53 resultados para Malpractice
Resumo:
Life is full of uncertainties. Legal rules should have a clear intention, motivation and purpose in order to diminish daily uncertainties. However, practice shows that their consequences are complex and hard to predict. For instance, tort law has the general objectives of deterring future negligent behavior and compensating the victims of someone else's negligence. Achieving these goals are particularly difficult in medical malpractice cases. To start with, when patients search for medical care they are typically sick in the first place. In case harm materializes during the treatment, it might be very hard to assess if it was due to substandard medical care or to the patient's poor health conditions. Moreover, the practice of medicine has a positive externality on the society, meaning that the design of legal rules is crucial: for instance, it should not result in physicians avoiding practicing their activity just because they are afraid of being sued even when they acted according to the standard level of care. The empirical literature on medical malpractice has been developing substantially in the past two decades, with the American case being the most studied one. Evidence from civil law tradition countries is more difficult to find. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the empirical literature on medical malpractice, using two civil law countries as a case-study: Spain and Italy. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, in the first place, some of the consequences of having two separate sub-systems (administrative and civil) coexisting within the same legal system, which is common in civil law tradition countries with a public national health system (such as Spain, France and Portugal). When this holds, different procedures might apply depending on the type of hospital where the injury took place (essentially whether it is a public hospital or a private hospital). Therefore, a patient injured in a public hospital should file a claim in administrative courts while a patient suffering an identical medical accident should file a claim in civil courts. A natural question that the reader might pose is why should both administrative and civil courts decide medical malpractice cases? Moreover, can this specialization of courts influence how judges decide medical malpractice cases? In the past few years, there was a general concern with patient safety, which is currently on the agenda of several national governments. Some initiatives have been taken at the international level, with the aim of preventing harm to patients during treatment and care. A negligently injured patient might present a claim against the health care provider with the aim of being compensated for the economic loss and for pain and suffering. In several European countries, health care is mainly provided by a public national health system, which means that if a patient harmed in a public hospital succeeds in a claim against the hospital, public expenditures increase because the State takes part in the litigation process. This poses a problem in a context of increasing national health expenditures and public debt. In Italy, with the aim of increasing patient safety, some regions implemented a monitoring system on medical malpractice claims. However, if properly implemented, this reform shall also allow for a reduction in medical malpractice insurance costs. This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides a review of the empirical literature on medical malpractice, where studies on outcomes and merit of claims, costs and defensive medicine are presented. Chapter 2 presents an empirical analysis of medical malpractice claims arriving to the Spanish Supreme Court. The focus is on reversal rates for civil and administrative decisions. Administrative decisions appealed by the plaintiff have the highest reversal rates. The results show a bias in lower administrative courts, which tend to focus on the State side. We provide a detailed explanation for these results, which can rely on the organization of administrative judges career. Chapter 3 assesses predictors of compensation in medical malpractice cases appealed to the Spanish Supreme Court and investigates the amount of damages attributed to patients. The results show horizontal equity between administrative and civil decisions (controlling for observable case characteristics) and vertical inequity (patients suffering more severe injuries tend to receive higher payouts). In order to execute these analyses, a database of medical malpractice decisions appealed to the Administrative and Civil Chambers of the Spanish Supreme Court from 2006 until 2009 (designated by the Spanish Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Dataset (SSCMMD)) has been created. A description of how the SSCMMD was built and of the Spanish legal system is presented as well. Chapter 4 includes an empirical investigation of the effect of a monitoring system for medical malpractice claims on insurance premiums. In Italy, some regions adopted this policy in different years, while others did not. The study uses data on insurance premiums from Italian public hospitals for the years 2001-2008. This is a significant difference as most of the studies use the insurance company as unit of analysis. Although insurance premiums have risen from 2001 to 2008, the increase was lower for regions adopting a monitoring system for medical claims. Possible implications of this system are also provided. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the main findings, describes possible future research and concludes.
Resumo:
In the last decades, medical malpractice has been framed as one of the most critical issues for healthcare providers and health policy, holding a central role on both the policy agenda and public debate. The Law and Economics literature has devoted much attention to medical malpractice and to the investigation of the impact of malpractice reforms. Nonetheless, some reforms have been much less empirically studied as in the case of schedules, and their effects remain highly debated. The present work seeks to contribute to the study of medical malpractice and of schedules of noneconomic damages in a civil law country with a public national health system, using Italy as case study. Besides considering schedules and exploiting a quasi-experimental setting, the novelty of our contribution consists in the inclusion of the performance of the judiciary (measured as courts’ civil backlog) in the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis is twofold. First, it investigates how limiting compensations for pain and suffering through schedules impacts on the malpractice insurance market in terms of presence of private insurers and of premiums applied. Second, it examines whether, and to what extent, healthcare providers react to the implementation of this policy in terms of both levels and composition of the medical treatments offered. Our findings show that the introduction of schedules increases the presence of insurers only in inefficient courts, while it does not produce significant effects on paid premiums. Judicial inefficiency is attractive to insurers for average values of schedules penetration of the market, with an increasing positive impact of inefficiency as the territorial coverage of schedules increases. Moreover, the implementation of schedules tends to reduce the use of defensive practices on the part of clinicians, but the magnitude of this impact is ultimately determined by the actual degree of backlog of the court implementing schedules.
Resumo:
There have been three medical malpractice insurance "crises" in the United States over a time spanning roughly the past three decades (Poisson, 2004, p. 759-760). Each crisis is characterized by a number of common features, including rapidly increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums, cancellation of existing insurance policies, and a decreased willingness of insurers to offer or renew medical malpractice insurance policies (Poisson, 2004, p. 759-760). Given the recurrent "crises," many sources argue that medical malpractice insurance coverage has become too expensive a commodity—one that many physicians simply cannot afford (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], 2002, p. 1-2; Physician Insurers Association of America [PIAA], 2003, p. 1; Jackiw, 2004, p. 506; Glassman, 2004, p. 417; Padget, 2003, p. 216). ^ The prohibitively high cost of medical liability insurance is said to limit the geographical areas and medical specializations in which physicians are willing to practice. As a result, the high costs of medical liability insurance are ultimately said to affect whether or not people have access to health care services. ^ In an effort to control the medical liability insurance crises—and to preserve or restore peoples' access to health care—every state in the United States has passed "at least some laws designed to reduce medical malpractice premium rates" (GAO, 2003, p.5-6). More recently, however, the United States has witnessed a push to implement federal reform of the medical malpractice tort system. Accordingly, this project focuses on federal medical malpractice tort reform. This project was designed to investigate the following specific question: Do the federal medical malpractice tort reform bills which passed in the House of Representatives between 1995 and 2005 differ in respect to their principle features? To answer this question, the text of the bills, law review articles, and reports from government and private agencies were analyzed. Further, a matrix was compiled to concisely summarize the principle features of the proposed federal medical malpractice tort reform bills. Insight gleaned from this investigation and matrix compilation informs discussion about the potential ramifications of enacting federal medical malpractice tort reform legislation. ^
Resumo:
"Section 155.19 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215ILCS5/155.19) requires the Department of Insurance to periodically release a medical malpractice claims study"--P. [1].
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for calendar year 2014 from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
Resumo:
The Iowa Insurance Division requested open and closed claim data for a calendar year from licensed insurance companies pursuant to Iowa Code Section 505.27. Licensed companies who wrote medical malpractice insurance in Iowa during the period from January 1, through December 31, were asked to provide specific data for claims closed during that period and separately those remaining open at the end of the year.
