External monitoring, managerial ownership and form performance in Malaysian capital market: a GMM based panel data approach

This study re-examines whether the structure of share ownership by both directors and institutional ownership provides explanation for firm performances. These relationships are modelled and estimated using GMM based dynamic panel data over a period from 1997 to 2001 with a sample of 100 CI components companies listed on Main Board of Malaysia. The findings provide strong evidence of simultaneity between firm performance and managerial ownership. Although an insignificant relationship between firm performance and institutional ownership is~ observed, the institutional holdings provide strong substitute for managerial ownership with a strong negative relationship between managerial ownership and institutional ownership. This is in line with the managerial incentive hypothesis, which suggests that manager's share in the firm's ownership leads to better performance and the monitoring substitute hypothesis, which suggests that managerial ownership could be effectively replaced by institutional ownership.

Managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict using logistic regression approach : evidence from Bursa Malaysia

This paper adopted logistic regression model to examine the relationship between level of managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict which are proxied by level of risk, firms leverage and firms dividend policy. The study covers a period of 5 years from 1997 through 2001. The study is based on the 100 blue-chip stocks, majority of which are derived from CI components. The findings suggest a positive and significant association between level of level of risk at lower level and managerial ownership while a negative and significant association is also evidenced between risk at higher level and managerial ownership concentration. While debt policy which serves as positive monitoring substitute for agency conflict is found to be positive and significant explaining the level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, dividend policies, which also serve as monitoring, substitute to reduce agency conflict between manager and external shareholders do not appear to have any significant impact on managerial ownership. On the other hand, the level of institutional ownership, which serves as external monitoring force, is found to have inverse impact on level of managerial ownership concentration. This is marginally significant at 10 level (p=.12). The findings, in part explain the argument that the managerial ownership help reduce agency conflict between outside equity holders and managers.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S& P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interst, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in previous studies. Managerial ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the shape of firm value. the results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by bith firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously determined by the other two variables.

The influence of safety ownership on occupational road safety outcomes

Questionnaires and interviews were conducted with employees and senior managers from three Australian organisations to explore the relationship between perceived managerial ownership of safety responsibilities and occupational road safety. It was found that the perceived authority of the person primarily responsible for managing road risks and perceived shared ownership of safety tasks were both significant independent predictors of safer driving behaviours. It was identified that the position of the person accepting primary risk management responsibilities was typically a member of the OHS team and typically in a management position. The extent that ownership was shared across members within the researched organisations varied, with personnel from OHS and fleet management typically accepting partial ownership of managing occupational road risks. Based on the findings, several recommendations are made to assist practitioners in managing occupational road risks.

Ownership structure and corporate performance : Australian evidence

This paper seeks to analyse the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance for fifty firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during 2002-2003. The study initially tests a two equation model similar to that in the existing literature, but is distinguished from prior literature by subsequently reclassifying leverage. By categorising leverage as an endogenous variable, an examination of the relationship between ownership and performance is undertaken through ordinary least squares and two stage least squares analysis of a three equation econometric model. Interestingly, empirical results illustrate the fact that managerial ownership impacts negatively on firm performance which is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis.

The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period : evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable attention among academician, practitioners as well as policy makers because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that corporations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions, which include corporate debt policy. Earlier study on the agency model of the firm widely recognizes that the managerial ownership and external debt play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also found that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 100 Composite Index companies from Brusa Malaysia between 1998 to 2002 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership which serves effective control mechanism on managerial ownership and corporate debt policy as hypothesized. Findings of such evidence suggest that institutional holding thus have played an important role in managers' strategic management decision and reduce agency conflict. In addition, corporate debt policy too is governed by managerial ownership and exhibited a negative relation.

The value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between the value of executive director share ownership and discretionary accruals.

Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a dataset of 1,173 firm-year observations drawn from 188 Australian listed companies for the period 2000-2006. The analysis is based on multivariate regression analysis and ordinary least square models were used to investigate the relation between the value of managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. The issue of potential endogeneity is addressed by using a simultaneous equation system.

Findings – A negative relation is found between value of managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals at lower levels of value of ownership, which is consistent with the theorised incentive alignment that as the managers commit more resources to their firms, stakeholders impose less contractual constraints specified in terms of accounting numbers and managers make lower accrual adjustments. After a certain level of value of ownership is attained, a positive relations seen, consistent with increased discretionary accrual adjustments associated with stakeholders anticipating managerial entrenchment. Also, it is found that these results are driven by firms with income increasing, as opposed to income decreasing, discretionary accruals.

Practical implications – Shares and options are forming an increasing proportion of executive remuneration that continues to be the subject of much debate amongst regulators and in the media. Showing that the value of share ownership may be an effective internal governance mechanism to help align incentives adds to the debate and has policy implications.

Originality/value – The paper's primary contribution is finding that the value (as opposed to proportion) of share ownership, typically representing a sizeable proportion of managers' undiversified wealth, is a potentially direct driver of theorised incentive alignment and entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

Monitoring style drift : evidence from U.S. Equity funds

This thesis examines the stewardship and investment style monitoring by managers and boards of U.S. equity funds. Results indicate that complying with a fund’s declared style, especially in value-growth dimension, remains a challenge for fund managers and boards, and that style-based investors should be aware of the risk of style drift since fund managers and boards do not always monitor the fund’s investment style as stated in the prospectus. Results also show that the quality of fund stewardship, as reflected by fund board quality, corporate culture, manager compensation, regulatory history, and fees are effective in ensuring that fund managers and boards perform their fiduciary obligation by increasing monitoring of the fund investment style.

Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility disclosures : evidence from an emerging economy

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in the annual reports of Bangladeshi companies. A legitimacy theory framework is adopted to understand the extent to which corporate governance characteristics, such as managerial ownership, public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence, CEO duality and presence of audit committee influence organisational response to various stakeholder groups. Our results suggest that although CSR disclosures generally have a negative association with managerial ownership, such relationship becomes significant and positive for export-oriented industries. We also find public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence and presence of audit committee to have positive significant impacts on CSR disclosures. However, we fail to find any significant impact of CEO duality. Thus, our results suggest that pressures exerted by external stakeholder groups and corporate governance mechanisms involving independent outsiders may allay some concerns relating to family influence on CSR disclosure practices. Overall, our study implies that corporate governance attributes play a vital role in ensuring organisational legitimacy through CSR disclosures. The findings of our study should be of interest to regulators and policy makers in countries which share similar corporate ownership and regulatory structures.

Corporate governance and bank performance: evidence from Bangladesh

This study investigates the relationship between the corporate governance structure and performance of listed banks in Bangladesh. We find that board independence and board size have a significant positive impact on performance. However, female directors appear to have no impact on performance. Our evidence indicates that the extent of the managerial ownership level has a significant negative impact on bank performance. These results suggest that better corporate governance mechanisms are imperative for every banking company and should be encouraged for the interest of the investors and other stakeholders.

Managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals in Australia : do independent and executive directors have different incentives?

We examine the relation between managerial share ownership (MSO) and discretionary accruals in Australia. We find a positive relation between MSO and discretionary accruals up to a certain level of MSO followed by a negative relation (inverse U-shaped). We suggest that these unique results are a result of certain Australian institutional features that are markedly different to those in the US and the UK and imply that the ownership-discretionary accruals relation is context specific with the wider corporate governance systems influencing the theorised incentive effects. We also posit that executive directors and independent directors have different ownership-discretionary accruals incentives and report results consistent with this proposition.

Managerial share ownership and operating performance : do independent and executive directors have different incentives?

We investigate the relationship between managerial share ownership (MSO) and earnings as a measure of operating performance in Australia. To mitigate potential earnings management, we also use discretionary accrual adjusted earnings as an alternative measure of performance. We document a negative relation between MSO and performance followed by a positive relation. We suggest that these unique results are an artefact of certain Australian institutional features and imply that the ownership–performance relation is context-specific, with the wider corporate governance systems influencing the theorised incentive effects. We also posit that executive directors and independent directors have different ownership–performance incentives. Our results are consistent with this proposition and suggest that independent directors may be immune to the theorised incentive alignment or entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.