A fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózati dinamikájának vizsgálata a likviditási válság előtt és után (Examination of the network dynamics of the uncovered interbank forint markel before the liquidity crisis and after)

A cikkben a magyar fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózatának időbeli alakulását vizsgáljuk 2002 decemberétől 2009 márciusáig. Bemutatjuk a piac általános jellemzőit (forgalom, kamatláb, koncentráció stb.) és az alapvető hálózati mutatókat. Azt tapasztaljuk, hogy az időszak első felében ezek a jellemzők lényegében stabilak voltak. 2006-2007-től kezdve azonban a mutatók egy része kezdett jelentősen megváltozni: a hitelfelvevők koncentrációja nőtt, az átlagos közelség és az átlagos fokszám csökkent, továbbá a hálózat magjának mérete is csökkent. Ezek a jelek arra utalhatnak, hogy a bankok már a válság kitörése előtt érzékelték a növekvő hitelkockázatot, és egyre inkább megválogatták, hogy kinek adnak hitelt. Figyelemre méltó, hogy mindeközben az általános piaci mutatók (forgalom, kamatláb, illetve ezek volatilitása) semmiféle változásra utaló jelet nem tükröztek egészen 2008 októberéig, de ekkor hirtelen minden mutatóban egyértelművé vált a rezsimváltás. Végül részletesen elemezzük az egyes szereplők viselkedését, és megmutatjuk, hogy válságban az egyes szerepek drasztikusan megváltoztak (például forrásokból nyelők lettek, és fordítva). / === / The article examines the changes in the network of Hungary's uncovered interbank forint market over the period Decembcr 2000 to March 2009. It presents the general features of the market (volume, interest rates, concentration etc.) and its basic network. It is found that the features were largely stable in the first half of the period, but some of the indicators began to change significantly in 2006-7: the concentration of borrowers incrcased, average distance and average degree declined, as did the size of the core of the network. These signs pointed to the fact that the banks had sensed an increase in credit risk even before the crisis broke and were becoming increasingly choosy selective in their lending. Meanwhile, however. there aerc no indications of change in the general market indicators (volume, interest rates, or volatility of these) right up to October 2008, when the change of regime was clear in all indicators. Finally, the authors analyse in detail the behaviour of each participant and show that thc roles of some altered drastically with the crisis (e.g. sources became consumers and vice versa).

Volt-e likviditási válság? Volatilitás és likviditás kapcsolatának vizsgálata (Was there a liquidity crisis? Analysis the relationship between volatility and liquidity)

Széleskörűen alátámasztott, empirikus tény, hogy önmagában a nagyobb volatilitás csökkenti a piac likviditását, vagyis változékonyabb piacokon várhatóan nagyobb lesz egy-egy tranzakció áreltérítő hatása. Kutatásomban azt a kérdést vizsgáltam, hogy a Budapesti Értéktőzsdén az OTP-részvény piacán a 2007/2008-as válságban tapasztalható, átmeneti likviditáscsökkenés betudható volt-e egyszerűen a megnövekedett volatilitásnak, vagy ezen túl abban más tényezők (pl. a szereplők körének és viselkedésének drasztikus megváltozása, általános forráscsökkenés stb.) is szerepet játszhattak-e. A volatilitást a loghozamok szórásával, illetve a tényleges ársávval, míg az illikviditást a Budapesti Likviditási Mértékkel (BLM) reprezentáltam. Egyrészt azt állapítottam meg, hogy az OTP esetében a tényleges ársáv szorosabban korrelál a BLM-mel, mint a szórás. Másrészt az is egyértelmű, hogy a válság előtti kapcsolat a volatilitás és a likviditás között a válságban és azután már jelentősen megváltozott. Válságban az illikviditás jóval nagyobb volt, mint amit a volatilitás növekedése alapján vártunk, a válság lecsengése után azonban megfordult ez a reláció. _________ It is a widely supported empirical fact, that the greater volatility in itself decreases the liquidity of the market, namely more volatile a market is, the higher a transaction’s price impact will be. I have examined in my paper the question, whether the decrease of liquidity during the crisis of 2007/2008 in case of the OTP stock – traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange – was the consequence of the increased volatility, or other factors had an effect on the illiquidity as well (e.g.: the drastic change of market participants’ behaviour; reduction of fi nancing sources; etc.). I have represented volatility with the standard deviation of the logreturns, and with the true range, while the illiquidity with the Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM). On one hand I have identifi ed, that in case of the OTP, the true range has a stronger relationship with the BLM than the standard deviation has. On the other hand it was clear, that the relationship between volatility and liquidity has changed notably during and after the crisis. During crisis the illiquidity was greater than what I have estimated based on the volatility increase, but after the crisis this relation has changed.

Bond fund runs: The financial crisis case

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of banks dimension on profitability, sustainability and efficiency: An analysis for the Iberian financial system

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The good, the bad and the ugly: The fall and resolution of Banco Espírito Santo

This case study – and accompanying teaching note – briefly describes the history of the Espírito Santo family, a banking dynasty who led one of Portugal’s leading economic and financial groups, along with its “crown jewel”, Banco Espírito Santo. It chronicles how the corporate governance issues at BES allowed the family to exploit the bank, its shareholders and its customers, so as to support its unprofitable non-financial businesses. This left the bank in a poor financial situation, which deteriorated beyond control, leaving regulators – whose actions are also analysed here – with no alternative, amidst a severe liquidity crisis, but to apply a resolution measure, pinning large losses on junior bondholders and shareholders before recapitalising the bank.

Cabelte restructuring by OxyCapital

This case study describes OxyCapital’s intervention in Cabelte’s operational and financial restructuring. Despite Cabelte’s strong debt burden, OxyCapital believed that the Group’s financial difficulties were temporary and that it had growth potential if the said restructuring would be implemented. Hence, while striving for an operational turnaround, OxyCapital managed to reach an agreement among not only the several banks but also the Group’s shareholder for the financial restructuring. The transaction included the acquisition of a majority stake on the Group’s share capital and of a significant part of Cabelte’s bank debt by OxyCapital’s Corporate Restructuring Fund.

Economic and legal analysis of mandatory non-recourse mortgages with applications to Spain

“The liquidity crisis of the Spanish banks is largely due to the lack of confidence of foreign investors and, therefore, the changes that occur in the legislation should not affect the credibility, stability, legal certainty, predictability that markets expect”.Sergio Nasarre (2011)In the current situation of economic crisis, many people have found they can no longer pay back the mortgage loans that were granted to them in order to purchase a dwelling. It is for this reason that, in light of the economic, political and social problems this poses, our paper studies the state of the Spanish real-estate system and of foreclosure, paying special attention to the solution that has been proposed recently as the best option for debtors that cannot make their mort-gage payments: non-recourse mortgaging. We analyze this proposal from legal and economic perspectives in order to fully understand the effects that this change could imply. At the same time, this paper will also examine several alternatives we believe would ameliorate the situation of mortgage-holders, among them legal reforms, mortgage insurance, and non-recourse mortgaging itself.

A curva de Rangel: origem, desenvolvimento e a formalização de Bresser-Pereira e Nakano

For Rangel inflation is caused by oligopolies and is necessary because it prevents a depression in an economy with low propensity to consume. Facing inflation, government prints money to avoid a liquidity crisis. This conception implies a double opposition to monetarist thought: conceives inflation as functional phenomenon and reverses the causality established by the quantitative equation. Bresser and Nakano were highly influenced by Rangel and stress that inflation is caused by oligopolies and also propose a "sanctioning role" of the state. However, these authors go further Rangel arguing that in recession inflation accelerates thus, formalizing a negative relationship between GDP growth and inflation, according with the so called "Rangel curve".

Vida y Muerte Empresarial. Caso de estudio Jeans and Jackets.

Dentro de este estudio de caso se busca identificar las posibles causas por las cuales una empresa de alto prestigio y reconocimiento por los consumidores colombianos, como lo era Jeans and Jackets, luego de treinta (30) años de funcionamiento se vio en la necesidad de acogerse a la Ley de Reestructuración Económica (Ley 550 de 1999) con el fin de reestructurar sus pasivos en un momento de crisis global que fue impredecible para muchas compañías. Desde el principio, el “Core Business” de Jeans and Jackets era la venta de prendas sofisticadas y de alta calidad a los jóvenes, especialmente en la capital de la República, con el fin de convertirse en la marca líder de este segmento de la industria. Este estudio de caso pretende identificar cuáles fueron las decisiones estratégicas implementadas por parte de la alta gerencia de la compañía en el contexto mencionado anteriormente que llevaron a la empresa a una crisis de liquidez. La metodología utilizada para el desarrollo de este estudio de caso se basa en variables cualitativas que permitan realizar un análisis profundo y la indagación sobre el fenómeno de morbilidad empresarial; De la misma manera se utilizan variables cuantitativas para observar la situación de la empresa financieramente y el desempeño económico de la misma.

Risk Allocation in Toll Highway Concessions in Spain: Lessons from Economic Recession

Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.

Understanding Liquidity and Credit Risks in the Financial Crisis

This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves latent factors which reflect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 fi nancial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more signifi cant role in the longer term (twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events in the financial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk.

Transmission of macro-liquidity shocks to liquidity-sorted stock portfolios’ returns: The role of the financial crisis

This study examines the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on the returns of UK stock portfolios sorted on the basis of a series of micro-liquidity measures. The macro-liquidity shocks are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in futures contracts on the 3-month LIBOR during the period June 1999- December 2009. We report definitive evidence that these shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with most liquid stocks playing a very active role. Our results emphatically document that the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign during the recent financial crisis; the standard inverse relationship between interest rate surprises and portfolios’ returns before the crisis has turned into positive during the crisis. This finding confirms the inability of interest rate cuts to boost returns in the shortrun during the crisis, because these were perceived by market participants as a signal of a deteriorating economic outlook.

Stock Market Liquidity and Macro-Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis

We develop an empirical framework that links micro-liquidity, macro-liquidity and stock prices. We provide evidence of a strong link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of UK stock portfolios constructed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures between 1999-2012. Specifically, macro-liquidity shocks, which are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, are transmitted in a differential manner to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with liquid stocks playing the most active role. We also find that there is a significant increase in shares’ trading activity and a rather small increase in their trading cost on MPC meeting days. Finally, our results emphatically document that during the recent financial crisis the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign. Interest rate cuts during the crisis were perceived by market participants as a signal of deteriorating economic prospects and reinforced “flight to safety” trading.

Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the Europeaninterbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find thatbanks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease theircredit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger forfirms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannotcompensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, theimpact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks.Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higherhoarding of liquidity.