Good governance and market-based reforms : a study of Bangladesh

‘Good governance’ is increasingly regarded as pivotal to development in developing countries. The six indicators recognized as the most effective measurement tools of ‘good governance’ across the world are: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Lobaton, 2003: 8–9). This paper investigates how lack of ‘good governance’ affects the success and sustainability of the market-based reforms undertaken in the agriculture sector of Bangladesh. The reforms have been associated with increased food grain production, improved food security conditions and easy access by farmers to agricultural inputs. However, a significant problem has arisen recently: the sale of low quality and underweight agricultural inputs sometimes at higher prices has become common. Not only is this problem undermining the positive impact of the reforms, it is also threatening their sustainability. The paper argues that the problems with regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption – indicators of good governance – are the underlying reasons for this problem. In the context of increasing pressures from donors to pursue market-based reforms, this paper stresses the need for integrated governance linking government, business and civil society as paramount for promoting good governance for the success and sustainability of the reforms.

Post-neoliberal electricity market ‘re-reforms’ in Argentina: Diverging from market prescriptions?

This paper focuses upon the policy and institutional change that has taken place within the Argentine electricity market since the country’s economic and social crisis of 2001/2. As one of the first less developed countries (LDCs) to liberalise and privatise its electricity industry, Argentina has since moved away from the orthodox market model after consumer prices were frozen by the Government in early 2002 when the national currency was devalued by 70%. Although its reforms were widely praised during the 1990s, the electricity market has undergone a number of interventions, ostensibly to keep consumer prices low and to avert the much-discussed energy ‘crisis’ caused by a dearth of new investment combined with rising demand levels. This paper explores how the economic crisis and its consequences have both enabled and legitimised these policy and institutional amendments, while drawing upon the specifics of the post-neoliberal market ‘re-reforms’ to consider the extent to which the Government appears to be moving away from market-based prescriptions. In addition, this paper contributes to sector-specific understandings of how, despite these changes, neoliberal ideas and assumptions continue to dominate Argentine public policy well beyond the postcrisis era.

TRAC: a market-based tax on capital flight as an alternative to Grexit. CEPS Commentary, 7 May 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros turns his attention to the main outstanding problem facing Greece today, namely capital flight. Fearful that the country will leave the euro, depositors are withdrawing cash from their bank accounts – thereby making this event more likely. He outlines a proposal in which outgoing payments from Greek banks in the form of cash or via the TARGET system would be limited to the amount of incoming payments, i.e. revenues from exports or tourism, via an auction system. Greece could remain formally a member of the euro area, but the price for cash withdrawals would encourage depositors to wait and stimulate exports.

Mitigating undesirable impacts in the marine environment: A review of market-based management measures

Internationally, marine biodiversity conservation objectives are having an increasing influence on the management of commercial fisheries. While this is largely being implemented through Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) other management measures, such as market based instruments (MBIs), have proved to be effective at managing target species catch in fisheries and reducing environmental impacts in industries such as mining and tourism. Market-based management measures aim to mitigate the impacts of activities by better aligning the incentives their participants face with the objectives of management, changing their behavior as a consequence. In this paper, we review the potential of MBIs as management tools to mitigate undesirable environmental impacts associated with commercial fishing. Where they exist, examples of previous applications are described and the factors that influence their applicability and effectiveness are discussed. Several fishing methods and impacts are considered and suggest that whilst no single approach is most appropriate in all circumstances either replacing or complementing existing management arrangements with MBIs has the potential to improve environmental performance. This has a number of implications. From the environmental perspective they should enable levels of undesirable impacts such as damage to sensitive habitat or the bycatch of protected species of turtles, marine mammals, and seabirds to be reduced. The increased flexibility MBIs allow industry when developing solutions also has the potential to reduce costs to both the industry and managers, improving the cost-effectiveness of regulation as a result. Further, in the increasingly relevant case of MPAs the need for publicly funded compensation, often paid to industry when vessels are excluded from grounds, may also be significantly reduced if improved environmental performance makes it possible for some industry members to continue operating.

The Economics of Gasification: A Market-Based Approach

This paper deals with the economics of gasification facilities in general and IGCC power plants in particular. Regarding the prospects of these systems, passing the technological test is one thing, passing the economic test can be quite another. In this respect, traditional valuations assume constant input and/or output prices. Since this is hardly realistic, we allow for uncertainty in prices. We naturally look at the markets where many of the products involved are regularly traded. Futures markets on commodities are particularly useful for valuing uncertain future cash flows. Thus, revenues and variable costs can be assessed by means of sound financial concepts and actual market data. On the other hand, these complex systems provide a number of flexibility options (e.g., to choose among several inputs, outputs, modes of operation, etc.). Typically, flexibility contributes significantly to the overall value of real assets. Indeed, maximization of the asset value requires the optimal exercise of any flexibility option available. Yet the economic value of flexibility is elusive, the more so under (price) uncertainty. And the right choice of input fuels and/or output products is a main concern for the facility managers. As a particular application, we deal with the valuation of input flexibility. We follow the Real Options approach. In addition to economic variables, we also address technical and environmental issues such as energy efficiency, utility performance characteristics and emissions (note that carbon constraints are looming). Lastly, a brief introduction to some stochastic processes suitable for valuation purposes is provided.

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.

Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies

Policy makers and analysts are often faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional uniform standards. We develop analytic expressions that can be employed with modest amounts of information to estimate the potential cost savings associated with market-based policies, with an application to the environmental policy realm. These simple formulae can identify instruments that merit more detailed investigation. We illustrate the use of these results with an application to nitrogen oxides control by electric utilities in the United States.

Biased selection within the social health insurance market in Colombia

Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación adicional por parte del gobierno.

A word of caution on calculating market-based minimum capital risk requirements

This paper demonstrates that the use of GARCH-type models for the calculation of minimum capital risk requirements (MCRRs) may lead to the production of inaccurate and therefore inefficient capital requirements. We show that this inaccuracy stems from the fact that GARCH models typically overstate the degree of persistence in return volatility. A simple modification to the model is found to improve the accuracy of MCRR estimates in both back- and out-of-sample tests. Given that internal risk management models are currently in widespread usage in some parts of the world (most notably the USA), and will soon be permitted for EC banks and investment firms, we believe that our paper should serve as a valuable caution to risk management practitioners who are using, or intend to use this popular class of models.

Valuation and reporting of native fauna in monetary terms: compatibility between a market-Based system and natural resources?

A change in community values and priorities has introduced ethical,
environmental and social issues into the way in which business conducts
its activities. There are an increasing number of managed investment funds focusing on socially responsible investment (SRI) by concentrating on firms that operate according to predetermined criteria for environmental, social and ethical issues. For investors in these funds environmental stewardship issues are integrated with concern over financial resources and performance. In this paper the accounting and reporting by business activities concerned with conservation of wildlife are examined. The world of accounting has functioned for many years with relatively few accounting standards devoted to specialised industry needs. In 1998 the Australian Accounting Standards Board and in 2001 the International Accounting Standards Board issued standards devoted to agriculture. Both standards deal with the reporting of managed biological assets and require application of essentially the same approaches despite the Australian standard requiring net market value while the International standard requires fair value. In this paper we analyse how one conservation firm Earth Sanctuaries Ltd. (ESL) has applied AASB 1037 and then we explore the implications for conservation firms operating in geographical locations outside Australia. It is suggested that AASB 1037 and indeed lAS 41 may not provide value appropriate information for investor decisions relating to accounting profits for such firms. Our examination shows that it is appropriate to reconsider accounting guidelines provided by these standards in order to link the information relating to economic and environmental performance. Transparency may be improved by a move closer to Elkington 's (1997) triple bottom line reporting. We therefore contend that the issues arising from the use ofAASB 1037 and lAS 41 need to be widely considered by all standard setters, particularly given the increasing attention to SRI.