Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Cómo recibir a Merleau-Ponty en la “theory of time” : una polémica

Resumen: El presente trabajo busca clarificar (en polémica con el abordaje de Stephen Priest) el auténtico sentido del “subjetivismo” merleaupontyano con respecto al tiempo, según el cual solo existe tiempo como correlato de una subjetividad situada en él. En un marco más general, reponer esta tesis merleaupontyana permite colocar las reflexiones del fenomenólogo francés en diálogo con la tradición analítica sobre el tiempo (centrada en el debate entre las teorías “A” y “B”), y, en particular, en continuidad temática con el abordaje de la “paradoja de McTaggart” por parte de Michael Dummett

A expressão da subjetividade na Filosofia de Merleau-Ponty

Neste trabalho, o filósofo francês Maurice Merleau-Ponty é autor privilegiado na busca de uma compreensão fenomenológica da subjetividade. Na primeira concede-se relevo às análises sobre a corporeidade, a partir da qual se revela uma socialidade originária aberta pela experiência perceptiva. Se na parte I predomina o mundo natural, na parte II a experiência do mundo cultural é o principal tema. O caráter estrutural da experiência perceptiva não é aban-donado, mas retomado no intuito de explorar a tese de que a significação da experiência é desvinculada de uma consciência separada da existência. Fundamentada na percepção, parti-cularmente em seu aspecto antepredicativo, desenvolve-se uma análise fenomenológica da linguagem, bem como o lugar da praxis e da intersubjetividade na compreensão deste tema, explicitando ainda mais a dimensão social originária revelada pela corporeidade. O vínculo da dimensão subjetiva com a existência, mediante o corpo, é realçado a partir da noção de ex-pressão. A noção de expressão refere-se à transcendência do sujeito em relação à sua situação, sem prescindir dela e serve para mostrar que o sentido das coisas percebidas é abordado não como algo isolável, mas produto de uma articulação na ordem do sensível, dispensando, assim, a tese de um paralelismo entre a ordem positiva (a percepção do mundo) e a ordem da idealidade (o que é dito ou pensado sobre a experiência). A lógica da expressão, verificada no corpo, é sucedida pelo estudo da linguagem na obra de Merleau-Ponty, para obter sua concep-ção sobre a relação do sujeito com o instituído. Constata-se que a expressividade presente na linguagem, análoga ao gesto corporal, aponta para a transcendência do significado em relação aos significantes partilhados em determinada cultura e, portanto, para a liberdade do sujeito enquanto produtora de uma história, a partir das transformações operadas na situação em que se encontra. Se a linguagem permitiu conceber de que modo o sujeito pode instaurar novas significações a partir das que estão estabelecidas, o retorno, no fim da dissertação, ao tema da liberdade, desenvolvido na Fenomenologia da Percepção, demonstra que as teses presentes em seus últimos textos mantêm uma coerência com os primeiros. A influência da noção de estrutura em seu interesse pela antropologia, abordada no último capítulo da dissertação, con-firma que a função simbólica, presente ao longo do texto como lógica da expressão, expõe a dialética sem síntese característica da subjetividade.

Merleau-Ponty and Nishida: Artistic expression as 'motor-perceptual faith'

This dissertation carries out a dialogue between Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Nishida Kitarō concerning their theories of artistic expression and faith. Both philosophers go through remarkably similar trajectories in their philosophic projects: In their early works they focus on the motor-perceptual body of the artist, and as they move towards the mature articulation of their ontologies, the concept of faith becomes central. I propose the term “motor-perceptual faith” to bring these seemingly diverse sets of concerns into a conceptual continuity. My study explores this connection, and argues that the artist’s motor-perceptual expressive body, as colourfully and sometimes poetically articulated in their early works, enacts the form of faith developed more abstractly in their later writings. Exploring these relations fosters a mutual expansion of the early by the later works, thus thickening the concept of faith by seeing it as enacted by the artist, while enlarging the concept of artistic expression by understanding it as a practice of motor‐perceptual faith. Framing these philosophers as putting forth a traditionally religious concept as illustrated by way of artistic expression, offers a new articulation of both of their writings, an important conceptual bridge between the two, while challenging un-ambiguous distinctions between art, philosophy and religion, and ultimately philosophy East and West.

Within the carnal: re-reading Merleau-Ponty through the language of drawing

In order to present visual art as a paradigm for philosophy, Merleau-Ponty investigated the creative processes of artists whose work corresponded closely with his philosophical ideas. His essays on art are widely valued for emphasising process over product, and for challenging the primacy of the written word in all spheres of human expression. While it is clear that he initially favoured painting, Merleau-Ponty began to develop a much deeper understanding of the complexities of how art is made in his late work in parallel with his advancement of a new ontology. Although his ontology remains unfinished and only exists as working notes and a manuscript entitled The Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty had begun to appreciate the fundamental role drawing plays in the making of art and the creation of a language of expression that is as vital as the written or spoken word. Through an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished manuscript and working notes my thesis will investigate his working methods and use of materials and also explore how he processed his ideas by using my own art practice as the basis of my research. This research will take the form of an inquiry into how the unfinished and incomplete nature of text and artworks, while they are still ‘works in progress’, can often reveal the more human and carnal components of creative processes. Applying my experience as a practitioner and a teacher in an art school, I focus on the significance of drawing practice for Merleau-Ponty’s later work, in order to rebalance an overemphasis on painting in the literature. Understanding the differences between these two art forms, and how they are taught, can offer an alternative engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s later work and his struggle to find a language to express his developing new ontology. In addition, by re-reading his work through the language of drawing, I believe we gain new insights which reaffirm Merleau-Ponty's relevance to contemporary art making and aesthetics.

A phenomenological account of Merleau-Ponty's notion of style : from embodiment to flesh

Abstract This thesis is an investigation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's notion of style via the individual, artwork, and the world. It aims to show that subject-object, self-other, and perceiver-perceived are not contrary, but are reverses of one another each requiring the other for meaningful experience. In experience, these cognitive contraries are engaged in relationships of communication and communion that render styles of interaction by which we have/are a world. A phenomenological investigation of Merleau-Ponty's notion of style via existential meaningfulness, corporeal and worldly understanding, stylistic nuances (with respect to the individual, the artwork, and the world), and the existential temporal dynamic provide the foundation for understanding our primordial connection with the world. This phenomenological unpacking follows Merleau-Ponty's thought from Phenomenology of Perception to "Cezanne's Doubt" and "Eye and Mind" through The Visible and the Invisible.

Corps et virtuel : itinéraires à partir de Merleau-Ponty

Voici une réflexion sur le rapport entre le concept de « virtuel » et celui de « corps ». Le virtuel, pensé dans son sens le plus banal, à savoir en rapport avec les nouvelles technologies, met en crise l'idée cartésienne de corps comme chose placée dans l'enceinte d'un espace défini avec des abscisses et des ordonnées. Cette recherche relève d'un triple enjeu : redéfinir le concept de corps, approfondir la notion de virtuel et rendre compte du rapport entre les deux termes.

Merleau-Ponty et la connaissance de soi

Notre objectif est d’habiliter la conception merleau-pontienne de la connaissance de soi. La difficulté consiste en ce que Merleau-Ponty fait reposer tout savoir sur un contexte perceptif que le sujet est par principe incapable d’appréhender dans sa totalité. La connaissance s’appuie ainsi sur un contexte comportant des zones d’ombre qui éludent la réflexion. Nous éclairons d’abord cette affirmation générale à partir de deux principes fondamentaux empruntés à la Gestalttheorie, dont le premier stipule que la donnée de base de la perception est une figure sur un fond et le second que nos structures mentales cherchent l’équilibre. Nous appliquons ensuite ces prémisses au problème spécifique de la connaissance de soi. Cette présentation nous permet de cibler deux obstacles à notre prétention : l’irréductibilité du sujet à ce qu’il donne à voir dans l’effort réflexif, ainsi que sa liberté fondamentale, contaminant la vérité de son caractère arbitraire. Finalement, nous montrons que ces deux obstacles ne sont qu’apparents, à condition toutefois de renoncer à une connaissance de soi absolue, et de ménager un espace entre le déterminisme et la liberté.

La naissance de l'espace moderne: Merleau‐Ponty et Panofsky sur la perspective linéaire

Nous nous proposons d’examiner et de comparer les analyses de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et d’Erwin Panofsky sur la question de la perspective linéaire. Merleau-Ponty, dans le sillage des analyses de Panofsky, soutient la thèse selon laquelle la perspective linéaire est non seulement une technique picturale qui nous présente une vision et une interprétation de l’espace et, plus généralement, du monde se constituant en rupture avec la perception naturelle, mais une « construction symbolique » qui nous fait proprement voir et concevoir le monde d’après les principes de la géométrie euclidienne. Quoiqu’ils partagent la même interprétation historique et symbolique de la perspective, Merleau-Ponty et Panofsky diffèrent pourtant quant à la signification philosophique qu’ils lui donnent. Alors que pour Panofsky la perspective témoigne de la vérité indépassable du criticisme kantien, elle est l’expression chez Merleau-Ponty d’une interrogation ontologique sur la perception irréductible à la conception de l’espace de la philosophie moderne.

Subjects and expressive worlds in the work of Merleau-Ponty

Examines Merleau-Ponty's claim that the relationship between subjects, world and others is one of interdependence. Questions traditional accounts of subjectivity based on dichotomous schemas and expands into the expressive domains of art, language and sexuality. Gives some forward-looking reflections as regards ethics arising out of Merleau-Ponty's new ontology.

Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts

Having initially not had the attention of Sartre or Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s work is arguably now more widely influential than either of his two contemporaries. Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts presents an accessible guide to the core ideas which structure Merleau-Ponty’s thinking as well as to his influences and the value of his ideas to a wide range of disciplines. The first section of the book presents the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, the major debates of his time, particularly existentialism, phenomenology, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history and society. The second section outlines his major contributions and conceptual innovations. The final section focuses upon how his work has been taken up in other fields besides philosophy, notably in sociology, cognitive science, health studies and feminism.