Putting the horse before the cart: a pragmatist analysis of knowledge

The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition. So fruitful indeed that it renders the Gettier counterexamples vacuous, allowing positive work in epistemology and related disciplines.

Un intento de disolución al problema de Gettier

Esta monografía cuestiona la validez de la crítica de Gettier a la suficiencia de lo que ha sido conocido como el análisis “tradicional” del conocimiento. Este análisis establece el conocimiento como creencia, verdadera justificada. Gettier en su famoso artículo "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Propone una serie de contraejemplos que parecen cumplir con las tres condiciones recién establecidas, pero no puede ser considerado conocimiento. La monografía explora dos estrategias principales para responderle a Gettier: por un lado, me pregunto sí los contraejemplos realmente cumplen con las tres condiciones. Yo argumento que los contraejemplos de Gettier son imperfectos en cuanto a que no pueden cumplir con la condición de creencia; y si esto es así los contraejemplos no serían una amenaza al análisis “tradicional” del conocimiento ni tampoco serían una prueba de su insuficiencia. Por otro lado, si uno pudiera aceptar la validez de los contraejemplos uno podría aun cuestionar su relevancia. Esto es lo que pretendo hacer en la segunda parte de este trabajo. Intento mostrar que una solución al problema de Gettier no mejora para nada nuestra investigación metodológica, ni cambia de ninguna manera la forma en que nosotros adquirimos nuestras creencias y nuestro conocimiento en general. Por lo tanto, los contraejemplos de Gettier aun si pudieran funcionar correctamente (lo cual defiendo en la primera parte de la monografía que no es así) son irrelevantes y no son una amenaza real al análisis “tradicional” del conocimiento. La monografía se propone, entonces, efectuar una disolución más que una solución al problema de Gettier.

"Tracciature Digitali": la conoscenza nell'era informazionale

La specificità dell'acquisizione di contenuti attraverso le interfacce digitali condanna l'agente epistemico a un'interazione frammentata, insufficiente da un punto di vista computazionale, mnemonico e temporale, rispetto alla mole informazionale oggi accessibile attraverso una qualunque implementazione della relazione uomo-computer, e invalida l'applicabilità del modello standard di conoscenza, come credenza vera e giustificata, sconfessando il concetto di credenza razionalmente fondata, per formare la quale, sarebbe invece richiesto all'agente di poter disporre appunto di risorse concettuali, computazionali e temporali inaccessibili. La conseguenza è che l'agente, vincolato dalle limitazioni ontologiche tipiche dell'interazione con le interfacce culturali, si vede costretto a ripiegare su processi ambigui, arbitrari e spesso più casuali di quanto creda, di selezione e gestione delle informazioni che danno origine a veri e propri ibridi (alla Latour) epistemologici, fatti di sensazioni e output di programmi, credenze non fondate e bit di testimonianze indirette e di tutta una serie di relazioni umano-digitali che danno adito a rifuggire in una dimensione trascendente che trova nel sacro il suo più immediato ambito di attuazione. Tutto ciò premesso, il presente lavoro si occupa di costruire un nuovo paradigma epistemologico di conoscenza proposizionale ottenibile attraverso un'interfaccia digitale di acquisizione di contenuti, fondato sul nuovo concetto di Tracciatura Digitale, definito come un un processo di acquisizione digitale di un insieme di tracce, ossia meta-informazioni di natura testimoniale. Tale dispositivo, una volta riconosciuto come un processo di comunicazione di contenuti, si baserà sulla ricerca e selezione di meta-informazioni, cioè tracce, che consentiranno l'implementazione di approcci derivati dall'analisi decisionale in condizioni di razionalità limitata, approcci che, oltre ad essere quasi mai utilizzati in tale ambito, sono ontologicamente predisposti per una gestione dell'incertezza quale quella riscontrabile nell'istanziazione dell'ibrido informazionale e che, in determinate condizioni, potranno garantire l'agente sulla bontà epistemica del contenuto acquisito.

Belief Revision in Multi-Agent Systems

The ability to respond sensibly to changing and conflicting beliefs is an integral part of intelligent agency. To this end, we outline the design and implementation of a Distributed Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System (DATMS) appropriate for controlling cooperative problem solving in a dynamic real world multi-agent community. Our DATMS works on the principle of local coherence which means that different agents can have different perspectives on the same fact provided that these stances are appropriately justified. The belief revision algorithm is presented, the meta-level code needed to ensure that all system-wide queries can be uniquely answered is described, and the DATMS’ implementation in a general purpose multi-agent shell is discussed.

Luck and the control theory of knowledge

The dissertation accomplishes two aims: 1) to diagnose what prevents true beliefs from being knowledge; 2) to give an positive account of knowledge. Concerning the first aim, it offers an account of the notion of luck. It defends the view that luck is a form of risk and distinguishes two types of luck. Then, it applies the account to the problem of epistemic luck and distinguishes, accordingly, two types of epistemic luck. It is argued that these two types of epistemic luck explain the whole range of cases of not-known true belief. Concerning the second aim, the dissertation advances an account of knowledge in terms of the notion of cognitive control that deals with the two forms of epistemic luck distinguished.

Obtención mediante procesos quimioenzimáticos de monoglicéridos, y derivados de los mismo, con posible actividad antimicrobiana

The dissertation accomplishes two aims: 1) to diagnose what prevents true beliefs from being knowledge; 2) to give an positive account of knowledge. Concerning the first aim, it offers an account of the notion of luck. It defends the view that luck is a form of risk and distinguishes two types of luck. Then, it applies the account to the problem of epistemic luck and distinguishes, accordingly, two types of epistemic luck. It is argued that these two types of epistemic luck explain the whole range of cases of not-known true belief. Concerning the second aim, the dissertation advances an account of knowledge in terms of the notion of cognitive control that deals with the two forms of epistemic luck distinguished.

Justified Belief Change

Justification Logic is a framework for reasoning about evidence and justification. Public Announcement Logic is a framework for reasoning about belief changes caused by public announcements. This paper develops JPAL, a dynamic justification logic of public announcements that corresponds to the modal theory of public announcements due to Gerbrandy and Groeneveld. JPAL allows us to reason about evidence brought about by and changed by Gerbrandy--Groeneveld-style public announcements.

Disowned recollections:denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering

Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them-that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Belief Propagation and Revision in Networks with Loops

Local belief propagation rules of the sort proposed by Pearl(1988) are guaranteed to converge to the optimal beliefs for singly connected networks. Recently, a number of researchers have empirically demonstrated good performance of these same algorithms on networks with loops, but a theoretical understanding of this performance has yet to be achieved. Here we lay the foundation for an understanding of belief propagation in networks with loops. For networks with a single loop, we derive ananalytical relationship between the steady state beliefs in the loopy network and the true posterior probability. Using this relationship we show a category of networks for which the MAP estimate obtained by belief update and by belief revision can be proven to be optimal (although the beliefs will be incorrect). We show how nodes can use local information in the messages they receive in order to correct the steady state beliefs. Furthermore we prove that for all networks with a single loop, the MAP estimate obtained by belief revisionat convergence is guaranteed to give the globally optimal sequence of states. The result is independent of the length of the cycle and the size of the statespace. For networks with multiple loops, we introduce the concept of a "balanced network" and show simulati.

Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning:distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning

Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), which can be used to explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network of brain regions comprising a 'standard' network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here use of a novel task in which psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated brain activity in the 'standard' ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM.

A critical study of John Hick's religious pluralism

This study examines the pluralistic hypothesis advanced by the late Professor John Hick viz. that all religious faiths provide equally salvific pathways to God, irrespective of their theological and doctrinal differences. The central focus of the study is a critical examination of (a) the epistemology of religious experience as advanced by Professor Hick, (b) the ontological status of the being he understands to be God, and further asks (c) to what extent can the pluralistic view of religious experience be harmonised with the experience with which the Christian life is understood to begin viz. regeneration. Tracing the theological journey of Professor Hick from fundamentalist Christian to religious pluralist, the study notes the reasons given for Hick’s gradual disengagement from the Christian faith. In addition to his belief that the pre-scientific worldview of the Bible was obsolete and passé, Hick took the view that modern biblical scholarship could not accommodate traditionally held Christian beliefs. He conceded that the Incarnation, if true, would be decisive evidence for the uniqueness of Christianity, but rejected the same on the grounds of logical incoherence. This study affirms the view that the doctrine of the Incarnation occupies a place of crucial importance within world religion, but rejects the claim of incoherence. Professor Hick believed that God’s Spirit was at work in all religions, producing a common religious experience, or spiritual awakening to God. The soteriological dimension of this spiritual awakening, he suggests, finds expression as the worshipper turns away from self-centredness to the giving of themselves to God and others. At the level of epistemology he further argued that religious experience itself provided the rational basis for belief in God. The study supports the assertion by Professor Hick that religious experience itself ought to be trusted as a source of knowledge and this on the principle of credulity, which states that a person’s claim to perceive or experience something is prima facie justified, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Hick’s argument has been extensively developed and defended by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and William Alston. This confirms the importance of Hick’s contribution to the philosophy of religion, and further establishes his reputation within the field as an original thinker. It is recognised in this thesis, however, that in affirming only the rationality of belief, but not the obligation to believe, Professor Hick’s epistemology is not fully consistent with a Christian theology of revelation. Christian theology views the created order as pre-interpreted and unambiguous in its testimony to God’s existence. To disbelieve in God’s existence is to violate one’s epistemic duty by suppressing the truth. Professor Hick’s critical realist principle, which he regards as the key to understanding what is happening in the different forms of religious experience, is examined within this thesis. According to the critical realist principle, there are realities external to us, yet we are never aware of them as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us within our particular cognitive machinery and conceptual resources. All awareness of God is interpreted through the lens of pre-existing, culturally relative religious forms, which in turn explains the differing theologies within the world of religion. The critical realist principle views God as unknowable, in the sense that his inner nature is beyond the reach of human conceptual categories and linguistic systems. Professor Hick thus endorses and develops the view of God as ineffable, but employs the term transcategorial when speaking of God’s ineffability. The study takes the view that the notion of transcategoriality as developed by Professor Hick appears to deny any ontological status to God, effectively arguing him out of existence. Furthermore, in attributing the notion of transcategoriality to God, Professor Hick would appear to render incoherent his own fundamental assertion that we can know nothing of God that is either true or false. The claim that the experience of regeneration with which the Christian life begins can be classed as a mere species of the genus common throughout all faiths, is rejected within this thesis. Instead it is argued that Christian regeneration is a distinctive experience that cannot be reduced to a salvific experience, defined merely as an awareness of, or awakening to, God, followed by a turning away from self to others. Professor Hick argued against any notion that the Christian community was the social grouping through which God’s Spirit was working in an exclusively redemptive manner. He supported his view by drawing attention to (a) the presence, at times, of comparable or higher levels of morality in world religion, when contrasted with that evidenced by the followers of Christ, and (b) the presence, at times, of demonstrably lower levels of morality in the followers of Christ, when contrasted with the lives of other religious devotees. These observations are fully supported, but the conclusion reached is rejected, on the grounds that according to Christian theology the saving work of God’s Spirit is evidenced in a life that is changing from what it was before. Christian theology does not suggest or demand that such lives at every stage be demonstrably superior, when contrasted with other virtuous or morally upright members of society. The study concludes by paying tribute to the contribution Professor Hick has made to the field of the epistemology of religious experience.

Resistant Hypertension Revisited: Definition And True Prevalence.

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Justified Fault-Ride-Through Requirements for Wind Turbines in Power Systems

In this paper, a novel adaptive strategy to obtain technically justified fault-ride-through requirements for wind turbines (WTs) is proposed. The main objective is to promote an effective integration of wind turbines into power systems with still low penetration levels of wind power based on technical and economical considerations. The level of requirement imposed by the strategy is increased stepwise over time, depending on system characteristics and on wind power penetration level. The idea behind is to introduce stringent requirements only when they are technically needed for a reliable and secure power system operation. Voltage stability support and fault-ride-through requirements are considered in the strategy. Simulations are based on the Chilean transmission network, a midsize isolated power system with still low penetration levels of wind power. Simulations include fixed speed induction generators and doubly fed induction generators. The effects on power system stability of the wind power injections, integrated into the network by adopting the adaptive strategy, are compared with the effects that have the same installed capacity of wind power but only considering WTs able to fulfill stringent requirements (fault-ride-through capability and support voltage stability). Based on simulations and international experience, technically justified requirements for the Chilean case are proposed.

Bioimpedance: Is it a predictor of true water volume?

Bioelectrical impedance analysis (BIA) has been reported to be insensitive to changes in water volumes in individual subjects, This study was designed to investigate the effect on the intra- and extracellular resistances (Ri and Re) of the segments of subjects for whom body water was changed without significant change to the total amount of electrolyte in the respective fluids, Twelve healthy adult subjects were recruited. Ri and Re of the leg, trunk, and arm of the subjects were determined from BIA measures prior to commencement of two separate studies that involved intervention, resulting in a loss/gain of body water effected either bt a sauna followed by water intake (study 1) or by ingestion (study 2). Ri and Re of the segments were also determined at a number of times following these interventions, The mean change in body water, expressed as a percentage of body weight, was 0.9% in study 1 and 1.25% in study 2. For each study, the results for each subject were normalized for each limb to the initial (prestudy) value and then the normalized results for each segment were pooled for all subjects, ANOVA of these pooled results failed to demonstrate any significant differences between the normalized mean values of Ri or Re of the segments measured through the course of each study, The failure to detect a change in Ri or Re is explained in terms of the basic theory of BIA.