915 resultados para Justification of Principles of Justice


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Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.

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Includes bibliographical references.

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Formation of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) policy within the international climate regime has raised a number of discussions about ‘justice’. REDD+ aims to provide an incentive for developing countries to preserve or increase the amount of carbon stored in their forested areas. Governance of REDD+ is multi-layered: at the international level, a guiding framework must be determined; at the national level, strong legal frameworks are a pre-requisite to ensure both public and private investor confidence and at the sub-national level, forest-dependent peoples need to agree to participate as stewards of forest carbon project areas. At the international level the overall objective of REDD+ is yet to be determined, with competing mitigation, biological and justice agendas. Existing international law pertaining to the environment (international environmental principles and law, IEL) and human rights (international human rights law, IHRL) should inform the development of international and national REDD+ policy especially in relation to ensuring the environmental integrity of projects and participation and benefit-sharing rights for forest dependent communities. National laws applicable to REDD+ must accommodate the needs of all stakeholders and articulate boundaries which define their interactions, paying particular attention to ensuring that vulnerable groups are protected. This paper i) examines justice theories and IEL and IHRL to inform our understanding of what ‘justice’ means in the context of REDD+, and ii) applies international law to create a reference tool for policy-makers dealing with the complex sub-debates within this emerging climate policy. We achieve this by: 1) Briefly outlining theories of justice (for example – perspectives offered by anthropogenic and ecocentric approaches, and views from ‘green economics’). 2) Commenting on what ‘climate justice’ means in the context of REDD+. 3) Outlining a selection of IEL and IHRL principles and laws to inform our understanding ofjustice’ in this policy realm (for example – common but differentiated responsibilities, the precautionary principle, sovereignty and prevention drawn from the principles of IEL, the UNFCCC and CBD as relevant conventions of international environmental law; and UNDRIP and the Declaration on the Right to Development as applicable international human rights instruments) 4) Noting how this informs what ‘justice’ is for different REDD+ stakeholders 5) Considering how current law-making (at both the international and national levels) reflects these principles and rules drawn from international law 6) Presenting how international law can inform policy-making by providing a reference tool of applicable international law and how it could be applied to different issues linked to REDD+. As such, this paper will help scholars and policy-makers to understand how international law can assist us to both conceptualise and embody ‘justice’ within frameworks for REDD+ at both the international and national levels.

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[EN] On 17 February 2008 Kosovo approved its declaration of independence from Serbia. The declaration was raised as a unilateral secession, a category which to date is widely debated by the international community, but supported in that case by a respectable number of the United Nation member states. A great many legal issues have been raised by the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. This opinion was eagerly awaited by legal scholars due to both its possible effects and the scope of its principles outside the context of decolonization in what it could constitute of new approach to the international scenario for the twenty-first century. The ICJ stated that the declaration of independence was in accordance with international law if it was not prohibited. The answer turned on whether or not international law prohibited the declaration of independence, without ever examining whether an entity seeking secession is entitled with a positive right to secede and if so, under which circumstances. The basic issue can be summarised as whether or not we are facing a new course in the interpretation of certain classical categories of international law: the principle of territorial integrity, statehood, sovereignty, recognition, the right to external self-determination, etc. In this study we shall analyse some of the aspects arising from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo focusing on the territorial issue. Firstly we shall analyse the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and how it operates ; secondly, we shall focus on the scope of that principle in relation to the interior of the State, and ask ourselves how international law operates in relation to declarations of independence. Lastly, we shall deal with the principle of respect for territorial integrity in the specific case of Serbia with respect to Kosovo, and then end with a series of general conclusions. This study aims, definitely, to contribute to the theoretical debate on the challenges to the traditional certainties of international law in this area.

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Il est mondialement reconnu que les institutions judiciaires jouent un rôle central dans le processus de prise de décisions politiques, à la fois au niveau national et international. C’est d’ailleurs le cas à la Haute Cour de justice d’Israël. L’étendue de son succès (ou de son échec) dans la tentative de trouver une solution aux violations des droits humains dans les territoires occupés est un problème qui continue de faire l’objet de bien des débats et de recherches académiques. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que, malgré l’absence de constitution écrite et l’existence d’un état d’urgence prolongé en Israël, la Haute Cour de justice a réussi à adopter une approche « judiciairement active » quant à la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homme de manière générale, y compris ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur le processus d’examen judiciaire de la Haute Cour de Justice tient pour acquise la notion qu’Israël est une démocratie. Ainsi, cet article cherche à examiner cette hypothèse. Premièrement, en adoptant la position que le processus de révision judiciaire est compatible avec la démocratie et la règle de loi. Deuxièmement, il examine l’approche « judiciairement active » de la Cour et soumet un bref aperçu du processus, des outils et des principes légaux que la Cour adopte pour examiner les actions des autorités israéliennes, y compris l’armée, et imposer une loi commune de protection des droits de la personne, donc ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. L’article argumente également que le contrôle prolongé des territoires occupés par Israël a eu des conséquences significatives, car tout effort fourni par la Cour pour garantir le respect des droits humains de la population civile palestinienne doit se faire sans compromettre la sécurité du pouvoir israélien. La conclusion à laquelle on arrive ici dépend de la façon dont on qualifie ce contrôle: une occupation à long terme ou une annexion (ce qui n’est pas réglementaire par rapport à loi internationale), ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur le rôle que la Haute Cour de justice peut effectivement jouer pour faire respecter les droits de la personne dans les territoires occupés.

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The focus of the present study is on issues related to Legal—Economics. The economic approach to legal issues is based on the belief held by both legal professionals and economists that law and economics are complementary disciplines and that collaboration is highly beneficial.The principles of economic analysis can help our understanding of the law. Economic approach has important effects on the costs and benefits that prospective litigants may expect from litigation and their decisions to litigate or to settle out of court. Economic consideration is also helpful to understand I 1 the significance of litigation costs, the practical problems of legal administration and the provision of legal servicesz. The economic approach to law is mainly based on the belief held by some economists that the core of economics, the theory of choice is in principle- applicable to all human and institutional behaviour.

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Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

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[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

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This paper anticipates the 2012 revision of the European Insolvency Regulation, which is the sole Union legislation on the subject of cross border insolvency proceedings. The paper first describes the historical background of the Regulation. The salient point of the historical discussion is that the Regulation is the product of forty years of negotiation and arises from a historical context that is no longer applicable to current economic realities, i.e. it provides for liquidation, not reorganization, it doesn’t deal with cross border groups of companies, and it lacks an effective mechanism for transparency and creditor participation. The paper then reviews the unique hybrid jurisdictional system of concurrent universal and territorial proceedings that the Regulation imposes. It looks at this scheme from a practical viewpoint, i.e. what issues arise with concurrent proceedings in two states, involving the same assets, the same creditors, and the same company. The paper then focuses on a significant issue raised by the European Court of Justice in the Eurofoods case, i.e. the need to comply with fundamental due process principles that, while not articulated in the Regulation, lie at the core of Union law. Specifically, the paper considers the ramifications of the Court’s holding that “a Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in flagrant breach of the fundamental right to be heard.” In response to the Court’s direction, this paper proposes a package of due process rights, consisting principally of an accessible, efficient and useful insolvency database, the infrastructure of which already exists, but the content and use of which has not yet been developed. As part of a cohesive three part due process package, the paper also proposes the formation of cross border creditors' committees and the establishment of a European Insolvency Administrator. Finally, on the institutional level, this paper proposes that the revision of the Regulation and the development of the insolvency database not only need to be coordinated, but need to be conceptualized, managed and undertaken, not as the separate efforts of diverse institutions, but as a single, unified endeavor.

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Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

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Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

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In 1990 the Dispute Resolution Centres Act, 1990 (Qld) (the Act) was passed by the Queensland Parliament. In the second reading speech for the Dispute Resolution Centres Bill on May 1990 the Hon Dean Wells stated that the proposed legislation would make mediation services available “in a non-coercive, voluntary forum where, with the help of trained mediators, the disputants will be assisted towards their own solutions to their disputes, thereby ensuring that the result is acceptable to the parties” (Hansard, 1990, 1718). It was recognised at that time that a method for resolving disputes was necessary for which “the conventional court system is not always equipped to provide lasting resolution” (Hansard, 1990, 1717). In particular, the lasting resolution of “disputes between people in continuing relationships” was seen as made possible through the new legislation; for example, “domestic disputes, disputes between employees, and neighbourhood disputes relating to such issues as overhanging tree branches, dividing fences, barking dogs, smoke, noise and other nuisances are occurring continually in the community” (Hansard, 1990, 1717). The key features of the proposed form of mediation in the Act were articulated as follows: “attendance of both parties at mediation sessions is voluntary; a party may withdraw at any time; mediation sessions will be conducted with as little formality and technicality as possible; the rules of evidence will not apply; any agreement reached is not enforceable in any court; although it could be made so if the parties chose to proceed that way; and the provisions of the Act do not affect any rights or remedies that a party to a dispute has apart from the Act” (Hansard, 1990, 1718). Since the introduction of the Act, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Branch of the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney General has offered mediation services through, first the Community Justice Program (CJP), and then the Dispute Resolution Centres (DRCs) for a range of family, neighbourhood, workplace and community disputes. These services have mirrored those available through similar government agencies in other states such as the Community Justice Centres of NSW and the Victorian Dispute Resolution Centres. Since 1990, mediation has become one of the fastest growing forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Sourdin has commented that "In addition to the growth in court-based and community-based dispute resolution schemes, ADR has been institutionalised and has grown within Australia and overseas” (2005, 14). In Australia, in particular, the development of ADR service provision “has been assisted by the creation and growth of professional organisations such as the Leading Edge Alternative Dispute Resolvers (LEADR), the Australian Commercial Dispute Centres (ACDC), Australian Disputes Resolution Association (ADRA), Conflict Resolution Network, and the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia (IAMA)” (Sourdin, 2005, 14). The increased emphasis on the use of ADR within education contexts (particularly secondary and tertiary contexts) has “also led to an increasing acceptance and understanding of (ADR) processes” (Sourdin, 2005, 14). Proponents of the mediation process, in particular, argue that much of its success derives from the inherent flexibility and creativity of the agreements reached through the mediation process and that it is a relatively low cost option in many cases (Menkel-Meadow, 1997, 417). It is also accepted that one of the main reasons for the success of mediation can be attributed to the high level of participation by the parties involved and thus creating a sense of ownership of, and commitment to, the terms of the agreement (Boulle, 2005, 65). These characteristics are associated with some of the core values of mediation, particularly as practised in community-based models as found at the DRCs. These core values include voluntary participation, party self-determination and party empowerment (Boulle, 2005, 65). For this reason mediation is argued as being an effective approach to resolving disputes, that creates a lasting resolution of the issues. Evaluation of the mediation process, particularly in the context of the growth of ADR, has been an important aspect of the development of the process (Sourdin, 2008). Writing in 2005 for example, Boulle, states that “although there is a constant refrain for more research into mediation practice, there has been a not insignificant amount of mediation measurement, both in Australia and overseas” (Boulle, 2005, 575). The positive claims of mediation have been supported to a significant degree by evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. A common indicator of the effectiveness of mediation is the settlement rate achieved. High settlement rates for mediated disputes have been found for Australia (Altobelli, 2003) and internationally (Alexander, 2003). Boulle notes that mediation agreement rates claimed by service providers range from 55% to 92% (Boulle, 2005, 590). The annual reports for the Alternative Dispute Resolution Branch of the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General considered prior to the commencement of this study indicated generally achievement of an approximate settlement figure of 86% by the Queensland Dispute Resolution Centres. More recently, the 2008-2009 annual report states that of the 2291 civil dispute mediated in 2007-2008, 86% reached an agreement. Further, of the 2693 civil disputes mediated in 2008-2009, 73% reached an agreement. These results are noted in the report as indicating “the effectiveness of mediation in resolving disputes” and as reflecting “the high level of agreement achieved for voluntary mediations” (Annual Report, 2008-2009, online). Whilst the settlement rates for the DRCs are strong, parties are rarely contacted for long term follow-up to assess whether agreements reached during mediation lasted to the satisfaction of each party. It has certainly been the case that the Dispute Resolution Centres of Queensland have not been resourced to conduct long-term follow-up assessments of mediation agreements. As Wade notes, "it is very difficult to compare "success" rates” and whilst “politicians want the comparison studies (they) usually do not want the delay and expense of accurate studies" (1998, 114). To date, therefore, it is fair to say that the efficiency of the mediation process has been evaluated but not necessarily its effectiveness. Rather, the practice at the Queensland DRCs has been to evaluate the quality of mediation service provision and of the practice of the mediation process. This has occurred, for example, through follow-up surveys of parties' satisfaction rates with the mediation service. In most other respects it is fair to say that the Centres have relied on the high settlement rates of the mediation process as a sign of the effectiveness of mediation (Annual Reports 1991 - 2010). Research of the mediation literature conducted for the purpose of this thesis has also indicated that there is little evaluative literature that provides an in-depth analysis and assessment of the longevity of mediated agreements. Instead evaluative studies of mediation tend to assess how mediation is conducted, or compare mediation with other conflict resolution options, or assess the agreement rate of mediations, including parties' levels of satisfaction with the service provision of the dispute resolution service provider (Boulle, 2005, Chapter 16).