Why should Restrictive Clauses be applicable in Cases of Forced Selling of Limited Liability Company Shares?

In many European countries, one of the most complex and widely discussed issues addressed by legal systems with respect to forced selling of limited liability and public limited company shares is the impact of possible statutory restrictions on transfers . Thus, while some authors deny the applicability of such provisions (as a possible avenue for commission of creditor fraud) , others support their validity (on the basis of prevention of possible fraudulent actions affecting interests protected by restrictive causes). In my opinion, a solution must be found in which prosecution of creditor fraud co-exists with respect for the rights scheme. As a general rule, this solution would call for applicability of restrictive clauses to cases of forced selling, regardless of whether such statutory provisions are viewed in terms of order or alienation.

The Illinois Limited Liability Company Act.

Description based on: June 1994; title from cover.

Limited liability corporations : administrative rules.

This booklet was published to help citizens to understand the rights, requirements, availability, and the use of names for registering a Limited Liability Company in Illinois and to explain what must be done to keep a limited liability company in good standing with the Office of the Secretary of State.

The special rights other than shares in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union. A perspective from the Spanish Law

The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.

Report of the departmental committee appointed by the Board of trade to inquire what amendments are necessary in the acts relating to joint stock companies incorporated with limited liability under the Companies acts, 1862 to 1890 : with appendix.

At head of title: Companies acts 1862 to 1890 (Amendment).

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.

Predicting bankruptcy of Finnish limited liability companies from historical financial statements

This master’s thesis studies the probability of bankruptcy of Finnish limited liability companies as a part of credit risk assessment. The main idea of this thesis is to build and test bankruptcy prediction models for Finnish limited liability companies that can be utilized in credit decision making. The data used in this thesis consists of historical financial statements from 2112 Finnish limited liability companies, half of which have filed for bankruptcy. A total of four models are developed, two with logistic regression and two with multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA). The time horizon of the models varies from 1 to 2 years prior to the bankruptcy, and 14 different financial variables are used in the model formation. The results show that the prediction accuracy of the models ranges between 81.7% and 88.9%, and the best prediction accuracy is achieved with the one year prior the bankruptcy logistic regression model. However the difference between the best logistic model and the best MDA model is minimal. Overall based on the results of this thesis it can be concluded that predicting bankruptcy is possible to some extent, but naturally the results are not perfect.

The role of auditors in the Finnish limited liability companies as to solvency test in the context of asset distribution

Suomen osakeyhtiölain mukaan varoja ei saa jakaa, jos jaosta päätettäessä tiedetään tai pitäisi tietää yhtiön olevan maksukyvytön tai jaon aiheuttavan maksukyvyttömyyden. Ongelmallista on, että maksukykyä ei ole selvästi määritelty laissa tai hallituksen esityksessä. Tilintarkastuslain mukaan tilintarkastajan on siten huomautettava, jos maksukykytestiä on rikottu, mutta tilintarkastaja joutuu yleensä määrittelemään tällaiset huomauttamista vaativat tilanteet itse. Maksukykytestistä on kirjoitettu suomalaisessa yhtiöoikeuden ja laskentatoimen kirjallisuudessa melko kattavasti. Kuitenkin tilintarkastajaa koskeva näkökulma on saanut osakseen suhteellisen vähän huomiota. Tästä näkökulmasta on kirjoitettu vain joitakin korkeakoulujen tutkielmia sekä lyhyehköjä ammatillisia seminaariesityksiä. Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on ollut koota laaja yleiskuva siitä, miten tilintarkastajat itse kokevat asemansa ja tehtävänsä yllä kuvatuissa tilanteessa. Tutkielmassa on käyty läpi aikaisempaa yhtiöoikeuden ja laskentatoimen kirjallisuudessa ja seminaariesityksissä esitettyä aineistoa. Lisäksi tutkielmaa varten tehtiin suomalaisille tilintarkastajille kohdennettu Internet-pohjainen kysely. Tutkielma selkeyttää kuvaa siitä, miten tilintarkastajat toimivat yllä kuvatussa tilanteessa ja miten he ovat sopeuttaneet toimiaan yhteiskunnan institutionaalisen asetelman muututtua. Kirjallisuuden pohjalta tapahtuva teoreettinen analyysi on yhdistetty kyselyyn siitä, miten tilintarkastajat käytännössä toimivat. Tutkimuksen perustana olevaa tietoa on analysoitu pääosin kyselytutkimuksen menetelmin, mutta myös tilastollisen tutkimuksen menetelmiä on käytetty. Tutkielman tuloksena tutkielmassa selvitetään tilintarkastajan tehtäviä maksukykytestin yhteydessä. Tuloksena voidaan myös todeta, että tilintarkastaja ei suorita varojenjaossa tarvittavan maksukyvyn arvioinnin kannalta keskeisiä tarkastustoimenpiteitä ainoastaan tilikauden päättymisen jälkeen. Päinvastoin, tällaisia tarkastustoimenpiteitä suoritetaan enemmän tai vähemmän koko tilintarkastuksen aikana. Lisäksi vaikuttaisi siltä, että tilintarkastajan oma suhtautuminen maksukykytestiin on ainakin jossain määrin merkityksellinen sen kannalta, kuinka paljon tarkastustoimenpiteitä tehdään ja kuinka paljon maksukyvystä ja siihen liittyvistä puutteista raportoidaan yhtiön johdolle.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.