Luck and the control theory of knowledge

The dissertation accomplishes two aims: 1) to diagnose what prevents true beliefs from being knowledge; 2) to give an positive account of knowledge. Concerning the first aim, it offers an account of the notion of luck. It defends the view that luck is a form of risk and distinguishes two types of luck. Then, it applies the account to the problem of epistemic luck and distinguishes, accordingly, two types of epistemic luck. It is argued that these two types of epistemic luck explain the whole range of cases of not-known true belief. Concerning the second aim, the dissertation advances an account of knowledge in terms of the notion of cognitive control that deals with the two forms of epistemic luck distinguished.

Structural changes in the US economy: Bad Luck or Bad Policy?

This paper investigates the relationship between time variations in output and inflation dynamics and monetary policy in the US. There are changes in the structural coefficients and in the variance of the structural shocks. The policy rules in the 1970s and 1990s are similar as is the transmission of policy disturbances. Inflation persistence is only partly a monetary phenomena. Variations in the systematic component of policy have limited effects on the dynamics of output and inflation. Results are robust to alterations in the auxiliary assumptions.

Skill, Luck, Overconfidence, and Risk Taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making luck more important induces greater optimism for the former, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance.

Good genes and good luck: Ammonoid diversity and the end-Permian mass extinction

The end-Permian mass extinction removed more than 80% of marine genera. Ammonoid cephalopods were among the organisms most affected by this crisis. The analysis of a global diversity data set of ammonoid genera covering about 106 million years centered on the Permian-Triassic boundary (PTB) shows that Triassic ammonoids actually reached levels of diversity higher than in the Permian less than 2 million years after the PTB. The data favor a hierarchical rather than logistic model of diversification coupled with a niche incumbency hypothesis. This explosive and nondelayed diversification contrasts with the slow and delayed character of the Triassic biotic recovery as currently illustrated for other, mainly benthic groups such as bivalves and gastropods.

The Price of luck

We find that the vast majority of students taking an advanced undergraduate finance course show a preference for luck in a classroom experiment. In Phase I of the experiment part of the students, group A, were asked to guess a coin toss five times in a row. In Phase II the rest of the students, group B, were given 10 EUR to bet on some of the Group A students taking a second go at guessing a sequence of five coin tosses (Phase III). Group B students’ bets were by default allocated to the worse performing student in Phase I. Switching to better performing Group A students was costly. A total of 23 out of 28 students were willing to pay for switching and thus showed a preference for luck.

La controverse avant le film : quelle politique pour Good Night, And Good Luck ?

This article aims to explain how newspapers commented on the movie Good Night, and Good Luck before its release. The media coverage anticipated George Clooney's film as a partisan attack launched against George W. Bush's policy since 9/11. Clooney advocates another reading: the historic confrontation between journalist Edward Murrow and Senator Joseph McCarty permits to reflect on the crucial role that the media play for democracy. Such reflection tries to prevent the dividing of the public sphere into antagonistic camps opposing "friends" to "foes," a division that undermines the possibility of a true pluralism. Our socio-semiotic analysis will focus on the critical work accomplished by the media, and on the way that work determines the collective meaning of a cultural object. Simultaneously, we will discuss the necessary conditions for pluralism in a public sphere.

How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility

Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.

Billy's luck.

Forma parte de una colección de libros de ficción estructurada en varias etapas, desde la diez a la catorce, y que tiene como finalidad que los alumnos de entre 7 y 11 años adquieran una mayor capacidad lectora. Para ello, las formas narrativas de las historias se hacen cada vez más complejas y se amplia el vocabulario de ellas; se aumentan el número de páginas y de texto y se reduce el número de ilustraciones. Joel y Alex juegan al fútbol en el Beaver Road Juniors, pero saben que su equipo es muy malo. Cuando Billy se incorpora a éste, hay una posibilidad de que la suerte cambie.

The bad luck of King Fred.

El pobre rey Fred está pasando una temporada de mala suerte y no sabe qué hacer para evitarlo. Además, el nuevo consejero real por intentar protegerlo de las supersticiones,le esta complicando la vida en palacio. Por todo esto, los trajes del rey están descuidados,su bigote más caído y su comportamiento se ha vuelto más gruñón.

Can I be a luck egalitarian and a Rawlsian?

Luck egalitarianism and Rawlsianism have been presented as competing answers to the same question: the question of distributive justice. In this paper, I show how they are in fact not different theories of the same thing, but rather different theories of different things - different answers to different questions. I trace the history of luck egalitarian thinking and try to show why Rawlsianism and luck egalitarianism were taken to be the same kind of project. I then examine different ways that one could consistently endorse (some version of) luck egalitarianism and (some version of/elements of) Rawls' theory.

Choices, chance and change: luck egalitarianism over time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone – if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken – that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.

Separating skill from luck in REIT mutual funds

This study uses a bootstrap methodology to explicitly distinguish between skill and luck for 80 Real Estate Investment Trust Mutual Funds in the period January 1995 to May 2008. The methodology successfully captures non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of the funds. Using unconditional, beta conditional and alpha-beta conditional estimation models, the results indicate that all but one fund demonstrates poor skill. Tests of robustness show that this finding is largely invariant to REIT market conditions and maturity.

The performance of football club managers: skill or luck?

This paper evaluates the extent to which the performance of English Premier League football club managers can be attributed to skill or luck when measured separately from the characteristics of the team. We first use a specification that models managerial skill as a fixed effect and we examine the relationship between the number of points earned in league matches and the club’s wage bill, transfer spending, and the extent to which they were hit by absent players through injuries, suspensions or unavailability. We next implement a bootstrapping approach to generate a simulated distribution of average points that could have taken place after the impact of the manager has been removed. The findings suggest that there are a considerable number of highly skilled managers but also several who perform below expectations. The paper proceeds to illustrate how the approach adopted could be used to determine the optimal time for a club to part company with its manager. We are able to identify in advance several managers who the analysis suggests could have been fired earlier and others whose sackings were hard to justify based on their performances.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.