120 resultados para Licences exclusives
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Le phénomène du commerce parallèle repose sur un constat de base à la fois simple et évident: le niveau des prix d’un même produit « créé et fabriqué » par le même titulaire peut souvent varier de manière importante d’un pays à l’autre, en raison notamment des disparités dans le revenu moyen des consommateurs, des règlementations nationales entravant les échanges, ou encore du niveau de concurrence qui peut être affecté par des restrictions d’ordre privé, telles que des conventions de partage de marchés ou des contrats de distribution. Les commerçants que l’on appelle « importateurs parallèles » achèteront le produit là où il est le moins cher, qu’il provienne directement du titulaire ou non, en vue de le revendre là où ils pourront faire le meilleur profit. Dans ce contexte, des problèmes apparaîtront dans le pays d’importation dans la mesure où les commerçants parallèles vendront, bien évidemment, moins cher que les distributeurs désignés par le titulaire. Le titulaire en sa qualité de « créateur » de produits, est souvent titulaire de droits de propriété intellectuelle qu’il désirera, non sans une certaine légitimité, « monnayer », tentant ainsi de cloisonner les marchés en vue d’obtenir le prix le plus élevé qu’un consommateur serait prêt à payer pour un produit « x » sur un marché « y ». Cet essai a pour mérite de mettre en tension, d'une part, la liberté des échanges et de la concurrence qui favorisent, notamment, l’obtention des produits au meilleur prix pour les acheteurs et les consommateurs et, d’autre part, la nécessité de protéger les efforts de création dans l’industrie afin que celle-ci continue à investir dans la recherche et le développement de nouveaux produits.
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This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.
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This thesis examines the microeconomic consequences of the arrival of open source in the software market. Specifically, it analyzes three features of open source software by using specific models of industrial organization. Open source software is free, and may be modified or duplicated by anyone. The first paper studies the entry of an open source software in a closed source software market. Using a model of horizontal differentiation, the analysis considers a closed source firm's investment in the quality of its software. The introduction of open source on the market reduces the firm's investment in quality and increases the price of its software. Moreover, the entry of open source software may reduce consumer welfare. Post-entry by an open source software, the reduction in market share lowers the firm's incentive to invest in quality. The second paper features vertical differentiation to study a monopolist selling supporting product to its software. The study begins by contrasting the supply of support by an open source provider and a closed source vendor. The model shows that in both cases the levels of support offered are the same. In addition, consumer welfare is higher and profit lower under an open source software. Then, the paper considers the competition in the provision of support. Here, the supply of high level support is greater than under a monopolist. Finally, the monopolist adopts a dual licensing strategy to extract more surplus from developers interested in modifying open source software and redistributing the resulting product. This technique, when the developers place high value on the source code, generates more profit if the monopolist chooses to publish as open source rather than closed source. The last paper studies how a closed source firm is affected by the introduction of an open source benefiting from contributions by users. A vertical differentiation model is used, and reveals that, when contribution of users is present, the closed source vendor may lower its price to a level where it forces the open source out of the market. The firm's lower price not only increases demand for its software, but also induces consumers into switching from open to closed source software therefore reducing the contribution of users.
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This article analyses whether Creative Commons licences are applicable to and compatible with design. The first part focuses on the peculiar and complex nature of a design, which can benefit from a copyright and a design protection. This shows how it can affect the use of Creative Commons licences. The second and third parts deal with a specific case study. Some Internet platforms have recently emerged that offer users the possibility to download blueprints of design products in order to build them. Designers and creative users are invited to share their blueprints and creations under Creative Commons licences. The second part of the article assesses whether digital blueprints can be copyrightable and serve as the subject matter of Creative Commons licences, while the last part assesses whether the right to reproduce the digital blueprint, as provided by Creative Commons licences, extends to the right to build the product.
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The award of the digital dividend can consolidate auctions as the preferred mechanism for spectrum allocation. Knowing in advance an estimate of what the results of an auction with these characteristics could be would be unquestionably useful for those in charge of designing the process, even if at the end another method such as a beauty contest is chosen. This article provides a simulation of a digital dividend auction in a major-type European country. In one of the scenarios, the spectrum is not pre-allocated to any service in particular (service neutrality) while in the remaining four, blocks of spectrum are pre-allocated to DTT, mobile multimedia and mobile broadband communications. The results of the simulations reveal that the service neutrality scenario maximizes revenues for the seller and that, in general, DTT operators would seem to have fewer opportunities as the spectrum packaging is less protective for them.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Memoir of Col. Joseph Lemuel Chester ... by John Ward Dean.