The rights approach to local public management: experiences from Brazil

The Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo, Public Management and Citizenship Program was set up in 1996 with Ford Foundation support to identify and disseminate Brazilian subnational government initiatives in service provision that have a direct effect on citizenship. Already, the program has 2,500 different experiences in its data bank, the results of four annual cycles. The article draws some initial conclusions about the possibilities of a rights-based approach to public management and about the engagement of other agencies and civil society organizations.

Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper examines the impact of urban sprawl, a phenomenon of particular interest in Spain, which is currently experiencing this process of rapid, low-density urban expansion. Many adverse consequences are attributed to urban sprawl (e.g., traffic congestion, air pollution and social segregation), though here we are concerned primarily with the rising costs of providing local public services. Our initial aim is to develop an accurate measure of urban sprawl so that we might empirically test its impact on municipal budgets. Then, we undertake an empirical analysis using a cross-sectional data set of 2,500 Spanish municipalities for the year 2003 and a piecewise linear function to account for the potentially nonlinear relationship between sprawl and local costs. The estimations derived from the expenditure equations for both aggregate and six disaggregated spending categories indicate that low-density development patterns lead to greater provision costs of local public services.

The effects of poor financial information systems on the long term sustainability of local public services. Empirical evidence from the Catalan Municipalities

In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accountingand we comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local publicservices. We relate these features to the lack of incentives amongst publicmanagers for improving the financial reporting and thus management of publicassets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians and managers since it allowsfor larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, these beingarguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the shorttime perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors runagainst public accountability. This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using anunique sample. We take data from around forty Catalan local authorities withpopulation above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-98. We build this databasis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can be linkedto some other local social and economic variables in order to test ourassumptions. The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financialillusion index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure.This reflects on important overruns and increases of the delay in payingsuppliers, as well as on a higher difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanismsfor FI creation have to do among other factors, with delays in paying suppliers(and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit of service), no adequateprovision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding either forreposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way inwhich capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result,for most of the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuityand sustainability of public services provision are today at risk.Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude thatpublic regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems inlocal public management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs.

Report on the Local Public Health Services Grant administered by the Bureau of Local Public Health Services, a division of Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Prevention of the Iowa Department of Public Health for the period July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2008

Report on the Local Public Health Services Grant administered by the Bureau of Local Public Health Services, a division of Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Prevention of the Iowa Department of Public Health for the period July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2008

Citizens' control and the efficiency of local public services

Està àmpliament acceptat que la descentralització fiscal incrementa el control dels ciutadans sobre els polítics, fomenta el rendiment de comptes i augmenta l¿eficiència. Aquest treball té per objectiu identificar les característiques socio-econòmiques dels ciutadans (votants potencials) que generen un major control sobre els responsables polítics locals provocant, així, un major nivell d'eficiència en un context descentralitzat.També s'analitzen les característiques fiscals dels governs locals que fomenten aquest control i eficiència. L'estudi s'ha aplicat a una mostra de municipis catalans seguint la metodologia convencional basada en l'estimació en dues etapes. A la primera etapa s'estima l'eficiència en que operen els municipis mitjançant la tècnica DEA. La novetat rau en el càlcul d'una nova versió d'indicador global d¿output municipal. En la segona etapa, a través d¿una estimació tipus Tobit (models censurats) i de mètodes bootstrap, es mostra com els factors abans comentats poden influir sobre l¿eficiència. Els resultats suggereixen que la forta presencia de comerciants, jubilats i persones amb dret a vot afavoreixen el control dels ciutadans, el rendiment de comptes i l¿eficiència. Un factor que facilita aquest control, i per tant una major eficiència, és la presència de baixos costos d'oportunitat d'obtenir informació sobre la gestió local dels serveis públics.

Citizens' control and the efficiency of local public services

Està àmpliament acceptat que la descentralització fiscal incrementa el control dels ciutadans sobre els polítics, fomenta el rendiment de comptes i augmenta l¿eficiència. Aquest treball té per objectiu identificar les característiques socio-econòmiques dels ciutadans (votants potencials) que generen un major control sobre els responsables polítics locals provocant, així, un major nivell d'eficiència en un context descentralitzat.També s'analitzen les característiques fiscals dels governs locals que fomenten aquest control i eficiència. L'estudi s'ha aplicat a una mostra de municipis catalans seguint la metodologia convencional basada en l'estimació en dues etapes. A la primera etapa s'estima l'eficiència en que operen els municipis mitjançant la tècnica DEA. La novetat rau en el càlcul d'una nova versió d'indicador global d¿output municipal. En la segona etapa, a través d¿una estimació tipus Tobit (models censurats) i de mètodes bootstrap, es mostra com els factors abans comentats poden influir sobre l¿eficiència. Els resultats suggereixen que la forta presencia de comerciants, jubilats i persones amb dret a vot afavoreixen el control dels ciutadans, el rendiment de comptes i l¿eficiència. Un factor que facilita aquest control, i per tant una major eficiència, és la presència de baixos costos d'oportunitat d'obtenir informació sobre la gestió local dels serveis públics.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Local Public Health Guidebook, September 2011

The local board of health is described in law in Iowa Code Chapter 137. It is described in rule in Iowa Administrative Code chapter 641.77. Law and rule define the structure, powers, and duties of the local board of health. The following information is a summation of the two. LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH JURISDICTION AND APPOINTMENT: There are three types of local boards of health. 1. City (has to have been in existence before July 1, 2010) 2. County 3. District • City boards of health have jurisdiction over public health matters within the city. City board members are appointed by the city council. • County boards of health have jurisdiction over public health matters within the county. County board members are appointed by the county board of supervisors. • District boards of health have jurisdiction over public health matters within the district. District board of health members are appointed by the county boards of supervisors from the counties represented by the district.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An empirical analysis

Intermunicipal cooperation is being increasingly adopted in various countries as a part of local service delivery reforms. This paper draws on survey data from Spain’s municipalities to examine the reasons underpinning the decisions of local governments to engage in intermunicipal cooperation and privatisation. Our empirical analysis indicates that small municipalities prefer to rely on cooperation for reducing costs, while their larger counterparts prefer to privatise the delivery of services. By cooperating, scale economies can be achieved with lower transaction costs and fewer concerns for competition than is the case via private production.

A New Symbiosis: Municipalities, Private Contractors and Non-Governmental Organisations for the Provision of Local Public Services"

This project considered the second stage of transforming local administration and public service management to reflect democratic forms of government. In Hungary in the second half of the 1990s more and more public functions delegated to local governments have been handed over to the private or civil sectors. This has led to a relative decrease of municipal functions but not of local governments' responsibilities, requiring them to change their orientation and approach to their work so as to be effective in their new roles of managing these processes rather than traditional bureaucratic administration. Horvath analysed the Anglo-Saxon, French and German models of self-government, identifying the differing aspects emphasised in increasing the private sector's role in the provision of public services, and the influence that this process has on the system of public administration. He then highlighted linkages between actors and local governments in Hungary, concluding that the next necessary step is to develop institutional mechanisms, financial incentives and managerial practices to utilise the full potential of this process. Equally important is the need for conscious avoidance of restrictive barriers and unintended consequences, and for local governments to confront the social conflicts that have emerged in parallel with privatisation. A further aspect considered was a widening of the role of functional governance at local level in the field of human services. A number of different special purpose bodies have been set up in Hungary, but the results of their work are unclear and Horvath feels that this institutionalisation of symbiosis is not the right path in Hungary today. He believes that the change from local government to local governance will require the formulation of specific public policy, the relevance of which can be proven by processes supported with actions.

A model for use by local public health departments to evaluate pandemic influenza plans

The events of the 1990's and early 2000's demonstrated the need for effective planning and response to natural and man-made disasters. One of those potential natural disasters is pandemic flu. Once defined, the CDC stated that program, or plan, effectiveness is improved through the process of program evaluation. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999) Program evaluation should be accomplished not only periodically, but in the course of routine administration of the program. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999) Accomplishing this task for a "rare, but significant event" is challenging. (Herbold, John R., PhD., 2008) To address this challenge, the RAND Corporation (under contract to the CDC) developed the "Facilitated Look-Backs" approach that was tested and validated at the state level. (Aledort et al., 2006).^ Nevertheless, no comprehensive and generally applicable pandemic influenza program evaluation tool or model is readily found for use at the local public health department level. This project developed such a model based on the "Facilitated Look-Backs" approach developed by RAND Corporation. (Aledort et al., 2006) Modifications to the RAND model included stakeholder additions, inclusion of all six CDC program evaluation steps, and suggestions for incorporating pandemic flu response plans in seasonal flu management implementation. Feedback on the model was then obtained from three LPHD's—one rural, one suburban, and one urban. These recommendations were incorporated into the final model. Feedback from the sites also supported the assumption that this model promotes the effective and efficient evaluation of both pandemic flu and seasonal flu response by reducing redundant evaluations of pandemic flu plans, seasonal flu plans, and funding requirement accountability. Site feedback also demonstrated that the model is comprehensive and flexible, so it can be adapted and applied to different LPHD needs and settings. It also stimulates evaluation of the major issues associated with pandemic flu planning. ^ The next phase in evaluating this model should be to apply it in a program evaluation of one or more LPHD's seasonal flu response that incorporates pandemic flu response plans.^