Expropriation of minority shareholders and payout policy

This paper studies the payout policy of Italian firms controlled by large majority shareholders (controlled firms). The paper reports that a firm’s share of dividends in total payout (dividends plus repurchases) is negatively related to the size of the cash flow stake of the firm’s controlling shareholder and positively associated with the wedge between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights. These findings are consistent with the substitute model of payout. One of the implications of this model is that controlled firms with weak corporate governance set-ups, in which controlling shareholders have strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, tend to prefer dividends over repurchases when disgorging cash.

Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance (summary section only)

“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.

Multiple large shareholders in corporate governance

Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.

A korlátolt felelősségű társaság tagjait megillető individuális és kisebbségi jogok szabályozása és joggyakorlata = Minority and individual rights in Ltd.

A tanulmány a magyar kis- és középvállalkozások társasági formájában a Kft-ben elemzi az individuális és csoportos jogokat. Az optimális társasági jogi szabályozásban két egymással ellentétes elvnek egyszerre kell érvényesülni. Érvényesülni kell annak az elvnek, amely szerint a nagyobb tőkével rendelkező nagyobb kockázatot vállalók nagyobb befolyással rendelkeznek a társaság ügyeiben, de érvényesülni kell annak az elvnek is, hogy a kisebb tőkével rendelkező társasági tagok nem kerülhetnek kiszolgáltatott helyzetbe. A kisebb tulajdonosok megfelelő védelme elősegíti a társaságok tőkevonzó képességét. A tanulmány földolgozza az individuális és kisebbségi jogok bírósági gyakorlatát. ----- The paper examines individual and group rights in small and medium-sized enterprises (Ltds). In case of an optimal business law regulation two contradictory principles should be considered in the same time. The first principle states that members who take more risk by investing more capital should have more influence over the company’s affairs. However, according to the second principle, minority shareholders can not suffer unfair prejudice. Proper protection of minority shareholders may facilitate the company’s capital-attractive ability. The paper reviews court practice routines on individual and minority rights.

Optimal monitoring in family-owned companies? Evidence from Asia

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. Research Findings: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Board of Directors, Family Firms, Monitoring.

In search of good governance for Asian family listed companies : a case study on Hong Kong

Discusses the importation of Western concepts of corporate governance into Hong Kong where many companies are family companies to which Asian culture is more familiar. Considers different models of corporate governance and questions the application of Western structures to family owned companies. Examines the weaknesses inherent in the typical structure of Asian companies, particularly from the point of view of minority shareholders. Suggests that a system of governance based on Confucian philosophy may be more effective in Hong Kong.

The impact of the Malaysian code on corporate governance: compliance, institutional investors and stock performance

In 2001, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) became an integral part of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules, which requires all listed firms to disclose the extent of compliance with the MCCG. Our panel analysis of 440 firms from 1999 to 2002 finds that corporate governance reform in Malaysia has been successful, with a significant improvement in governance practices. The relationship between ownership by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and corporate governance has strengthened during the period subsequent to the reform, in line with the lead role taken by the EPF in establishing the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group. The implementation of MCCG has had a substantial effect on shareholders' wealth, increasing stock prices by an average of about 4.8%. Although there is no evidence that politically connected firms perform better, political connections do have a significantly negative effect on corporate governance, which is mitigated by institutional ownership.

Family representatives in family firms

Research Question/Issue: Family control in family firms can extend beyond the direct involvement of family members, but identifying these mechanisms is difficult in most markets. We utilize unique disclosures made by Taiwanese firms to examine the role played by family representatives in listed family firms. Family representatives are non-family members that represent the controlling family’s indirect shareholdings in the firm. We examine whether family representatives are used in the same manner as family members and whether they provide net benefits or costs to shareholders. Research Findings/Insights: In our sample of listed family firms, we find that omitting family representatives understates the influence of controlling families by 46 percent. We show that family representatives are associated with net costs to shareholders, but to a lesser extent than family members. We also find that controlling families use family members and family representatives differently. Family members are more involved in older family firms and in firms founded by the family. Family representatives are more involved in acquired and second generation family firms and in larger firms with more fixed assets. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the use of family representatives and show that family representatives are being used by controlling families to extend their influence within their firms, increasing agency costs to minority shareholders. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, our analysis shows that disclosure of family member and representative relationships within firms is important and value-relevant to investors. Furthermore, our results suggest that firm performance could be improved by limiting the involvement of family members and family representatives in family firms.

Conflito de interesses na sociedade de economia mista: interesse público versus interesse privado

A presente tese tem por objetivo tratar do conflito de interesses na sociedade de economia mista. Referida sociedade tem na sua base constitutiva o conflito como elemento inerente. Por possuir capital público e privado, não é fácil solucionar facilmente os problemas que se apresentam no decorrer de sua existência frente à possibilidade de que o detentor do poder de controle pode decidir em prol do interesse público. E é visando limitar a má utilização do interesse público como resposta à tomada de decisões por parte do acionista controlador que se propõe uma mudança de paradigma. Para tanto, propõe-se analisar o papel do Estado empresário na atual conjuntura de limitação de intervenção do Estado na economia. Também é abordada a forma com que o poder Executivo vem intervindo no mercado, de forma a limitar a livre iniciativa e, por vezes, até mesmo eivada de certa inconstitucionalidade. No entanto, para evitar que haja afronta à Constituição no que diz respeito à exploração de atividade econômica por parte do Estado sem que sejam observados os limites constitucionais impostos, apresenta-se o meta-interesse como meio de solução. Sendo o meta-interesse o interesse da própria companhia, e considerando que o interesse público que fundamenta a autorização para a criação da sociedade de economia mista se extingue com a criação da referida companhia, tem-se que as normas que devem reger as sociedades de economia mista são as normas de direito privado. Com o meta-interesse o Estado passa a intervir na seara privada em igualdade de condições com as demais companhias, não podendo mais se valer de sua posição de acionista majoritário para tomar decisões que conflitem com o interesse da companhia e que privilegiem o interesse público secundário ou até mesmo o interesse político do Estado em detrimento do interesse social e dos acionistas minoritários. Dessa forma, o meta-interesse tem por finalidade colocar fim aos conflitos em relação à aplicação das normas jurídicas e as indefinições da própria natureza da sociedade de economia mista.

Um estudo sobre a relação entre ações preferenciais e valor de mercado das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto

O mercado de capitais brasileiro se caracteriza pela alta concentração de poder nas mãos de poucos acionistas controladores. No Brasil, a existência de ações preferenciais sem direito a voto enseja o surgimento de conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e acionistas minoritários, agravado pelo fato de que o controle pode ser exercido com uma participação relativamente pequena sobre o total de ações emitidas pelas companhias. A concentração de propriedade permitiria a possibilidade de expropriação dos direitos dos minoritários. Diversos estudos empíricos vêm sendo realizados ao longo dos últimos anos com o objetivo de avaliar a influência da estrutura de propriedade das ações sobre o valor de mercado das companhias. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho pretende trazer novas contribuições, com ênfase na participação de ações preferenciais na estrutura de propriedade. Neste trabalho, usando uma amostra de empresas de capital aberto negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA, a partir de teste de diferença de médias, rejeita-se a hipótese de igualdade de valor entre empresas que só possuem ações ON em sua estrutura de propriedade, em relação às que possuem ambos os tipos, ON e PN. Em continuidade, usando modelos de regressão linear, encontra-se relação negativa estatisticamente significativa entre valor de mercado das empresas e variável utilizada para caracterizar a estrutura de propriedade, especificamente, a diferença entre o percentual de participação dos acionistas não controladores no total de ações PN e o percentual de participação dos acionistas controladores no total de ações PN.