O Estado e a aplicação de atos legistativos contrários ao princípio da reserva da lei penal

Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS

Defences in medical negligence : to what extent has tort law reform in Australia limited the liability of health professionals?

Tort law reform has resulted in legislation being passed by all Australian jurisdictions in the past decade implementing the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report. The report was in response to a perceived crisis in medical indemnity insurance. The objective was to restrict and limit liability in negligence actions. This paper will consider to what extent the reforms have impacted on the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions. The reversal of the onus of proof through the obvious risk sections has attempted to extend the scope of the defence of voluntary assumption of risk. There is no liability for the materialisation of an inherent risk. Presumptions and mandatory reductions for contributory negligence have attempted to reduce the liability of defendants. It is now possible for reductions of 100% for contributory negligence. Apologies can be made with no admission of legal liability to encourage them being made and thereby reduce the number of actions being commenced. The peer acceptance defence has been introduced and enacted by legislation. There is protection for good samaritans even though the Ipp Report recommended against such protection. Limitation periods have been amended. Provisions relating to mental harm have been introduced re-instating the requirement of normal fortitude and direct perception. After an analysis of the legislation, it will be argued in this paper that while there has been some limitation and restriction, courts have generally interpreted the civil liability reforms in compliance with the common law. It has been the impact of statutory limits on the assessment of damages which has limited the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions.

Defences in medical negligence : to what extent has tort law reform in Australia limited the liability of health professionals?

Tort law reform has resulted in legislation being passed by all Australian jurisdictions in the past decade implementing the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report. The report was in response to a perceived crisis in medical indemnity insurance. The objective was to restrict and limit liability in negligence actions. This paper will consider to what extent the reforms have impacted on the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions. After an analysis of the legislation, it will be argued in this paper that while there has been some limitation and restriction, courts have generally interpreted the civil liability reforms in compliance with the common law. It has been the impact of statutory limits on the assessment of damages through thresholds and caps which has limited the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions.

Physical effect in patent law

This thesis addresses one of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today. It is a question that strikes at the heart of what a patent is and what it is supposed to protect. That question is whether an invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether patent law contains a physicality requirement. Resolving this issue will determine whether only traditional mechanical, industrial and manufacturing processes are patent eligible, or whether patent eligibility extends to include purely intangible, or non-physical, products and processes. To this end, this thesis seeks to identify where the dividing line lies between patentable subject matter and the recognised categories of excluded matter, namely, fundamental principles of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. It involves determining which technological advances are worth the inconvenience monopoly protection causes the public at large, and which should remain free for all to use without restriction. This is an issue that has important ramifications for innovation in the ‘knowledge economy’ of the Information Age. Determining whether patent law contains a physicality requirement is integral to deciding whether much of the valuable innovation we are likely to witness, in what are likely to be the emerging areas of technology in the near future, will receive the same encouragement as industrial and manufacturing advances of previous times.

Free software and the law. Out of the frying pan and into the fire: How shaking up intellectual property suits competition law just fine

Free software is viewed as a revolutionary and subversive practice, and in particular has dealt a strong blow to the traditional conception of intellectual property law (although in its current form could be considered a 'hack' of IP rights). However, other (capitalist) areas of law have been swift to embrace free software, or at least incorporate it into its own tenets. One area in particular is that of competition (antitrust) law, which itself has long been in theoretical conflict with intellectual property, due to the restriction on competition inherent in the grant of ‘monopoly’ rights by copyrights, patents and trademarks. This contribution will examine how competition law has approached free software by examining instances in which courts have had to deal with such initiatives, for instance in the Oracle Sun Systems merger, and the implications that these decisions have on free software initiatives. The presence or absence of corporate involvement in initiatives will be an important factor in this investigation, with it being posited that true instances of ‘commons-based peer production’ can still subvert the capitalist system, including perplexing its laws beyond intellectual property.

Stability of systems with power-law non-linearities

It is shown that a sufficient condition for the asymptotic stability-in-the-large of an autonomous system containing a linear part with transfer function G(jω) and a non-linearity belonging to a class of power-law non-linearities with slope restriction [0, K] in cascade in a negative feedback loop is ReZ(jω)[G(jω) + 1 K] ≥ 0 for all ω where the multiplier is given by, Z(jω) = 1 + αjω + Y(jω) - Y(-jω) with a real, y(t) = 0 for t < 0 and ∫ 0 ∞ |y(t)|dt < 1 2c2, c2 being a constant associated with the class of non-linearity. Any allowable multiplier can be converted to the above form and this form leads to lesser restrictions on the parameters in many cases. Criteria for the case of odd monotonic non-linearities and of linear gains are obtained as limiting cases of the criterion developed. A striking feature of the present result is that in the linear case it reduces to the necessary and sufficient conditions corresponding to the Nyquist criterion. An inequality of the type |R(T) - R(- T)| ≤ 2c2R(0) where R(T) is the input-output cross-correlation function of the non-linearity, is used in deriving the results.

A general mass law for broadband energy harvesting

It is well known that the power absorbed by a linear oscillator when excited by white noise base acceleration depends only on the mass of the oscillator and the spectral density of the base motion. This places an upper bound on the energy that can be harvested from a linear oscillator under broadband excitation, regardless of the stiffness of the system or the damping factor. It is shown here that the same result applies to any multi-degree-of-freedom nonlinear system that is subjected to white noise base acceleration: for a given spectral density of base motion the total power absorbed is proportional to the total mass of the system. The only restriction to this result is that the internal forces are assumed to be a function of the instantaneous value of the state vector. The result is derived analytically by several different approaches, and numerical results are presented for an example two-degree-of-freedom-system with various combinations of linear and nonlinear damping and stiffness. © 2013 The Author.

Transgender Freedom and the Law: A Liberal-Poststructural Discussion on McNally

In R v McNally, gender deception is found capable of leading to the vitiation of consent to sexual intercourse and, in so doing, places restriction on the freedom of transgendered individuals in favour of cisgendered freedom. This paper seeks to challenge the standing of this decision by adopting a combined methodological approach between Deleuzian post-structuralism and Gewirthian legal idealism. In so doing, we attempt to show that the combination offers a novel and productive approach to contentious decisions, such as that in McNally. Our approach brings together post-structuralist corporeality which conceives of the body as material and productive, and Gewirth’s ‘agent’ to conceptualise the legal body as an entity which can, and should, shape judicial reasoning. It does this by employing the criterion of categorically necessary freedom on institutionalised practical reasoning. These ‘bodies of agents’ can be conceived as the underpinning and justificatory basis for the authority of the law subject to the morally rational Principle of Generic Consistency. This egalitarian condition precedent requires individualisation and the ability to accept self-differentiation in order to return to a status, which can be validly described as “law”. Ultimately, we argue that this theoretical combination responds to a call to problematise the connection made between gender discourse and judicial reasoning, whilst offering the opportunity to further our conceptions of law and broaden the theoretical armoury with which to challenge judicial reasoning in McNally. That is, a ‘good faith’ attempt to further and guarantee transgender freedoms.

The notions of 'restriction' and 'discrimination' in the context of the free movement of persons provisions: from a relationship of interdependence to one of (almost complete) independence

This article aims to analyse how the meaning of the notions of ‘restrictions’ and ‘discrimination’ in EU free movement law has developed through the years, and to explore how the relationship between them has evolved. It is explained that the two concepts under examination had originally been closely intertwined, in the sense that one defined the other, the element holding them together being the aim of the relevant provisions to liberalise the inter-State movement of persons in the EU, as part of the process of establishing an internal market. Yet, more recently, the way that the Court has chosen to delimit their scope, illustrates that each of these notions can now have a life of its own, meaning that ‘discrimination’ can include discriminatory measures which do not lead to restrictions that are contrary to the free movement provisions, and ‘restriction’ can cover national measures that are not discriminatory.

[Pamphlets on banks and banking law in Great Britain.

[1] Committee of Private Country Banks. Reasons against legislative interference. 1844.--[2] Drummond, Henry. Causes which lead to a bank restriction bill. 1839.--[3] Dun, John. The English bankers' grievance and its proper remedy. 1874.--[4] Greig, J.K. Bank note and banking reform. 1880.--[5] Holdsworth, A.H. A letter to a friend in Devonshire. 1818.--[6] Kinnear, George. Banks and exchange companies. 1847.--[7] A letter to the Right Hon. the Viscount Althorp on his proposed interference with the present system of country banking. 1833.--[8] LLoyds Bank Limited. Permanent staff training. 1919.--[9] [Maclean, A.W.] Additional considerations, addressed to all classes, on the necessity and equity of a national system of deposit-banking and paper currency. 1835.--[10] Nicholson, N.A. The controversy on free banking. 1868.--[11] Steele, F.E. On changes in the bank rate. [1891]--[12] Stirling, James. Practical considerations on banks and bank management. 1865.--[13] Thoughts upon the principles of banks, and the wisdom of legislative interference. 1837.--[14] Watt, Peter. The theory and practice of joint-stock banking. 1836.

Legislative restriction on the carrying trade of the railways of the state of New York : viewed in connection with outside competition : addressed to the citizens of the city and state of New York.

Cover title: Legislative restrictions on the carrying trade of the railways of the state of New York.

Speech of Mr. Otis, on the restriction of slavery in Missouri : Delivered in the Senate of the United States, January 25, 1820.

Not in Lib. Company. Afro-Americana.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.