functor of the meaning of that initial set of sentences. This result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems for Modal Logic and unlike the original Autoepistemic Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where quantified variables may be shared across the scope of modal expressions thus allowing the derivation of quantified consequences. Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such quantifiers since both the Barcan formula and its converse hold.

Aristotle’s modal syllogistic and first-order modal logic

In Prior Analytics 1.1–22, Aristotle develops his proof system of non-modal and modal propositions. This system is given in the language of propositions, and Aristotle is concerned with establishing some properties and relations that the expressions of this language enjoy. However, modern scholarship has found some of his results inconsistent with positions defended elsewhere. The set of rules of inference of this system has also caused perplexity: there does not seem to be a single interpretation that validates all the rules which Aristotle is explicitly committed to using in his proofs. Some commentators have argued that these and other problems cannot be successfully addressed from the viewpoint of the traditional, ‘first-order’ interpretation of Aristotle’s syllogistic, whereby propositions are taken to involve quantification over individuals only. Accordingly, this interpretation not only is inadequate for formal analysis, but also stems from a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s ideas about quantification. On the contrary, in this study I purport to vindicate the adequacy and plausibility of the first-order interpretation. Together with some assumptions about the language of propositions and an appropriate regimentation, the first-order interpretation yields promising solutions to many of the problems raised by the modal syllogistic. Thus, I present a reconstruction of the language of propositions and a formal interpretation thereof which will prove respectful and responsive to most of the views endorsed by Aristotle in the ‘modal’ chapters of the Analytics.