649 resultados para License Revocations.


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Utah Department of Public Safety, Salt Lake City

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It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view.

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Drivers License Cost Study Report

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This 12 page document outlines the regulations for deer hunting in Iowa.

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This 12 page document outlines the regulations for deer hunting in Iowa.

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Regulations and lincense guide for fall turkey hunting.

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Regulations for hunting in Iowa.

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Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders arewidespread. In this paper, we measure the returns to an occupationallicense using novel data on Soviet trained physicians that immigrated toIsrael. An immigrant re-training assignment rule used by the IsraelMinistry of Health provides an exogenous source of variation inre-licensing outcomes. Instrumental variables and quantile treatmenteffects estimates of the returns to an occupational license indicate excesswages due to occupational entry restrictions and negative selectioninto licensing status. We develop a model of optimal license acquisitionwhich suggests that the wages of high-skilled immigrant physicians in thenonphysician sector outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrantsface in acquiring a medical license. Licensing thus leads to lower averagequality of service. However, the positive earnings effect of entry restrictionsfar outweighs the lower practitioner quality earnings effect that licensinginduces.