Statistics of opinion domains of the majority-vote model on a square lattice

The existence of juxtaposed regions of distinct cultures in spite of the fact that people's beliefs have a tendency to become more similar to each other's as the individuals interact repeatedly is a puzzling phenomenon in the social sciences. Here we study an extreme version of the frequency-dependent bias model of social influence in which an individual adopts the opinion shared by the majority of the members of its extended neighborhood, which includes the individual itself. This is a variant of the majority-vote model in which the individual retains its opinion in case there is a tie among the neighbors' opinions. We assume that the individuals are fixed in the sites of a square lattice of linear size L and that they interact with their nearest neighbors only. Within a mean-field framework, we derive the equations of motion for the density of individuals adopting a particular opinion in the single-site and pair approximations. Although the single-site approximation predicts a single opinion domain that takes over the entire lattice, the pair approximation yields a qualitatively correct picture with the coexistence of different opinion domains and a strong dependence on the initial conditions. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations indicate the existence of a rich distribution of opinion domains or clusters, the number of which grows with L(2) whereas the size of the largest cluster grows with ln L(2). The analysis of the sizes of the opinion domains shows that they obey a power-law distribution for not too large sizes but that they are exponentially distributed in the limit of very large clusters. In addition, similarly to other well-known social influence model-Axelrod's model-we found that these opinion domains are unstable to the effect of a thermal-like noise.

Reverse transcription of a naturally occurring nonretroviral RNA produces a precise deletion in the majority of its cDNA products

A precise, reproducible deletion made during in vitro reverse transcription of RNA2 from the icosahedral positive-stranded Helicoverpa armigera stunt virus (Tetraviridae) is described. The deletion, located between two hexamer repeats, is a 50-base sequence that includes one copy of the hexamer repeat. Only the Moloney murine leukemia virus reverse transcriptase and its derivative Superscript I, carrying a deletion of the carboxy-terminal RNase H region, showed this response, indicating a template-switching mechanism different from one proposed that involves a RNase H-dependent strand transfer, Superscript II, however, which carries point mutations to reduce RNase H activity, does not cause a deletion. A possible mechanism involves the enzyme pausing at the 3' side of a stem-loop structure and the 3' end of the nascent DNA strand separating from the template and reannealing to the upstream hexamer repeat.

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label ('majority' versus 'minority'), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects' for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be interpreted as expressing neighborhood, and which is formalized by a graph. Our restriction on preferences is as follows: each agent can freely rank his immediate neighbors, but then he is indifferent between each neighbor and all other agents that this neighbor "leads to". Hence, agents can be highly perceptive regarding their neighbors, while being insensitive to the differences between these and other agents which are further removed from them. We show quasi-transitivity of the majority relation when the graph expressing the neighborhood relation is a tree. We also discuss a further restriction allowing to extend the result for more general graphs. Finally, we compare the proposed restriction with others in the literature, to conclude that it is independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

Characterization of a Plasmodium falciparum mutant that has deleted the majority of the gametocyte-specific Pf11-1 locus

We identified a gametocyte-specific protein of Plasmodium falciparum called Pf11-1 and provide experimental evidence that this molecule is involved in the emergence of gametes of the infected erythrocyte (gametogenesis). A mutant parasite clone, which has deleted over 90% of the PF11-1 gene locus, was an important control to establish the gametocyte-specific expression of the Pf11-1. Molecular analysis of the Pf11-1 deletion indicates that it is presumably due a chromosome breakage with subsequent "healing" by the addition of telomeric heptanucleotides. Moreover, similar DNA rearrangements are observed in most of the laboratory isolates during asexual propagation in vitro.

Ethnic minority-majority asymmetry in national attitudes around the world: A multilevel analysis

Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, this research investigated asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities towards their country and explored the impact of human development, ethnic diversity, and social inequality as country-level moderators of national attitudes. In line with the general hypothesis of ethnic asymmetry, we found that ethnic, linguistic, and religious majorities were more identified with the nation and more strongly endorsed nationalist ideology than minorities (H1, 33 countries). Multilevel analyses revealed that this pattern of asymmetry was moderated by country-level characteristics: the difference between minorities and majorities was greatest in ethnically diverse countries and in egalitarian, low inequality contexts. We also observed a larger positive correlation between ethnic subgroup identification and both national identification and nationalism for majorities than for minorities (H2, 20 countries). A stronger overall relationship between ethnic and national identification was observed in countries with a low level of human development. The greatest minority-majority differences in the relationship between ethnic identification and national attitudes were found in egalitarian countries with a strong welfare state tradition.