Flexible labour markets, workers' protection and the security of the wings": a Danish flexicurity solution to the unemployment and social problems in globalized economies"

Includes bibliography

Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation.

Unleashing Competition in EU Business Services. CEPS Policy Brief No. 284, 24 September 2012

In most EU member states, the business services industry has booked no productivity growth during the last two decades. The industry’s performance in the other member states was weaker than that of its US counterparts. Exploring what may be causing this productivity stagnation, this policy brief reports that weak competition has contributed to the continuing malaise in European business services. The study analyzed the persistence (over time) of firm-level inefficiencies. The evidence further suggests that competition between small firms and large firms in business services is weak. Markets for business services work best in countries with flexible regulation on employment change and with low regulatory costs for firms that start up or close down a business. Countries that are more open to foreign competition perform better in terms of competitive selection and productivity. The policy simulations in this paper show that greater import openness strengthens competition in business services markets. The largest positive impact comes from lower regulatory barriers for growing and shrinking firms. More particularly, competitive selection would be fostered by a reduction of administrative and regulatory costs related to labour contracts, bankruptcy and start-up requirements. A key element of the European Commission’s Europe-2020 strategy is the Single European Market for Services. Business services form one of the largest industries in Europe – and given its productivity stagnation, it deserves to be a priority target of the Europe-2020 strategy. Improving the way the business services market functions may have large positive knock-on effects for the EU economy.

Employment relations : integrating industrial relations and human resource management

Incorporating Human Resource Management policies within the regulatory and institutional framework that governs contemporary industrial relations has always been problematic. This paper details the nature and causes of this problem, noting the different conceptual and practical understandings that underpin each form of labour management when being applied in organisational settings. It then looks at a range of industrial relations realities confronting managers when trying to apply HRM practices, and how these practices might be accommodated within the context of such realities as a means of improving organisational effectiveness. In so doing it delineates four approaches an organisation might take in its relations with trade unions when bargaining and concluding labour contracts, and which of these are consistent and inconsistent with the coexistence of HRM and industrial relations practices. It then looks at the issue of workplace change involving trade unions and collective bargaining in terms of three categorical models—the management-driven model, the trade union gatekeeper model, and the management-union alliance model, the intention again being to show which are consistent and inconsistent with the coexistence of these different forms of labour management. The paper concludes by drawing on these conceptual models to outline the issues and policies that need to be considered when applying HRM practices within an industrial relations setting.

Social Panorama of Latin America 1999-2000

Includes bibliography

Informalidad, inseguridad y cohesión social en América Latina

Incluye Bibliografía

Government procurement contracts and minimum labour standards enforcement: Rhetoric, duplication and distraction?

Government contracts for services typically include terms requiring contractors to comply with minimum labour standards laws. Procurement contract clauses specify reporting procedures and sanctions for non-compliance, implying that government contracting agencies will monitor and enforce minimum labour standards within contract performance management. In this article, the case of school cleaners employed under New South Wales government contracts between 2010 and 2011 is the vehicle for exploring the effectiveness of these protective clauses. We find that the inclusion of these protective clauses in procurement contracts is unnecessary in the Australian context, and any expectations that government contracting agencies will monitor and enforce labour standards are misleading. At best, the clauses are rhetoric, and at worst, they are a distraction for parties with enforcement powers.

Educational Mismatch and Employment Contracts: A Labour Productivity Analysis

SCOPUS: no.j

Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy

A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-ended contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-ended contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level.

Firing and training costs and labour market segmentation

This dissertation consists of three essays on the labour market impact of firing and training costs. The modelling framework resorts to the search and matching literature. The first chapter introduces firing costs, both liner and non-linear, in a new Keynesian model, analysing business cycle effects for different wage rigidity degrees. The second chapter adds training costs in a model of a segmented labour market, accessing the interaction between these two features and the skill composition of the labour force. Finally, the third chapter analyses empirically some of the issues raised in the second chapter.

Case note - Roosters, ducks and labour hire arrangements : Damevski v Guidice (2003) 202 ALR 494 (FCA Full Court)

One of the features of the current Australian labour market is the growth in the number of businesses "contracting out" work that was previously performed by their employees. The "contracting out" is often done through labour hire arrangements: the business engages a labour hire agency to provide it with suitable labour on an "as needs" basis. A common scenario is that the labour hire agency contracts both with the workers who provide the services to the agency's client, and with the client to whom those services are provided. Often the agency pays the workers and bills its client for the labour costs, plus a service fee. Research indicates that during the first half of the 1990s, "the number of agency workers more or less doubled."1 Analysis of the latest data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics on the number of workers employed through labour hire arrangements has suggested: "290,100 employees were 'on-hired' through agencies in June 2002 and 162,000 workers were paid by labour hire firms in November 2001 (almost doubling from 84,300 some three years earlier)." The value of the employment services industry in 2001-02 was $10.2 billion. 2

New directions for development banking in the Caribbean: financing to take advantage of unlimited supplies of labour skills and entrepreneurship

Includes bibliography

Labour costs and competitiveness in the Latin American manufacturing sector, 1990-1998

Includes bibliography

A tale of oversimplification and deregulation: the mainstream approach to labour market segmentation and the recent responses to the crisis in European countries. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 102/2013

After advocating flexibilization of non-standard work contracts for many years, some European and international institutions and several policy makers now indicate the standard employment relationship and its regulation as a cause of segmentation between the labour market of "guaranteed" insiders, employed under permanent contracts with effective protection against unfair dismissal, and the market of the “not-guaranteed” outsiders, working with non-standard contracts. Reforms of employment legislation are therefore being promoted and approved in different countries, allegedly aiming to balance the legal protection afforded to standard and non-standard workers. This article firstly argues that this approach is flawed as it oversimplifies reasons of segmentation as it concentrates on an “insiders-outsiders” discourse that cannot easily be transplanted in continental Europe. After reviewing current legislative changes in Italy, Spain and Portugal, it is then argued that lawmakers are focused on “deregulation” rather than “balancing protection” when approving recent reforms. Finally, the mainstream approach to segmentation and some of its derivative proposals, such as calls to introduce a “single permanent contract”, are called into question, as they seem to neglect the essential role of job protection in underpinning the effectiveness of fundamental and constitutional rights at the workplace.

Fixed wages and bonuses in agency contracts: the case of a continuous state space

In this paper, we extend the state-contingent production approach to principal–agent problems to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems. The central observation is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal contract may involve a fixed wage with a bonus for above-normal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" at the bottom in the optimal tax literature.