What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

The epistemological basis of the metaphysics of the Will of Arthur Schopenhauer

RESUMO: Analisamos neste artigo a teoria do conhecimento de Arthur Schopenhauer com base em sua dissertação Sobre a quádrupla raiz do princípio de razão suficiente (1813), seu ensaio Sobre a visão e as cores (1816), os dois primeiros livros de O mundo como vontade e representação (1819), bem como o apêndice a esta obra intitulado Crítica da filosofia kantiana. Aqui temos em mente a relação de Schopenhauer com as filosofias anteriores (em especial a de Kant) e a fundamentação de sua intuição do mundo como Vontade baseada em uma epistemologia de raízes kantianas.

The Metaphysics of Information The Power and the Glory of Machinehood

Não há disciplina em qualquer ramo da ciência, seja esta natural, social, humana, descritiva, experimental ou teórica, qualitativa ou quantitativa, que não tenha sido afectada a vários níveis da instrumentalidade, conceptualização, construção de modelos, escolha de metáforas heurísticas ou ontológicas, e sentidO da investigação, em alguns casos muito profunda e decisivamente, pela influência crescente da constelação informacional computacional. A investigação baseada em simulações por computador é uma “terceira espécie de ciência”, que se soma aos tipos teórico e físico-experimental de trabalho científico. A ciber-ciência é um lugar natural para simular ciência, ou meta-ciberciência, mas todo o conhecimento científico cai no domínio da meta-ciberciência ou da filosofia da ciência computacional. A meta-ciência simula a ciência(o estudo computacional da produção do conhecimento científico); a ciber-ciência é por definição simulatória; a ciber-ciência simula a Natureza; a Natureza, segundo alguns físicos, é ela mesma uma simulação. Receber a categoria da informação nas ciências da vida e nas ciências humanas e sociais, da maneira específica como tem vindo a ocorrer, traz um considerável lastro metafísico: os humanos como máquinas, ultrapassáveis por máquinas inteligentes ou “espirituais”. A informação emerge como a alavanca de Arquimedes para as nossas intervenções n o domínio da vida e do espírito, de máquinas informacionais naturais, com evidentes implicações para a ciência política.

The impact of type of language and number of reasons on purchase intent

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The metaphysics of quantum gravity : a causal approach

The dissertation investigates some relevant metaphysical issues arising in the context of spacetime theories. In particular, the inquiry focuses on general relativity and canonical quantum gravity. A formal definition of spacetime theory is proposed and, against this framework, an analysis of the notions of general covariance, symmetry and background independence is performed. It is argued that many conceptual issues in general relativity and canonical quantum gravity derive from putting excessive emphasis on general covariance as an ontological prin-ciple. An original metaphysical position grounded in scientific essential- ism and causal realism (weak essentialism) is developed and defended. It is argued that, in the context of general relativity, weak essentialism supports spacetime substantivalism. It is also shown that weak essentialism escapes arguments from metaphysical underdetermination by positing a particular kind of causation, dubbed geometric. The proposed interpretive framework is then applied to Bohmian mechanics, pointing out that weak essentialism nicely fits into this theory. In the end, a possible Bohmian implementation of loop quantum gravity is considered, and such a Bohmian approach is interpreted in a geometric causal fashion. Under this interpretation, Bohmian loop quantum gravity straightforwardly commits us to an ontology of elementary extensions of space whose evolution is described by a non-local law. The causal mechanism underlying this evolution clarifies many conceptual issues related to the emergence of classical spacetime from the quantum regime. Although there is as yet no fully worked out physical theory of quantum gravity, it is argued that the proposed approach sets up a standard that proposals for a serious ontology in this field should meet.

Hypothetical metaphysics of nature

The paper first sketches out a reply to the underdetermination challenge and the incommensurability challenge that rebuts the sceptical conclusions of these challenges and that is sufficient to lay the ground for the project of a metaphysics of nature. That metaphysics is as hypothetical as are our scientific theories. The paper then explains how can one can argue for certain views in the metaphysics of nature based on our current fundamental physical theories, namely the commitments to a tenseless theory of time and existence instead of a tensed one, to events instead of substances, and to relations instead of intrinsic properties. Finally, the paper mentions the themes of causation, laws and dispositions.

Delayed-Choice Experiments and the Metaphysics of Entanglement

Delayed-choice experiments in quantum mechanics are often taken to undermine a realistic interpretation of the quantum state. More specifically, Healey has recently argued that the phenomenon of delayed-choice entanglement swapping is incompatible with the view that entanglement is a physical relation between quantum systems. This paper argues against these claims. It first reviews two paradigmatic delayed-choice experiments and analyzes their metaphysical implications. It then applies the results of this analysis to the case of entanglement swapping, showing that such experiments pose no threat to realism about entanglement.

Friendship and the grounds of reasons

L’amitié de même que d’autres relations intimes ont créé des difficultés pour les philosophes moraux. Bien que la morale semble exiger que nous demeurions impartiaux, l’amitié semble donner naissance à des obligations de partialité envers nos proches. Mais cette difficulté peut disparaître une fois que l’on cesse de se concentrer sur la catégorisation des raisons en tant que morales ou non morales. Cette tendance à classer les raisons comme morales vs. non morales nous mène à accorder la place d’honneur à l’étiquette « moral » et à supposer que cette catégorie est uniforme. Si nous abandonnons ces suppositions, alors les raisons données par nos proches ou nos amis ne nous sembleront plus problématiques. Il sera alors possible de voir que toutes les raisons sont, en bout de ligne, egocentriques d’une importante façon, et que la délibération doit toujours provenir d’une perspective egocentrique.