Developing a theatre of the integrated actor : the application of the Suzuki actor training method within three theatrical contexts

This research project examines the application of the Suzuki Actor Training Method (the Suzuki Method) within the work ofTadashi Suzuki's company in Japan, the Shizuoka Performing Arts Complex (SPAC), within the work of Brisbane theatre company Frank:Austral Asian Performance Ensemble (Frank:AAPE), and as related to the development of the theatre performance Surfacing. These three theatrical contexts have been studied from the viewpoint of a "participant- observer". The researcher has trained in the Suzuki Method with Frank:AAPE and SP AC, performed with Frank:AAPE, and was the solo performer and collaborative developer in the performance Surfacing (directed by Leah Mercer). Observations of these three groups are based on a phenomenological definition of the "integrated actor", an actor who is able to achieve a totality or unity between the body and the mind, and between the body and the voice, through a powerful sense of intention. The term "integrated actor" has been informed by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and his concept of the "lived body". Three main hypotheses are presented in this study: that the Suzuki Method focuses on actors learning through their body; that the Suzuki Method presents an holistic approach to the body and the voice; and that the Suzuki Method develops actors with a strong sense of intention. These three aspects of the Suzuki Method are explored in relation to the stylistic features of the work of SPAC, Frank:AAPE and the performance Surfacing.

‘All in a day’s work’ : the lifeworld of older people in New Zealand rest homes

This doctoral thesis contributes to critical gerontology research by investigating the lived experiences of residents in the everyday world of New Zealand rest homes. There is a need to understand how frail rest home residents experience "age". This study focuses on describing and understanding residents lived experiences. As the New Zealand population is ageing, this phenomenological focus adds clarity to the poorly understood lived experiences about being aged in rest homes. Policy initiatives such as the Positive Ageing Strategy with its emphasis on keeping older people living in the community largely ignore the life practices of the increasing proportions of frail older people who require long-term residential care. My mixed-methods modified framework approach draws on the lifeworld as understood by Max van Manen (1990) and Alfred Schütz (1972). The lifeworld is made up of thematic strands of lived experience: these being lived space, lived time, lived body and lived relations with others, which are both the source and object of phenomenological research (van Manen, 1990). These strands are temporarily unravelled and considered in-depth for 27 residents who took part in audio-recorded interviews, before being interwoven through a multiple-helix model, into an integrated interpretation of the residents‟ lifeworld. Supplementing and backgrounding the interviews with these residents, are descriptive data including written interview summaries and survey findings about the relationships and pastimes of 352 residents living in 21 rest homes, which are counted and described. The residents day-to-day use of rest home space, mediated temporal order, self-managed bodies and minds, and negotiated relationships are interpreted. The mythology of the misery of rest home life is challenged, and a more constructive critical gerontology approach is offered. Findings of this research reveal how meanings around daily work practices are constructed by the residents. These elders participate in daily rest home life, from the sidelines or not at all, as they choose or are able, and this always involves work for the residents. They continue to actively manage satisfactory and fulfilling pastimes and relationships, because in their ordinary, everyday lifeworld it is “all in a day‟s work”.

Incarnate Subjectivity : The Constitutive Significance of Embodiment in Husserlian Phenomenology

This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.

Kotitaloustaidon ulottuvuuksia : Analyysi kotitaloustaidosta eksistentialistis-hermeneuttisen fenomenologian valossa

DOMESTIC SKILLS AS THE ART OF EVERYDAY LIFE. An inquiry about domestic skills as a way of being-in-the-world in the light of existentialist-hermeneutics phenomenology. This study focuses on analyzing domestic skills in a phenomenological manner. The description phenomenological emerges from the interpretation process, which originates from the ontological question of domestic skills. The ontological question of how domestic skills are directs one s phenomenological gaze to the experiencing of domestic skills, rather than merely viewing their action or technical aspects. Along with the ontological question, the axiological question of what the meaning of domestic skills is drives the analysis. This study is both theoretical and philosophical. Phenomenology is the guiding philosophy, theory and methodology of the inquiry. Existentialist-hermeneutics is the emphasis which most appropriately describes the phenomenological attitude adopted within the analysis. Martin Heidegger s philosophy of being and Maurice Merleau-Ponty s philosophy of the lived body essentially form the theoretical base for the inquiry. The analysis reveals domestic skills within a core of Care and the Other. Care and the Other are anchored both in Heidegger s analysis of Dasein and in Merleau-Ponty s analysis of the reversible being-in-the-world. The social nature of being and the action-oriented intentionality of the lived body are embodied in Care and the Other. This ontological base of domestic skills enables us to see the extensions that inhabit in it. These extensions are redoing, emotional experiencing, adapting and emancipating. The analysis connects ability and action, which is why domestic skills and household activity must be seen as a united whole. This united whole is not the matter of the two components of the phenomenon, but is rather the matter of domestic skills as a way of being-in-the-world. Domestic skills are a channel for the phenomenon Home Economics to manifest in our lives. This is the gaze that presents domestic skills as to be like the poetry of everyday life. The main result of the study is the elucidation of the ontology of domestic skills and the naming of its extensions. This growth of philosophical understanding makes it possible to strengthen the science of home economics.

Luonnoksia käsityön ruumiillisuudesta. : Käsityö Maurice Merleau-Pontyn ruumiinfenomenologian valossa.

Purpose This study focused on craft from a standpoint of phenomenological philosophy and craft was interpreted through Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. The main focus was the physical phase of the craft process, wherein a product is made from material. The aim was to interpret corporality in craft. There is no former research focusing on lived body in craft science. Physical, bodily making is inalienable in craft, but it is not articulated. Recent discussion has focused on craft as ”whole”, which emphasizes designing part in the process, and craft becomes conceptualized with the theories of art and design. The axiomatic yet silenced basis of craft, corporality, deserves to become examined as well. That is why this study answers the questions: how craft manifests in the light of phenomenology of the body and what is corporality in craft? Methods In this study I cultivated a phenomenological attitude and turned my exploring eye on craft ”in itself”. In addition I restrained myself from mere making and placed myself looking at the occurrence of craft to describe it verbally. I read up Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body on his principal work (2002) and former interpretations of it. Interpreting and understanding textual data were based on Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and the four-pronged composition of the study followed Koski’s (1995) version of the Gadamerian process of textual interpretation. Conclusions In the construction of bodily phenomenology craft was to be contemplated as a mutual relationship between the maker and the world materializing in bodily making. At the moment of making a human being becomes one with his craft, and the connection between the maker, material and the equipment appears as communication. Operational dimension was distinctive in the intentionality of craft, which operates in many ways, also in craft products. The synesthesia and synergy of craft were emphasized and craft as bodily practice came to life through them. The moment of making appeared as situation generating time and space, where throwing oneself into making may give the maker an experience of upraise beyond the dualism of mind and body. The conception of the implicit nature of craft knowledge was strengthened. In the light of interpretation it was possible to conceptualize craft as a performance and making ”in itself” as a work of art. In that case craft appeared as bodily expression, which as an experience approaches art without being it after all. The concept of aesthetic was settled into making as well. Bodily and phenomenological viewpoint on craft gave material to critically contemplate the concept of “whole craft” (kokonainen käsityö) and provided different kind of understanding of craft as making.

O corpo como obra de arte e fundador da experiência estética em MerleauPonty

Este trabalho parte de uma leitura da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty centrada na noção de Corpo como Obra de arte, fundamentando-se no pressuposto de que se trata de um conceito fundamental da fenomenologia contemporânea e da estética. Este trabalho assume a tarefa de mostrar que, Merleau-Ponty discute a questão do corpo como obra de arte não com os pressupostos do intelectualismo, do empirismo, ou antes, da Psicologia Clássica, mas tomando como base o vivido, o corpo como aquele que percebe, que está situado num mundo e que portanto ele tem um corpo que é fundante. É neste sentido que o seu projeto filosófico se fundamenta, em primeiro lugar, na tentativa de estabelecer um retorno ao vivido e a tarefa da compreensão de que a verdadeira filosofia é reaprender a ver o mundo. Por conseguinte, justifica-se uma investigação que irá pensar o corpo como obra de arte e como tal, inacabada e ao mesmo tempo, ele se dá através de seus desdobramentos na medida em que o sentido só é acessível por um contato direto. Do mesmo modo, partindo de uma compreensão merleau-pontiana de corpo como obra de arte, por fim, este trabalho assume também a tarefa de se indagar acerca da repercussão desta mesma afirmação na relação do saber filosófico consigo mesmo, logo, no modo da própria filosofia entender a sua história, estando, pois, a importância desta incursão no ensejo de explicitar o que, para Merleau Ponty, seria um corpo comparado a obra de arte como um nó de significações vivas e não a lei de um certo número de termos co-variantes.

O corpo vivido entre afetos: psicorporeidade e intersubjetividade em Ferenczi, Balint e Winnicott

Esta tese pretende reafirmar duas dimensões existenciais, constituintes do ser humano: a psicorporeidade e a intersubjetividade. O ser humano é uma unidade psicossomática que se constitui no e através do ambiente humano que é seu entorno. Essa afirmativa parece nada incomum em 2005, mas não foi a hegemônica no pensamento ocidental. No racionalismo dualista, proposto por Platão na antiguidade e radicalizado e sistematizado por Descartes na modernidade, vigorava a radical separação entre corpo (res extensa) e alma (res cogitans), entre sujeito e objeto. Recorro à noção de corpo vivido na intersubjetividade, presente em Merleau-Ponty, para expor como concebo estas duas dimensões. Assinalo os paralelos de sua concepção ulterior (a noção de carne) com a da reformulação teórica freudiana - a partir da introdução do conceito de narcisismo (1914c) e do inconsciente originário, enraizado no corpo (1923a). Este é o período da formulação freudiana no qual encontram-se os pilares das principais concepções desenvolvidas por Ferenczi, Balint e Winnicott, clínicos da psicanálise cujas contribuições podem ser agrupadas no que denomino de matriz ferencziana - destacando-se a reformulação da teoria do trauma e a proposta clínica da regressão/progressão num ambiente facilitador que propicie continente para a experiência subjetiva. O segundo objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar a articulação entre as suas principais obras e como as dimensões da psicorporeidade e da intersubjetividade nelas estão presentes.

The Pontydian Performance:the performative layer

In this paper we reflect on the performer-instrument relationship by turning towards the thinking practices of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological idea of the body as being at the centre of the world highlights an embodied position in the world and bestows significance onto the body as a whole, onto the body as a lived body. In order to better understand this two-way relationship of instrument and performer, we introduce the notion of the performative layer, which emerges through strategies for dealing with discontinuities, breakdowns and the unexpected in network performance.

Experiences and meaning of the aquatic environment for individuals with physical disabilities

This study examines the experiences and meaning of physical activity in the aquatic environment to enhance social, cultural and political understanding of its impact in the lives of individuals with physical disabilities. Interviews, lived experience descriptions and artifacts present an explanation of the felt sense oftheir bodies as they engage in swimming or scuba diving. 11 Combining written, verbal and visual descriptions generated by informants provides a detailed account of the unique qualities of physical activity in the water for those with physical disabilities. Participants' descriptions highlight that context is an important aspect of physical activity among individuals with physical disabilities through discussion of motility and the role of the lived body. Aspects of the aquatic environment create a setting that facilitates forgetfulness of the lived body's presence. Instructors and participants alike will benefit from learning the difference between the object body and the lived body, listening to the body's voice as they participate in physical activity .

Encountering the suffering other in illness narratives : between the memory of suffering and the suffering memory

Cette étude porte sur la dimension intersubjective de la souffrance qui affecte le rapport du souffrant à son corps, au temps et à l’espace vécus de même que son identité narrative et sa mémoire narrative. Mon argument principal est que la voix narrative constitue le rapport intersubjectif dans les récits de maladie que les proches écrivent sur leurs partenaires souffrant de cancer de cerveau ou de la maladie d’Alzheimer. Ma discussion est basée sur l’éthique, la phénoménologie, les théories de l’incorporation, les études des récits de vie, la sociologie et l’anthropologie médicales et la narratologie. L’objet de mon étude est l’expérience incorporée de la souffrance dans les récits de maladie et je me concentre sur la souffrance comme perte de la mémoire et du soi narratif. J’analyse le journal How Linda Died de Frank Davey et les mémoires de John Bayley, Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch et Iris and Her Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire. J’explore comment les récits de maladie constituent le rapport éthique à l’Autre souffrant de la rupture de la mémoire. La discussion de la voix est située dans le contexte des récits de vie et se propose de dépasser les limites des approches sociologiques et anthropologiques de la voix dans les récits de maladie. Dans ce sens, dans un premier temps je porte mon attention sur des études narratologiques de la voix en indiquant leurs limites. Ma propre définition de la voix narrative est basée sur l’éthique dans la perspective d’Emmanuel Levinas et de Paul Ricœur, sur l’interprétation du temps, de la mémoire et de l’oubli chez St-Augustin et la discussion levinasienne de la constitution intersubjective du temps. J’avance l’idée que la “spontanéité bienveillante” (Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre 222) articule la voix narrative et l’attention envers l’Autre souffrant qui ne peut plus se rappeler, ni raconter sa mémoire. En reformulant la définition augustinienne du temps qui met en corrélation les modes temporels avec la voix qui récite, j’avance l’idée que la voix est distendue entre la voix présente de la voix présente, la voix présente de la voix passée, la voix présente de la voix future. Je montre comment la voix du soignant est inscrite par et s’inscrit dans les interstices d’une voix interrompue, souffrante. Je définis les récits de vies comme des interfaces textuelles entre le soi et l’Autre, entre la voix du soi et la voix du souffrant, comme un mode de restaurer l’intégrité narrative de l’Autre.

Circulation symbolique des désordres fonctionnels gastro-intestinaux : étude réalisée dans les familles québécoises francophones

La présente étude en anthropologie médicale propose d’examiner la dimension socioculturelle des désordres fonctionnels gastro-intestinaux (DFGI) en considérant l’expérience de six familles québécoises francophones où un pré-adolescent souffre de symptômes associés à un DFGI. Le regard anthropologique qui nous a permis d’appréhender ces expériences de douleur s’appuie principalement sur les travaux issus de la psychiatrie transculturelle, de même que sur les influences de l’anthropologie du corps et de la phénoménologie. À travers ce regard, la somatisation est considérée comme une forme de communication de la douleur, modulée de manière importante par le contexte socioculturel et représentative d’une certaine souffrance sociale. Ce langage ponctué d’idiomes de détresse et de métaphores permet aux individus d’exprimer leur souffrance et de mobiliser un soutien social efficace pour la prendre en charge. Dès lors, le corps doit être perçu comme un corps vécu; comme un lieu de marquage du social, mais également comme un instrument de positionnement social et une frontière où des mouvements d’appartenance et de divergence sont exprimés. Par l’exploration, dans chacune de ces familles, des différentes manières de décrire les symptômes, de les interpréter et d’y réagir, nous avons procédé à la reconstruction d’histoires particulières pour voir comment ces symptômes venaient s’inscrire dans la biographie individuelle et familiale. À travers l’analyse de la construction du sens de la douleur et des pratiques adoptées pour la contrôler, la douleur abdominale nous est apparue comme intimement liée à l’expérience sociale et la médicalisation comme une base pour une meilleure appréhension de cette douleur. Par ses maux de ventre, l’enfant exprime ses limites corporelles et sociales. À l’intérieur de la famille, l’expression de cette limite peut être parfois dérangeante, confrontante, et même entraîner des rapports conflictuels. C’est ainsi qu’est « négociée » une approche appropriée à la douleur qui redéfinit les rôles de chacun par rapport à cette dernière. Le ventre devient le médiateur qui permet le compromis nécessaire au « vivre ensemble » ou au « vivre dans le monde ». À l’issue de ii cette négociation qui implique la participation du médecin traitant, les rapports sont parfois reconstruits et la relation au monde et aux autres peut devenir différente.

Interior architecture

Interior Architecture brought together eight very different artists who employed a range of processes and materials in their exploration of the body in space. What was refreshing about this exhibition was the fact that architecture was examined in relation to the lived body of the artist. Since contemporary discussions about architecture tend to either explore its relationship to media or (more concretely) the built versus the natural environment, it was significant that each artist instead examined architecture in the context of their personal experience of space

Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science

What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.

Is Merleau-Ponty's position in phenomenology of perception a new type of transcendental idealism?

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.