A COMPARISON OF MARKET CLEARING TOOLS IN ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS

To maintain a strict balance between demand and supply in the US power systems, the Independent System Operators (ISOs) schedule power plants and determine electricity prices using a market clearing model. This model determines for each time period and power plant, the times of startup, shutdown, the amount of power production, and the provisioning of spinning and non-spinning power generation reserves, etc. Such a deterministic optimization model takes as input the characteristics of all the generating units such as their power generation installed capacity, ramp rates, minimum up and down time requirements, and marginal costs for production, as well as the forecast of intermittent energy such as wind and solar, along with the minimum reserve requirement of the whole system. This reserve requirement is determined based on the likelihood of outages on the supply side and on the levels of error forecasts in demand and intermittent generation. With increased installed capacity of intermittent renewable energy, determining the appropriate level of reserve requirements has become harder. Stochastic market clearing models have been proposed as an alternative to deterministic market clearing models. Rather than using a fixed reserve targets as an input, stochastic market clearing models take different scenarios of wind power into consideration and determine reserves schedule as output. Using a scaled version of the power generation system of PJM, a regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia, and wind scenarios generated from BPA (Bonneville Power Administration) data, this paper explores a comparison of the performance between a stochastic and deterministic model in market clearing. The two models are compared in their ability to contribute to the affordability, reliability and sustainability of the electricity system, measured in terms of total operational costs, load shedding and air emissions. The process of building the models and running for tests indicate that a fair comparison is difficult to obtain due to the multi-dimensional performance metrics considered here, and the difficulty in setting up the parameters of the models in a way that does not advantage or disadvantage one modeling framework. Along these lines, this study explores the effect that model assumptions such as reserve requirements, value of lost load (VOLL) and wind spillage costs have on the comparison of the performance of stochastic vs deterministic market clearing models.

Ancillary services market clearing simulation: a comparison between deterministic and heuristic methods

Electricity market players operating in a liberalized environment requires access to an adequate decision support tool, allowing them to consider all the business opportunities and take strategic decisions. Ancillary services represent a good negotiation opportunity that must be considered by market players. For this, decision support tool must include ancillary market simulation. This paper proposes two different methods (Linear Programming and Genetic Algorithm approaches) for ancillary services dispatch. The methodologies are implemented in MASCEM, a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. A test case based on California Independent System Operator (CAISO) data concerning the dispatch of Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve services is included in this paper.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Analysis of Electricity Market Prices Using Multidimensional Scaling

This paper studies the impact of the energy upon electricity markets using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). Data from major energy and electricity markets is considered. Several maps produced by MDS are presented and discussed revealing that this method is useful for understanding the correlation between them. Furthermore, the results help electricity markets agents hedging against Market Clearing Price (MCP) volatility.

Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals. An experiment

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.

Dodd Frank act and the Brazilian capital market: extraterritorial effects of regulation to the over-the-counter derivatives market

This paper aims to describe the chief alterations proposed by the Dodd Frank Act to the American over-the-counter derivatives market and, at the same time, understand the extraterritorial reach of this law compared to the regulatory framework of the Brazilian derivative market. In order to do so, I will study the extraterritorial effects of the law, particularly in reference to the international nature of Title II of the Dodd Frank, which deals with the over-the-counter derivatives, in order to evaluate its reach to foreign markets, especially the Brazilian market.

A Bilevel Approach to Transmission Expansion Planning Within a Market Environment

We present a bilevel model for transmission expansion planning within a market environment, where producers and consumers trade freely electric energy through a pool. The target of the transmission planner, modeled through the upper-level problem, is to minimize network investment cost while facilitating energy trading. This upper-level problem is constrained by a collection of lower-level market clearing problems representing pool trading, and whose individual objective functions correspond to social welfare. Using the duality theory the proposed bilevel model is recast as a mixed-integer linear programming problem, which is solvable using branch-and-cut solvers. Detailed results from an illustrative example and a case study are presented and discussed. Finally, some relevant conclusions are drawn.

Market-driven security-constrained transmission network expansion planning

This paper presents a Bi-level Programming (BP) approach to solve the Transmission Network Expansion Planning (TNEP) problem. The proposed model is envisaged under a market environment and considers security constraints. The upper-level of the BP problem corresponds to the transmission planner which procures the minimization of the total investment and load shedding cost. This upper-level problem is constrained by a single lower-level optimization problem which models a market clearing mechanism that includes security constraints. Results on the Garver's 6-bus and IEEE 24-bus RTS test systems are presented and discussed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. © 2011 IEEE.

Electricity market price spike forecast with data mining techniques

Electricity market price forecast is a changeling yet very important task for electricity market managers and participants. Due to the complexity and uncertainties in the power grid, electricity prices are highly volatile and normally carry with spikes. which may be (ens or even hundreds of times higher than the normal price. Such electricity spikes are very difficult to be predicted. So far. most of the research on electricity price forecast is based on the normal range electricity prices. This paper proposes a data mining based electricity price forecast framework, which can predict the normal price as well as the price spikes. The normal price can be, predicted by a previously proposed wavelet and neural network based forecast model, while the spikes are forecasted based on a data mining approach. This paper focuses on the spike prediction and explores the reasons for price spikes based on the measurement of a proposed composite supply-demand balance index (SDI) and relative demand index (RDI). These indices are able to reflect the relationship among electricity demand, electricity supply and electricity reserve capacity. The proposed model is based on a mining database including market clearing price, trading hour. electricity), demand, electricity supply and reserve. Bayesian classification and similarity searching techniques are used to mine the database to find out the internal relationships between electricity price spikes and these proposed. The mining results are used to form the price spike forecast model. This proposed model is able to generate forecasted price spike, level of spike and associated forecast confidence level. The model is tested with the Queensland electricity market data with promising results. Crown Copyright (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

"Minimálbér-paradoxon" versenyzői munkaerőpiacon? ("Minimum-wage paradox" in a competitive labour market? Lessons from an experimental line of thought)

A versenyzői munkaerőpiac hagyományos kereslet-kínálati modellje az egyensúlyi bérszintet meghaladó minimálbér következményeként az egyensúlyi bérszint mellettinél alacsonyabb foglalkoztatást jósol; minél magasabb a minimálbér, annál alacsonyabbat. Empirikus vizsgálatok szerint ugyanakkor a minimálbér-emelés nem feltétlenül csökkenti a foglalkoztatást - ezt nevezik minimálbér-paradoxonnak -, ami legkézenfekvőbben a munkáltatók munkaerő-piaci monopszonerejével látszik magyarázhatónak. Ezzel szemben az a gondolatkísérlet, amelyről ez a cikk beszámol, általánosabb érvényű, versenyzői munkaerőpiacot feltételező magyarázat kidolgozására irányul. / === / In the conventional textbook demand/supply model of competitive labour markets, the introduction of a minimum wage above market-clearing level must reduce employment. Empirical findings suggest, however, that this may not always be the case, a finding most readily explained by monopsonistic competition in the labour market. The experimental line of thought reported here explores an alternative root, interpreting the "minimum-wage paradox" as the outcome of a competitive labour market that displays friction.

Long-term price range forecast applied to risk management using regression models

Long-term contractual decisions are the basis of an efficient risk management. However those types of decisions have to be supported with a robust price forecast methodology. This paper reports a different approach for long-term price forecast which tries to give answers to that need. Making use of regression models, the proposed methodology has as main objective to find the maximum and a minimum Market Clearing Price (MCP) for a specific programming period, and with a desired confidence level α. Due to the problem complexity, the meta-heuristic Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) was used to find the best regression parameters and the results compared with the obtained by using a Genetic Algorithm (GA). To validate these models, results from realistic data are presented and discussed in detail.

Mixed integer non linear programming and artificial neural network based approach to ancillary services dispatch in competitive electricity markets

Ancillary services represent a good business opportunity that must be considered by market players. This paper presents a new methodology for ancillary services market dispatch. The method considers the bids submitted to the market and includes a market clearing mechanism based on deterministic optimization. An Artificial Neural Network is used for day-ahead prediction of Regulation Down, regulation-up, Spin Reserve and Non-Spin Reserve requirements. Two test cases based on California Independent System Operator data concerning dispatch of Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Spin Reserve and Non-Spin Reserve services are included in this paper to illustrate the application of the proposed method: (1) dispatch considering simple bids; (2) dispatch considering complex bids.

Análise do mercado de serviços de regulação de frequência secundária e terciária no sistema eléctrico português

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica Ramo Energia

Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences

This paper shows the robust non-existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a sophisticated and naive representative agent. Even when underlying preferences are monotone and convex, at given prices, we show by example that the induced preference of the sophisticated representative agent over choices in first-period markets is both non-convex and satiated. Even allowing for negative prices, the market-clearing allocation is not contained in the convex hull of demand. Finally, with a naive representative agent, we show that perfect foresight is incompatible with market clearing and individual optimization at given prices.

Large economies with differential information but without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.