Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

Federal tax deductibility for local taxes and its effect on local revenue policies

This dissertation analyzes whether and how changes in federal tax policy affect local tax policies, specifically, the elimination of the federal deductibility of state and local taxes for individual taxpayers by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) in 59 California cities. Two methods are used in the study: a survey of local revenue officials and a time event time-series/cross sectional sales tax reliance study.^ The reliance study uses a covariance model to pool cross-section and time-series observations. The results of the reliance study indicate a statistically significant overall decline in sales tax reliance after 1986. The results of the survey indicate that local policy makers generally do not believe that federal deductibility is an important factor when considering raising local sales taxes. Further analysis shows that local revenue officials claiming federal deductibility is not an important factor are associated mostly with cities that registered no significant decline in sales tax reliance after 1986. Similarly, local revenue officials claiming federal deductibility is an important factor when considering local tax policy are associated mostly with cities that suffered a significant decline in sales tax reliance after 1986.^ Of that group, further analysis shows that the declines in sales tax reliance are associated mostly with cities located in the southwestern part of the state. When compared to other cities in the state, an analysis of variance reveals that there are a series of statistically significant factors associated with southwestern cities which may contribute to the decline in sales tax reliance following the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. ^

Tuloverotuksen reaalinen muuttuminen Suomessa : Kuusikymmentä vuotta verojen vuoristorataa

The study seeks to find out whether the real burden of the personal taxation has increased or decreased. In order to determine this, we investigate how the same real income has been taxed in different years. Whenever the taxes for the same real income for a given year are higher than for the base year, the real tax burden has increased. If they are lower, the real tax burden has decreased. The study thus seeks to estimate how changes in the tax regulations affect the real tax burden. It should be kept in mind that the progression in the central government income tax schedule ensures that a real change in income will bring about a change in the tax ration. In case of inflation when the tax schedules are kept nominally the same will also increase the real tax burden. In calculations of the study it is assumed that the real income remains constant, so that we can get an unbiased measure of the effects of governmental actions in real terms. The main factors influencing the amount of income taxes an individual must pay are as follows: - Gross income (income subject to central and local government taxes). - Deductions from gross income and taxes calculated according to tax schedules. - The central government income tax schedule (progressive income taxation). - The rates for the local taxes and for social security payments (proportional taxation). In the study we investigate how much a certain group of taxpayers would have paid in taxes according to the actual tax regulations prevailing indifferent years if the income were kept constant in real terms. Other factors affecting tax liability are kept strictly unchanged (as constants). The resulting taxes, expressed in fixed prices, are then compared to the taxes levied in the base year (hypothetical taxation). The question we are addressing is thus how much taxes a certain group of taxpayers with the same socioeconomic characteristics would have paid on the same real income according to the actual tax regulations prevailing in different years. This has been suggested as the main way to measure real changes in taxation, although there are several alternative measures with essentially the same aim. Next an aggregate indicator of changes in income tax rates is constructed. It is designed to show how much the taxation of income has increased or reduced from one year to next year on average. The main question remains: How aggregation over all income levels should be performed? In order to determine the average real changes in the tax scales the difference functions (difference between actual and hypothetical taxation functions) were aggregated using taxable income as weights. Besides the difference functions, the relative changes in real taxes can be used as indicators of change. In this case the ratio between the taxes computed according to the new and the old situation indicates whether the taxation has become heavier or easier. The relative changes in tax scales can be described in a way similar to that used in describing the cost of living, or by means of price indices. For example, we can use Laspeyres´ price index formula for computing the ratio between taxes determined by the new tax scales and the old tax scales. The formula answers the question: How much more or less will be paid in taxes according to the new tax scales than according to the old ones when the real income situation corresponds to the old situation. In real terms the central government tax burden experienced a steady decline from its high post-war level up until the mid-1950s. The real tax burden then drifted upwards until the mid-1970s. The real level of taxation in 1975 was twice that of 1961. In the 1980s there was a steady phase due to the inflation corrections of tax schedules. In 1989 the tax schedule fell drastically and from the mid-1990s tax schedules have decreased the real tax burden significantly. Local tax rates have risen continuously from 10 percent in 1948 to nearly 19 percent in 2008. Deductions have lowered the real tax burden especially in recent years. Aggregate figures indicate how the tax ratio for the same real income has changed over the years according to the prevailing tax regulations. We call the tax ratio calculated in this manner the real income tax ratio. A change in the real income tax ratio depicts an increase or decrease in the real tax burden. The real income tax ratio declined after the war for some years. In the beginning of the 1960s it nearly doubled to mid-1970. From mid-1990s the real income tax ratio has fallen about 35 %.

Impuestos locales a las transferencias de dominio de bienes inmuebles (Tema Central)

Este artículo versa sobre los impuestos municipales y metropolitanos a la transferencia de dominio de bienes inmuebles en el contexto ecuatoriano como parte de la tributación local, y examina con un enfoque teórico los elementos cardinales de esta específica imposición, así como de aspectos formales y de gestión, a remolque del marco normativo vigente. En esta línea se exponen algunas inconsistencias del régimen jurídico de la materia con el correlativo planteamiento de varios supuestos que podrían considerarse para la depuración del régimen en cuestión.

Extract from legislation passed 1799 February 7

One fragment of a leaf containing a handwritten extract from unidentified legislation stipulating that a section of the bill "should not be so construed as to exempt" the real estate of the College or its officers from payment of local taxes beyond that exempted in the Charter of 1650 and the state Constitution. The text includes the note, "passed 7 Feb'y --99" and presumably refers to the bill referenced in President Willard's letter to Samuel Phillips that "passed the House, and is now before the Senate." The section did not become part of the tax law.

Efectos fiscales de los asentamientos hidroeléctricos: el caso de la cuenca de los Ríos Negro y Nare en Colombia

Con la presencia de asentamientos hidroeléctricos en su territorio, los municipios del oriente y nordeste antioqueño han visto afectada su estructura tributaria y territorial, a pesar de la reglamentación compen­satoria del sector eléctrico. Este artículo, analiza los efectos tributarios generados por la compensación del impuesto predial. Para lograrlo se revisan los montos recibidos por los municipios de las empresas generadoras y se realiza una indagación empírica del impuesto bajo los escenarios con y sin asenta­mientos hidroeléctricos. De esta forma se determina el diferencial tributario. Se concluye que, además de la insuficiencia de las transferencias para compensar la pérdida del capital natural de las cuencas hidroeléctricas, la expansión del sector eléctrico genera regresividad tributaria, por causa de privilegios y exenciones concebidos por las Leyes.

Local air pollution and global climate change taxes: a distributional analysis

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