A crise financeira de 2008 e seus impactos na economia brasileira: uma análise sob a perspectiva de Minsky

Diante do colapso financeiro de 2008, este trabalho retoma a teoria econômica proposta por Hyman P. Minsky com o objetivo de esclarecer as circunstâncias que propiciaram uma crise financeira tão profunda. A estrutura analítica de Minsky é marcada pela Hipótese da Instabilidade Financeira, a qual aponta para fatores endógenos ao próprio sistema capitalista como o principal causador de instabilidades financeiras. Este processo, caracterizado principalmente por um avanço desfavorável no nível de endividamento dos agentes, constrói um ciclo de estágios que pode se desenvolver para uma crise financeira ou um colapso sistêmico, definidos como “Momento Minsky” e “Colapso Minsky”. Este cenário descrito por Minsky, também analisado à luz de teorias mais recentes como as de Gary A. Dymski e Alessandro Vercelli, é conhecido por “ciclo minskyano”. Ao adotar estes preceitos da análise teórica de Minsky, é possível visualizar como o processo de desregulamentação e fragilização financeira dos Estados Unidos nas décadas de 1980 e 1990 proveram condições para a crise do subprime e, posteriormente, o colapso financeiro de 2008. De maneira similar, é possível observar que a análise teórica de Minsky também é aplicável à crise que afeta a economia brasileira no final de 2008. A fragilização financeira que se inicia no Brasil poucos anos antes da crise, acentuada no setor exportador de commodities, cria a condição para o “momento Minsky brasileiro”, demonstrando que apesar das falhas da análise teórica de Minsky, que supõe uma economia fechada com características da economia estadunidense, é possível visualizar uma relação de causa e efeito da recente crise financeira com a teoria minskyana.

Minsky on "Big Government"

This paper objective is to assess, in light of the main works of Minsky, his view and analysis of what he called the "Big Government" as that huge institution which, in parallels with the "Big Bank" was capable of ensuring stability in the capitalist system and regulate its inherently unstable financial system in mid-20th century. In this work, we analyze how Minsky proposes an active role for the government in a complex economic system flawed by financial instability.

Finance, development and the Chinese entrepreneurial state: A Schumpeter-Keynes - Minsky approach

ABSTRACTThe paper's central claim is that China's speed and ability to leapfrog its peer-nations in the last three decades stems, largely, from the fact that it is a fully developed Entrepreneurial State (ES). The discussion seeks to dig deeper on ES as a bridging concept that fits well with the Schumpeter-Keynes-Minsky analytical framework and one that is particularly appropriated analyzing contemporary China's development trajectory. Although rooted in a historical perspective and using historical examples, the main purpose of the paper is analytical, not descriptive.

Fragilidade financeira externa, a partir de Minsky, e os desequilíbrios externos no Plano Real (1994-98)

O presente trabalho é uma aplicação da estrutura analítica de Minsky às relações financeiras entre países, no atual contexto de abertura financeira das economias emergentes. Constrói-se assim uma tipologia das posturas financeiras para países e do modelo dos dois sistemas de preços com financiamento externo. A separação da dinâmica dos diferentes ativos enseja a ocorrência de ciclos de ativos e/ou de investimentos, dados pelo influxo de capitais nas economias em desenvolvimento e se analisa a possibilidade de crises endógenas, a partir da estratégia adotada pelos países, de endividamento externo com uma oferta de crédito que tende a se tornar crescentemente menos elástica. O instrumental teórico é aplicado à experiência do Plano Real e procura-se averiguar quais foram as condições intrínsecas da política econômica e da conjuntura externa para a crise cambial ocorrida em janeiro de 1999.

A crise financeira de 2008: uma reflexão a partir da teoria da fragilidade financeira de Hyman Minsky

This paper aims to use the theoretical framework developed by Hyman P. Minsky for understanding the concept of financial fragility observed in the capitalist system. It is intended to clarify the concept of intrinsic instability to which capitalism is subject, which is responsible for generating more economic cycles - periods of prosperity and crashes that affect global economies - particularly the one initiated in the United States in 2008. Thus, we made theoretical analysis of the theory of economic cycles and financial instability beyond historical reviews on the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression

Uma crise à lá Minsky?: uma análise da crise financeira sob a ótica de Hyman Minsky

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

"Pää"

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

Innovation, competition and financial vulnerability in economic development

The financial sector has been viewed traditionally as either providing the "oil" for the "wheels of commerce" or as a parasite on the real sector of the economy where real productivity gains provide for increasing real wages and per capita incomes. The present paper takes a different route and attempts to an analysis of financial institutions on a par with the production sector of the economy. It also develops a link which amalgamates "the knowledge-based" perspective on firms' operations with Schumpeterian financial leverage to exploit productivity enhancing innovations, and Minsky's tendency towards financial fragility. The analysis also leads to some policy recommendations concerning financial regulation, risk management and financial institution's building.

Liquidez internacional e ciclo reflexo: algumas observações para a América Latina

International liquidity and reflex cycle: some observations to Latin America. The international financial instability of the 1990 has been analysed in several occasions on Minskyan perspectives. The paper is based on this theoretical approach and intends to demonstrate that the financial fragility hypothesis is very useful to the analysis of the cycle in peripheral economies, which real performance is associated to the availability of international liquidity. The analysis is based on three Latin American countries: Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.

As famílias na abordagem Minskyana: aspectos e desdobramentos do endividamento das famílias americanas no século XX e início do XXI

RESUMO Este artigo busca retratar a inserção financeira das famílias e suas implicações para a dinâmica do sistema econômico, tendo em vista a importância assumida pelo endividamento das famílias norte-americanas nas últimas décadas, em particular, na crise de 2007 nos EUA. Frente às transformações da economia norte-americana e de seu sistema financeiro, é proposto o resgate das contribuições da economia monetária de Keynes e da visão financeira de Minsky para compreender de forma adequada o comportamento das famílias, tanto na dimensão dos fluxos de renda e gastos, quanto nas decisões sobre estoques de ativos e passivos sujeitos à volatilidade e incerteza.

A política monetária recente: alguns aspectos teóricos

Esta Pesquisa tem como Objetivo Apresentar uma Avaliação das Práticas Presentes da Política Monetária Conhecidas como Simples Regras Monetárias e Metas Inflacionárias e Discutir o Contexto Histórico de seu Surgimento. Procurará Mostrar que Tais Praticas Implicam Também o Conceito de Endogeneidade Monetária Análogo a Idéia de Alguns Economistas como Kaldor, Davidson, Minsky e Outros, Mas que À Diferença Destes Autores, Fazem a Suposição Extrema de que a Política Monetária Embora não Seja Neutra a Curto Prazo é Neutra no Longo Prazo. esta Hipótese, com suas Implicações de Política, Pode ser Criticada em Várias Instâncias, o que Será Desenvolvido neste Trabalho.

A política monetária recente - alguns aspectos teóricos

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo apresentar uma avaliação das práticas presentes da política monetária conhecidas como simples regras monetárias e metas inflacionárias e discutir o contexto histórico de seu surgimento. Procurará mostrar que tais praticas implicam também o conceito de endogeneidade monetária análogo a idéia de alguns economistas como Kaldor, Davidson, Minsky e outros, mas que à diferença destes autores, fazem a suposição extrema de que a política monetária embora não seja neutra a curto prazo é neutra no longo prazo. Esta hipótese, com suas implicações de política, pode ser criticada em várias instâncias, o que será desenvolvido neste trabalho.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.