990 resultados para Mental representations
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Two studies demonstrate dissociation between children's understanding of pictorial representations (photos and drawings) and mental representations (beliefs). In Study 1, 37 preschoolers were tested on false belief, appearance-reality, false photo, and false drawing tasks. The false picture tasks were significantly easier, and no correlation was found between children's performances on false belief and false picture tasks. Ln Study 2, 30 children who failed a false belief pretest were randomly assigned to 3 training groups: Belief (trained on false belief tasks), Picture (trained on false picture tasks), or Control (trained on number conservation tasks). Training was conducted in 2 sessions over the course of 2 weeks, tasks were presented and feedback was provided. All children were posttested on theory of mind tasks, false picture tasks, and a number conservation task. The posttest results showed differential patterns of performance, with the Belief group scoring highest on the theory of mind posttests, the Picture group scoring highest on the false picture posttests, and the Control group scoring highest on the number conservation posttest. Results are discussed with respect to competing models of theory of mind development.
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This study contributes to a central debate within contemporary generative second language (L2) theorizing: the extent to which adult learners are (un)able to acquire new functional features that result in a L2 grammar that is mentally structured like the native target (see White, 2003). The adult acquisition of L2 nominal phi-features is explored, with focus on the syntactic and semantic reflexes in the related domain of adjective placement in two experimental groups: English-speaking intermediate (n = 21) and advanced (n = 24) learners of Spanish, as compared to a native-speaker control group (n = 15). Results show that, on some of the tasks, the intermediate L2 learners appear to have acquired the syntactic properties of the Spanish determiner phrase but, on other tasks, to show some delay with the semantic reflexes of prenominal and postnominal adjectives. Crucially, however, our data demonstrate full convergence by all advanced learners and thus provide evidence in contra the predictions of representational deficit accounts (e.g., Hawkins & Chan, 1997; Hawkins & Franceschina, 2004; Hawkins & Hattori, 2006).
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The body is represented in the brain at levels that incorporate multisensory information. This thesis focused on interactions between vision and cutaneous sensations (i.e., touch and pain). Experiment 1 revealed that there are partially dissociable pathways for visual enhancement of touch (VET) depending upon whether one sees one’s own body or the body of another person. This indicates that VET, a seeming low-level effect on spatial tactile acuity, is actually sensitive to body identity. Experiments 2-4 explored the effect of viewing one’s own body on pain perception. They demonstrated that viewing the body biases pain intensity judgments irrespective of actual stimulus intensity, and, more importantly, reduces the discriminative capacities of the nociceptive pathway encoding noxious stimulus intensity. The latter effect only occurs if the pain-inducing event itself is not visible, suggesting that viewing the body alone and viewing a stimulus event on the body have distinct effects on cutaneous sensations. Experiment 5 replicated an enhancement of visual remapping of touch (VRT) when viewing fearful human faces being touched, and further demonstrated that VRT does not occur for observed touch on non-human faces, even fearful ones. This suggests that the facial expressions of non-human animals may not be simulated within the somatosensory system of the human observer in the same way that the facial expressions of other humans are. Finally, Experiment 6 examined the enfacement illusion, in which synchronous visuo-tactile inputs cause another’s face to be assimilated into the mental self-face representation. The strength of enfacement was not affected by the other’s facial expression, supporting an asymmetric relationship between processing of facial identity and facial expressions. Together, these studies indicate that multisensory representations of the body in the brain link low-level perceptual processes with the perception of emotional cues and body/face identity, and interact in complex ways depending upon contextual factors.
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The goal of this study was to examine the antecedents and correlates of children’s mental representations of attachment at 5 years (Attachment Story Completion Task, Bretherton, Ridgeway, & Cassidy, 1990; MacArthur Story Stem Battery, Bretherton, Oppenheim, Buchsbaum, Emde, & the MacArthur Narrative Group, 1990). Predictors included children’s attachment security with mothers and fathers assessed via the Attachment Q-Set (AQS, Waters, 1987) at 3 years, and parent-child narrative quality regarding positive and negative events at 5 years. Participants included 71 children and their mothers and fathers. Structural equation models (SEM) indicated that children’s attachment security exerted a significant indirect effect on children’s mental representations through parent-child narrative quality. Specifically, children’s attachment security with fathers was related to their mental representations via father-child reminiscing about positive events, and children’s attachment security with mothers was related to their mental representations via mother-child reminiscing about negative events. Results are discussed in terms of the development and implications of attachment relationships within the family context.
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Processing language is postulated to involve a mental simulation, or re-enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states that were acquired experientially (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). One such aspect that is mentally simulated during processing of certain concepts is spatial location. For example, upon processing the word “moon” the prominent spatial location of the concept (e.g. ‘upward’) is mentally simulated. In six eye-tracking experiments, we investigate how mental simulations of spatial location affect processing. We first address a conflict in previous literature whereby processing is shown to be impacted in both a facilitatory and inhibitory way. Two of our experiments showed that mental simulations of spatial association facilitate saccades launched toward compatible locations; however, a third experiment showed an inhibitory effect on saccades launched towards incompatible locations. We investigated these differences with further experiments, which led us to conclude that the nature of the effect (facilitatory or inhibitory) is dependent on the demands of the task and, in fitting with the theory of Grounded Cognition (Barsalou, 2008), that mental simulations impact processing in a dynamic way. Three further experiments explored the nature of verticality – specifically, whether ‘up’ is perceived as away from gravity, or above our head. Using similar eye-tracking methods, and by manipulating the position of participants, we were able to dissociate these two possible standpoints. The results showed that mental simulations of spatial location facilitated saccades to compatible locations, but only when verticality was dissociated from gravity (i.e. ‘up’ was above the participant’s head). We conclude that this is not due to an ‘embodied’ mental simulation, but rather a result of heavily ingrained visuo-motor association between vertical space and eye movements.
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Aim: Rather than being rigid, habitual behaviours may be determined by dynamic mental representations that can adapt to context changes. This adaptive potential may result from particular conditions dependent on the interaction between two sources of mental constructs activation: perceived context applicability and cognitive accessibility . Method: T wo web-shopping simulations of fering the choice between habitually chosen and non-habitually chosen food products were presented to participants. This considered two choice contexts dif fering in the habitual behaviour perceived applicability (low vs. high) and a measure of habitual behaviour chronicity . Results: Study 1 demonstrated a perceived applicability ef fect, with more habitual (non-organic) than non-habitual (organic) food products chosen in a high perceived applicability (familiar) than in a low perceived applicability (new) context. The adaptive potential of habitual behaviour was evident in the habitual products choice consistency across three successive choices, despite the decrease in perceived applicability . Study 2 evidenced the adaptive potential in strong habitual behaviour participants – high chronic accessibility – who chose a habitual product (milk) more than a non-habitual product (orange juice), even when perceived applicability was reduced (new context). Conclusion: Results portray consumers as adaptive decision makers that can flexibly cope with changes in their (inner and outer) choice contexts.
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Tese de Doutoramento apresentada ao ISPA - Instituto Universitário
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In this study of the structure of self-knowledge, we examined priming effects for the recall of personal episodes in order to investigate whether abstract trait knowledge and personal episodes are independent mental representations. We found that accessing similar abstract representations of traits facilitated a faster recall of related personal episodes than did accessing irrelevant abstract representations of traits (Experiments 1 and 2), reading a nonword prime (Experiments 2 and 3), accessing knowledge of one's mother (Experiment 3), or accessing semantic knowledge (Experiment 3). Contrary to previous findings, which indicated that abstract trait knowledge is represented independently of related personal episodes (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993, our results suggest that abstract trait knowledge is associated with personal episodes, and therefore that semantic self-knowledge is associated with episodic self-knowledge in long-term self-knowledge.
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Investigaremos, a partir da perspectiva da Ciência Cognitiva, a noção de representação mental, no domínio da percepção visual humana. Ênfase é dada ao paradigma Conexionista, ou de Redes Neurais, de acordo com o qual tais representações mentais são descritas como estruturas emergentes da interação entre sistemas de processamento de informação que se auto-organizam - tais como o cérebro - e a luz estruturada no meio ambiente. Sugerimos que essa noção de representação mental indica uma solução para uma antiga polêmica, entre Representacionalistas e Eliminativistas, acerca da existência de representações mentais no sistema perceptual humano.
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Con base en los ejemplos de representaciones mentales del espacio geográfico a diferentes escalas, elaborados por estudiantes de varias carreras de la Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR), se realizó el presente análisis. Si bien la cartografía mental ha sido clasificada como una técnica cuantitativa dados los análisis factoriales que de ella pueden desprenderse, el análisis que de las representaciones mentales se hace, es totalmente cualitativo, poniéndose énfasis en el conocimiento y la forma en que se expresan imágenes y conceptos. Pese a que la cartografía mental posee sus deficiencias, el análisis es valioso en tanto que los mapas mentales del espacio geográfico permiten representar un espacio percibido, pensado.Palabras claves: Cartografía mental, espacio geográfico, geografía del comportamiento, representaciones mentales.Abstract:Based on mental representation of geographic space draws by students from Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR) this study was realized. Even though, mental cartography has been classified as a cuantitative technique due to factorial analysis than can be derived by, the analysis done in this study is totally qualitative, emphasizing in the knowledge and shape that images and concepts are expressed. Although mental cartography has deficiencies, its analysis is valuable in the sense that mental maps of geographic places allow us to represent a percept space.Keywords: Mental cartography, geographic space, behavior geography, mental representations
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By examining Japanese fictional novels, this article will discuss how anaphoric devices (noun phrases (NPs), third person pronouns (TPPs), and zero anaphors) are selected and arranged in a given discourse. The traditional view of anaphora considers the co-referential relationship between anaphoric devices to be syntagmatic; that is, a pronoun, for example, refers back to its antecedent. It also declares the hierarchical order of information values between anaphoric devices; NPs are semantically the most informative, indicating an episode boundary, and pronouns less informative. Furthermore, zero anaphora is the most referentially transparent, showing the most accessibility of a topic. However, real text shows the contrary. NPs occur frequently while there is no apparent discourse boundary, and the same episode is continuous. This is because zero anaphors and TPPs (if they occur) break down readily due to the nature of a forthcoming sentence and the NP is reinstated, in order to continue the same topic in a given discourse. Therefore, the article opposes the traditional view of anaphora. Based on the concept of text processing, using ‘mental representations’, this article will determine certain occurrence patterns of the three anaphoric devices.
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Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências da Comunicação - Especialidade em Comunicação Estratégica e Organizacional
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Most theories of perception assume a rigid relationship between objects of the physical world and the corresponding mental representations. We show by a priori reasoning that this assumption is not fulfilled. We claim instead that all object-representation correspondences have to be learned. However, we cannot learn to perceive all objects that there are in the world. We arrive at these conclusions by a combinatory analysis of a fictive stimulus world and the way to cope with its complexity, which is perceptual learning. We show that successful perceptual learning requires changes in the representational states of the brain that are not derived directly from the constitution of the physical world. The mind constitutes itself through perceptual learning.