929 resultados para Markov-Perfect
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We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find that outcomes are affected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the fiscal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its effects on fluctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little effect on the provision of government services, it does cause the fiscal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.
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Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In the context of a business cycle model in which a scal authority chooses government spending and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods, we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include a risk-sensitive scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We show that the risk-sensitive scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation, reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.
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This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main fi ndings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce ine¢ ciently high capital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers preferences, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a conflict of interests.
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General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).
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Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are "close" to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular forms of externalities, their presence typically suggests government action. I survey and discuss existing theoretical work on economies with local interactions and point to areas for further research.
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Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strategies), ergodicity, and welfare results. Also, we characterize equilibria in terms of agents' policy function, spatial equilibrium correlations and social multiplier effects, depending on the nature of interactions. Most importantly, we study formally the issue of the identification of social interactions, with special emphasis on the restrictions imposed by dynamic equilibrium conditions.
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This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.
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I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.
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We explicitly construct a stationary coupling attaining Ornstein`s (d) over bar -distance between ordered pairs of binary chains of infinite order. Our main tool is a representation of the transition probabilities of the coupled bivariate chain of infinite order as a countable mixture of Markov transition probabilities of increasing order. Under suitable conditions on the loss of memory of the chains, this representation implies that the coupled chain can be represented as a concatenation of i.i.d. sequences of bivariate finite random strings of symbols. The perfect simulation algorithm is based on the fact that we can identify the first regeneration point to the left of the origin almost surely.
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The main goal of this paper is to establish some equivalence results on stability, recurrence, and ergodicity between a piecewise deterministic Markov process ( PDMP) {X( t)} and an embedded discrete-time Markov chain {Theta(n)} generated by a Markov kernel G that can be explicitly characterized in terms of the three local characteristics of the PDMP, leading to tractable criterion results. First we establish some important results characterizing {Theta(n)} as a sampling of the PDMP {X( t)} and deriving a connection between the probability of the first return time to a set for the discrete-time Markov chains generated by G and the resolvent kernel R of the PDMP. From these results we obtain equivalence results regarding irreducibility, existence of sigma-finite invariant measures, and ( positive) recurrence and ( positive) Harris recurrence between {X( t)} and {Theta(n)}, generalizing the results of [ F. Dufour and O. L. V. Costa, SIAM J. Control Optim., 37 ( 1999), pp. 1483-1502] in several directions. Sufficient conditions in terms of a modified Foster-Lyapunov criterion are also presented to ensure positive Harris recurrence and ergodicity of the PDMP. We illustrate the use of these conditions by showing the ergodicity of a capacity expansion model.
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This paper deals with the long run average continuous control problem of piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDMPs) taking values in a general Borel space and with compact action space depending on the state variable. The control variable acts on the jump rate and transition measure of the PDMP, and the running and boundary costs are assumed to be positive but not necessarily bounded. Our first main result is to obtain an optimality equation for the long run average cost in terms of a discrete-time optimality equation related to the embedded Markov chain given by the postjump location of the PDMP. Our second main result guarantees the existence of a feedback measurable selector for the discrete-time optimality equation by establishing a connection between this equation and an integro-differential equation. Our final main result is to obtain some sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution for a discrete-time optimality inequality and an ordinary optimal feedback control for the long run average cost using the so-called vanishing discount approach. Two examples are presented illustrating the possible applications of the results developed in the paper.
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We propose and analyze two different Bayesian online algorithms for learning in discrete Hidden Markov Models and compare their performance with the already known Baldi-Chauvin Algorithm. Using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a measure of generalization we draw learning curves in simplified situations for these algorithms and compare their performances.
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We adopt the Dirac model for graphene and calculate the Casimir interaction energy between a plane suspended graphene sample and a parallel plane perfect conductor. This is done in two ways. First, we use the quantum-field-theory approach and evaluate the leading-order diagram in a theory with 2+1-dimensional fermions interacting with 3+1-dimensional photons. Next, we consider an effective theory for the electromagnetic field with matching conditions induced by quantum quasiparticles in graphene. The first approach turns out to be the leading order in the coupling constant of the second one. The Casimir interaction for this system appears to be rather weak. It exhibits a strong dependence on the mass of the quasiparticles in graphene.
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The main goal of this paper is to apply the so-called policy iteration algorithm (PIA) for the long run average continuous control problem of piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDMP`s) taking values in a general Borel space and with compact action space depending on the state variable. In order to do that we first derive some important properties for a pseudo-Poisson equation associated to the problem. In the sequence it is shown that the convergence of the PIA to a solution satisfying the optimality equation holds under some classical hypotheses and that this optimal solution yields to an optimal control strategy for the average control problem for the continuous-time PDMP in a feedback form.
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This work is concerned with the existence of an optimal control strategy for the long-run average continuous control problem of piecewise-deterministic Markov processes (PDMPs). In Costa and Dufour (2008), sufficient conditions were derived to ensure the existence of an optimal control by using the vanishing discount approach. These conditions were mainly expressed in terms of the relative difference of the alpha-discount value functions. The main goal of this paper is to derive tractable conditions directly related to the primitive data of the PDMP to ensure the existence of an optimal control. The present work can be seen as a continuation of the results derived in Costa and Dufour (2008). Our main assumptions are written in terms of some integro-differential inequalities related to the so-called expected growth condition, and geometric convergence of the post-jump location kernel associated to the PDMP. An example based on the capacity expansion problem is presented, illustrating the possible applications of the results developed in the paper.