The Kremlin's Scholar. A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev

The memoirs are dominated by two grand figures of Soviet history, Stalin and Khrushchev. The account of Stalin is riddled with ambiguities. There is an undoubted personal admiration for Stalin, his intellectual and political capacity (Stalin allegedly read 300 pages per day), his simplicity in daily life seen in "an old tunic, patched-up socks, almost constant isolation" (p. 190). At the same time, Shepilov acknowledged the paranoid aspects of Stalin's personality, especially towards the end of his life. Stalin's mechanisms of power are illustrated by Shepilov's account of work on a new book on political economy. Stalin personally chose key people for important tasks and controlled them at key junctures to ensure the desired outcome. In this light, Shepilov's claims that the Great Purges of the late 1930s could have been outside of Stalin's immediate control seem implausible, to say the least (p. 41).

All Stalin's deficiencies, however, pale in comparison with those of Khrushchev, the bête noire of Shepilov's memoirs. There is plenty of criticism of Khrushchev's policies, particularly in agriculture and foreign affairs. What comes across most pungently is, however, Shepilov's disdain of Khrushchev's personality and leadership style. In this respect, the book is unashamedly biased and remarkable for its omissions as much as for its revelations.

The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

The invisible hand... of the Kremlin. Capitalism 'a la russe'. OSW Point of View, February 2007

This study describes the two main economic processes observed in Russia during President Vladimir Putin's second term; renationalisation, and the concentration of economic assets. As a result of these processes, the share of state-owned property has increased and the position of the state in the economy has strengthened. According to the authorities, the wide-range renationalisation of the assets and the construction of superholdings based on the state enterprises are intended to boost Russia's potential and stimulate the development of the whole economy. However, in practice the current ruling elite are using these superholdings to strengthen Russia's position on the international arena and to promote their vested interests.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Potemkin conservatism. An ideological tool of the Kremlin. OSW Point of View 48, February 2015

Since the beginning of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin has consistently invoked conservative ideology. Thus he legitimises the Kremlin’s new political strategy, the aim of which is to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation in Russia around a liberal agenda. This strategy is also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the current model of government, by portraying it as ‘traditional’ for Russia; and to justify the government’s repressive and anti-Western policies. It also includes the policy of reintegrating the post-Soviet space under the auspices of Moscow, as evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and the Novorossiya project. This strategy was devised as a response to the galvanisation of adherents of liberalisation in Russia, namely the new middle class and a part of the business and administrative elites who publicly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the regime in 2011 and 2012. However, the dissonance between the conservative slogans mouthed by the ruling elite and its actual conduct suggest that the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is purely instrumental in nature, which in the longer term will undercut its effectiveness by undermining its credibility in the eyes of Russian society.

He wanted to sleep in the Kremlin

Mode of access: Internet.

Case of Captain Abraham Wendell, Jr., of the brig Kremlin of New York, arising from an outrage perpetrated by him upon William Bell, first officer of said brig, in the port of Havana, July, 1838. ...

Mode of access: Internet.

A Body Outside the Kremlin

A BODY OUTSIDE THE KREMLIN is a historical mystery novel set in the Northern Camps of Special Significance, a Soviet Russian penal institution based in the Solovetsky Archipelago during the 1920s. The protagonist, working first with the camp authorities, then in spite of their disapproval, solves the murder of a fellow prisoner. In the process he improves his position within the camp, while also becoming hardened to the brutal necessities of camp life. Prior to the establishment of the penal camp, the Solovetsky Archipelago was the site of an important Russian Orthodox monastery, and the mystery proves to involve valuables, particularly icons, seized from the monks by the Soviet secret police. Thus the novel treats themes not only of statist repression, but also religious epiphany and the problems of true perception in a world of symbols.

"Kirjailijoiden tapaus" Venäjällä vuonna 1997

In the autumn of 1997, Russian government was faced with media pressure when owners of the TV channels ORT and NTV joined forces against it. This study is based on media sources from October 1997 to December 1997. It shows clearly how the enormous power of the media was able to dictate what happened in Russia. In the mid-1990s Russians started to talk about political technology, which became a commonly used term by professionals, journalists, politicians and intelligence services. As a result of this action, two leading reformers in the government, Anatoliy Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, were dismissed from their highly influential posts as finance and energy ministers respectively, but retained their power as first deputy prime ministers. According to the correspondents, the real reason was to resolve a conflict within the parliament, which had demanded the dismissal of Mr. Chubais. This demand was presented after Chubais had accepted $90,000 as a reward for co-writing a book on privatization. Chubais was considered to be Russia’s “business card” towards the west – the"Authors’ case" (Delo avtorov) was only solved after President Boris Yeltsin took part in the public debate. According to the research, the media owned by powerful businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinski, was able to use its own security services to expose sensitive material (Russian term ‘kompromat’), if necessary, concerning any given person. The so-called Authors’ case can be considered as a part of the battle and the tip of the iceberg in arrangements designed to organize the funding of the Russian presidential election campaign in 2000. The reason why this particular incident was so widely covered on television was because several programs aimed to reveal to the public "hidden bribes" that, as they claimed, government officials had received. The political aspect, however, was quite mild, when the concrete issues of possible dismissals of Ministers were debated in the Parliament. Everything was dealt with as a “family matter” inside Kremlin. Yeltsin's "family" consisted of practically anybody from oligarch Berezovsky to Chubais, the father of Russia's privatization policy. Methods of critical history implementation analysis has been used in this research in determining the use of the source material. Literature and interviews have also provided a good base for the study. The study proves that any literature dealing with the subject has not paid enough attention to how the dismissal of Alexander Kazakov, deputy of President’s administration, was linked directly with Gazprom, the state gas monopoly. Kazakov had to leave Gazprom and lose his position as Chubais' ally when the influential ORT television company was deteriorated.

The Soviet Union and the International Brigades, 1936-1939

The International Brigades are typically viewed as a fighting force whose impetus came from the Comintern, and thus from within the walls of the Kremlin. If the assumption is essentially correct, the broader relation between Stalin’s USSR and the IB has received little attention. This chapter constitutes an empirically-based study of the Soviet role not only in the formation of the IB, but of the Red Army’s collaboration with IB units, and Moscow’s role in the climax and denouement of the brigadistas’ Spanish experience. This study’s principal conclusion is twofold: First, that the creation and sustenance of the IB was part of Stalin’s goal of linking the Loyalist cause with that of the Soviet Union and international communism, a component of a larger geo-strategic gamble which sought to create united opposition to the fascist menace, one which might eventually bring Moscow and the West into a closer alliance. The second conclusion is that the IB, like the broader projection of Soviet power and influence into the Spanish theater, was an overly ambitious operational failure whose abortive retreat is indicative of the basic weakness of the Stalinist regime in the years prior to the Second World War.