Reforming the Iowa Civil Justice System, January 30, 2012

Executive Summary I. Survey The Task Force conducted a wide-ranging survey of more than 9,000 licensed Iowa attorneys and judges to obtain their input on a variety of civil justice system topics. The survey results helped inform the Task Force of problem areas in Iowa’s civil justice system. II. Two-Tier Justice System The Task Force recommends a pilot program based on a two-tier civil justice system. A two-tier system would streamline litigation processes—including rules of evidence and discovery disclosures—and reduce litigation costs of certain cases falling below a threshold dollar value. III. One Judge/One Case and Date Certain for Trial Some jurisdictions in Iowa have adopted one judge/one case and date certain for trial in certain cases. The assignment of one judge to each case for the life of the matter and the establishment of dates certain for civil trials could enhance Iowans’ access to the courts, improve judicial management, promote consistency and adherence to deadlines, and reduce discovery excesses. IV. Discovery Processes Reforms addressing inefficient discovery processes will reduce delays in and costs of litigation. Such measures include adopting an aspirational purpose for discovery rules to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,” holding discovery proportional to the size and nature of the case, requiring initial disclosures, limiting the number of expert witnesses, and enforcing existing rules. V. Expert Witness Fees The Task Force acknowledges the probable need to revisit the statutory additional daily compensation limit for expert witness fees. Leaving the compensation level to the discretion of the trial court is one potential solution. VI. Jurors Additions to the standard juror questionnaire would provide a better understanding of the potential jurors’ backgrounds and suitability for jury service. The Task Force encourages adoption of more modern juror educational materials and video. Rehabilitation of prospective jurors who express an unwillingness or inability to be fair should include a presumption of dismissal. VII. Video and Teleconferencing Options When court resources are constrained both by limited numbers of personnel and budget cuts, it is logical to look to video and teleconferencing technology to streamline the court process and reduce costs. The judicial branch should embrace technological developments in ways that will not compromise the fairness, dignity, solemnity, and decorum of judicial proceedings. VIII. Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution(ADR) Litigants and practitioners in Iowa are generally satisfied with the current use of private, voluntary ADR for civil cases. There is concern, however, that maintaining the status quo may have steep future costs. Court-annexed ADR is an important aspect of any justice system reform effort, and the Task Force perceives benefits and detriments to reforming this aspect of the Iowa civil justice system. IX. Relaxed Requirement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law A rule authorizing parties to waive findings of fact and conclusions of law could expedite resolution of nonjury civil cases. X. Business (Specialty) Courts Specialty business courts have achieved widespread support across the country. In addition, specialty courts provide excellent vehicles for implementing or piloting other court innovations that may be useful in a broader court system context. A business specialty court should be and could be piloted in Iowa within the existing court system framework of the Iowa Judicial Branch. Appendix included as a separate document, is 176 pages.

Internet press releases : informative or manipulative?

Una anàlisi de la difusió voluntària de dades o la seva gestió discreta en els Comunicats de Premsa i la importància de la presentació de resultats anuals. L¿exemple del context espanyol: cost de regulació i litigi.

Economics of Justice in Kerala

The focus of the present study is on issues related to Legal—Economics. The economic approach to legal issues is based on the belief held by both legal professionals and economists that law and economics are complementary disciplines and that collaboration is highly beneficial.The principles of economic analysis can help our understanding of the law. Economic approach has important effects on the costs and benefits that prospective litigants may expect from litigation and their decisions to litigate or to settle out of court. Economic consideration is also helpful to understand I 1 the significance of litigation costs, the practical problems of legal administration and the provision of legal servicesz. The economic approach to law is mainly based on the belief held by some economists that the core of economics, the theory of choice is in principle- applicable to all human and institutional behaviour.

Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Monopólio postal e litigância predatória pelos correios

Este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o comportamento da Empresa Brasileira de Correios e Telégrafos (ECT) no âmbito judicial diante de seus concorrentes e os clientes destes, buscando verificar se há evidências de que a empresa estaria praticando um ilícito concorrencial e utilizando o judiciário para prejudicar concorrentes no mercado e dificultar a entrada de novos agentes (ou seja, se haveria litigância predatória pelos Correios), mediante a criação de novos custos aos seus rivais e, assim, prejudicando a competição no setor postal. No âmbito jurídico, há pouca clareza quanto à extensão do monopólio postal e verifica-se, uma carência de política pública para o setor. Para realizar o estudo, foi analisado o contexto no qual se insere a conduta da ECT e foi elaborada uma base de dados a partir da análise de processos judiciais movidos pela ECT. Na análise empírica dos dados coletados, buscou-se avaliar como a decisão do STF sobre a existência e validade de uma exclusividade da ECT na prestação de certos serviços postais, tais quais definidos por lei, afetou a probabilidade de uma decisão final em 1ª instância ser favorável aos Correios. Os resultados indicaram que tal probabilidade é significativamente menor após a decisão do STF em 2009, o que serve de evidência de que a ECT vinha extrapolando seus direitos nos pedidos realizados judicialmente. Apesar de o contexto no qual a conduta se insere, especialmente quanto aos custos de litigar, indicarem racionalidade na conduta e de a análise empírica ir no mesmo sentido, as evidências não são fortes o suficiente para se concluir que a ECT praticou litigância predatória.

Birth, Development and Progressive Institutionalization of the Ombudsman in the Russian Legal and Political System

One of the current trends in governance and legal development in Russia is aimed at establishing a modern, efficient and internationally harmonised system of safeguards of human rights and civil liberties. A fairly recent addition to this system has been the institution of ombudsman as a public authority specialised in promoting and protecting human rights and civil liberties. The introduction of this institution as well as its formalisation at the constitutional and legislative levels has been increasingly relevant and important, as it raises the dealings between the state and the individual to a new level. As an independent public institution resolving conflicts between citizens and government authorities, the ombudsman makes steps, within the scope of his jurisdiction, to restitute individual rights, and helps to enhance the reputation of government. The present work describes and assesses the birth, development and institutionalization process of the Ombudsman Office in the Russian Federation, at federal and regional levels, with a particular emphasis on the role of international references and cooperation for institution building. Ombudsmen have done a magnificent job in demonstrating value with the resolution of individual and systemic complaints; subsequent improvements to government; and economic savings by mitigating litigation costs.

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.

Legal Change and the Social Value of Lawsuits

This paper integrates the literatures on the social value of lawsuits, the evolution of the law, and judicial preferences to evaluate the hypothesis that the law evolves toward efficiency. The setting is a simple accident model with costly litigation where the efficient law minimizes the sum of accident plus litigation costs. In the steady state equilibrium, the distribution of legal rules is not necessarily efficient but instead depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent.

The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue

The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs' expected recovery at trial compared to their filing costs, whereas the social value consists of the incentives suits create for injurers to invest in accident avoidance. Generally, there is no relationship between these two values: there may be either too many or too few suits from a social perspective. Thus, there is scope for corrective measures, although there is no simple policy. Extending the model to consider a negligence rule rather than strict liability, and to allow for pretrial settlements, leads to some modified conclusions but does not alter the basic insights.

A Note on Optimal Care by Wealth-Constrained Injurers

This paper clarifies the relationship between an injurer's wealth level and his care choice by highlighting the distinction between monetary and non-monetary care. When care is non-monetary, wealth-constrained injurers generally take less than optimal care, and care is increasing in their wealth level under both strict liability and negligence. In contrast, when care is monetary, injurers may take too much or too little care under strict liability, and care is not strictly increasing in injurer wealth. Under negligence, the relationship between injurer care and wealth is similar in the two formulations. However, when litigation costs are added to the model, the relationship between injurer care and wealth becomes non-monotonic under both liability rules.

Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Conventional tort law does not allow victims of exposure to a toxic substance to seek compensation until they develop actual symptoms of illness. This may effectively bar recovery because at the time the illness arises, injurers may be judgment proof. One possible response is to allow a tort for risk that allows victims to seek expected damages at the time of exposure. However, critics charge that this could create a 'race to file' wherein victims rush to file suit to ensure that they will get a share of the injurer's limited assets. We show that such a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file at exposure if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. If bankruptcy is not inevitable, it is possible that a tort for risk will trigger bankruptcy, although a no-bankruptcy equilibrium always exists and Paretodominates the bankruptcy equilibrium. We examine the consequences of the various tort-for-risk equilibria on the compensation of exposure victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.

A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral

This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims can take care. The basic conclusions of that literature remain valid in this context: the private and social values generally differ, and there is no necessary relationship between them, meaning that there may be either too many or too few suits. Introducing the possibility of victim care does, however, alter the calculation of the deterrent effect of lawsuits. In particular, because allowing suits tends to reduce the incentives for victims to invest in precaution, the social value of prohibiting suits increases in direct relation to the productivity of victim care in lowering accident risk.

Una sociedad legalista: Abogados, procuradores de causas y la creación de una cultura legal colonial en Lima y Potosí, 1540–1670

This study deals with the formation, reproduction, and the role in litigation of two branches of the legal profession, lawyers and procurators. They were the experts in charge of civil, criminal, and ecclesiastical litigation during the Old Regime. While the lawyers provided erudite legal advice, procurators oriented and drove the procedure as legal representatives of their clients. The European legal revolutions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries forged a new legal culture in which the lawsuit was reputed to be the best way to settle disputes. Likewise, that legal culture conferred an important place to specialists as legal facilitators of the contending parties. When Castilians exported their legal system to the New World, they spread a complex and bureaucratic framework, contributing to the reproduction of a class of experts in urban spaces. Lima and Potosi, two urban centers created in the sixteenth century, quickly became significant ‘legal cities’. This dissertation explores how the legal markets of these cities operated, the careers of their specialists, their professional options, social images regarding them, and litigation costs. This study examines the careers of 267 facilitators and demonstrates that they constituted a class of distinctive legal professionals. Legal culture embodies the representation and use of law. The closeness of specialists with litigants, in particular of procurators familiarized the parties with litigation and its complex processes. These specialists forged dominant legal discourses and manipulated juridical order. Litigants were not passive agents of their specialists. Caciques and members of the Hispanicized communities appropriated the law in a visible way as the growing litigiousness illustrates. Colonial law (of a pluralistic basis) was an arena of assertion and discussion of rights by different social actors, encomenderos, leading citizens, widows, native chieftains, artisans, and commoners. This study concludes that this struggle and manipulation served to legitimate the role of those legal experts and gave birth to a complex legalistic society in the Andes under Spanish Habsburg rule.

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO disputes settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or in indirect ways. The argument is empirically assessed by conducting a case study on four West African cotton-producing countries (C4) and their involvement in dispute settlement.