The mandatory life sentence for murder : an argument for judicial discretion in England

In 1965, alongside the abolition of capital punishment, a mandatory life sentence for murder was implemented in England and Wales. The mandatory life sentence served as a signal to the public that the criminal justice system would still implement the most severe sanction of life imprisonment in cases of murder. Nearly 50 years later, this article examines whether the imposition of a mandatory life sentence for murder is still in the best interests of justice or whether English homicide law would be better served by a discretionary sentencing system. In doing so, the article considers debates surrounding the political and public need for a mandatory life sentence for murder by drawing upon interviews conducted with 29 members of the English criminal justice system. This research concludes that a discretionary sentencing framework is required to adequately respond to the many contexts within which the crime of murder is committed.

Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, And Social Values

This paper studies the institutional structure of criminal sentencing, focusing on the interaction between legislatures, which set sentencing ranges ex ante, and judges, who choose actual sentences from within those ranges ex post. The key question concerns the optimal degree of judicial discretion, given the sequential nature of the process and the possibly divergent interests of legislatures and judges regarding the social function of criminal punishment. The enactment of sentencing reform in the 1970s and 80s provides both a context for the model and an opportunity to evaluate its conclusions.

‘Structuring’ judicial sentencing discretion : consistency, guidance or pandering to the punitive?

Until quite recently, most Australian jurisdictions gave statutory force to the principle of imprisonment as a sanction of last resort, reflecting its status as the most punitive sentencing option open to the court.1 That principle gave primary discretion as to whether incarceration was the most appropriate means of achieving the purpose of a sentence to the sentencing court, which received all of the information relevant to the offence, the offender and any victim(s). The disestablishment of this principle is symptomatic of an increasing erosion of judicial discretion with respect to sentencing, which appears to be resulting in some extremely punitive consequences.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Conscience, discretion and the creation of property rights

This paper considers the utility of the concept of conscience or unconscionable conduct as a contemporary rationale for intervention in two principles applied where a person seeks to renege on an informal agreement relating to land: the principle in Rochefoucauld v Boustead; and transfers 'subject to' rights in favour of a claimant. By analysing the concept in light of our current understanding of the nature of judicial discretion and the use of general principles, it responds to arguments that unconscionability is too general a concept on which to base intervention. In doing so, it considers the nature of the discretion that is actually in issue when the court intervenes through conscience in these principles. However, the paper questions the use of constructive trusts as a response to unconscionability. It argues that there is a need, in limited circumstances, to separate the finding of unconscionability from the imposition of a constructive trust. In these limited circumstances, once unconscionability is found, the courts should have a discretion as to the remedy, modelled on that developed in the context of proprietary estoppel. The message underlying this paper is that many of the concerns expressed about unconscionability that have led to suggestions of alternative rationales for intervention can in fact be addressed whilst retaining an unconscionability analysis. Unconscionability remains a preferable rationale for intervention as it provides a common thread that links apparently separate principles and can assist our understanding of their scope.

Constitutionalism, good faith and the doctrine of specific performance: rights, duties and equitable discretion

This article will explore the European roots of the doctrine of specific performance and the influence of transformative constitutionalism on these in recent times. The question whether specific performance is available as of right (as in the civil law), or only subject to judicial discretion (as in the common law), will be investigated. The demonstrated impact of constitutional rights on contract law in the mixed system of South Africa will be contrasted with developments in English and Australian contract law, where the common-law rules are more deeply entrenched and the potential scope for human rights-based development of these is arguably smaller, though still important. The article will argue, using comparative rules on specific performance as an example, that the concept of a duty of good faith or contractual fairness is likely to play a greater role in future in all three of the countries under consideration, reducing the common/civil/mixed legal systems divide.

Legislação e judiciatura: o lugar da lei na realização judicial do direito

O presente trabalho questiona o papel da legislação na realização judicial do direito. Para responder a essa questão, empreende-se uma tese conceitual sobre a dinâmica jurídica, que pretende superar a tradicional dicotomia entre a legislação e a função judicial concebida pela doutrina clássica da separação dos poderes. De acordo com a argumentação desenvolvida aqui, o judiciário julga não somente fatos dos casos, mas também as próprias escolhas legislativas, de modo que já não é possível defender que a função judicial consiste em mera declaração da lei nos casos particulares ou ainda em subsunção lógica das lides que lhe são submetidas às normas previamente postas pelo processo legislativo. Assim, a realização judicial do direito não pode ser anteriormente determinada, uma vez que não está condicionada pelo conteúdo legislado. Contudo, os conteúdos da lei transmitem algum sentido para os cidadãos e, por isso, criam expectativas. Confirmar ou não essas expectativas é uma questão relacionada com a justificação e a legitimidade dos Estados racionais modernos, que estabelecem com os cidadãos uma relação de dominação legal-racional. Desse modo, a questão do papel da legislação (direito positivo passado) na realização do direito atual é posta em termos de legitimidade. Se, de um lado, constatamos que não é possível pretender controlar a discricionariedade judicial dentro dos próprios limites do direito, de outro lado defendemos que é legítimo pretender submeter o direito positivo à crítica e ao controle democrático. Isso porque interessa a todos os cidadãos que as decisões judiciais possam ser justificadas de modo razoável, graças a uma argumentação cuja força e a pertinência se reconheçam amplamente na sociedade. A partir dessa perspectiva, propomos um redimensionamento do argumento legal na prática jurídica e passamos a analisar as diversas implicações da questão central posta neste trabalho na realização judicial do direito.

Child complainants and the court process in Australia

In recent years, it has been recognised that child complainants in the criminal justice system can experience difficulties over and above those of other complainants and that children can experience the court process as extremely traumatising. This can be exacerbated if children are complainants in child sexual offence matters and if they have to give evidence against a family member. This paper has three primary aims. First, it outlines the major factors that contribute to making court processes harrowing for child complainants. Second, it outlines some of the main initiatives that have been introduced to address these factors. Finally, it weighs up the evidence about initiatives designed to assist child complainants and concludes that such initiatives have had only limited practical impact for child complainants in the criminal justice system. The limited impact is attributed to the need to balance the rights of the accused with consideration for the complainant, a failure to translate legislative changes into practice, the impact of judicial discretion and/or a focus on protecting child complainants at the expense of increasing convictions.

Equal shared parental responsibility and shared care post-return to Australia under the Hague Child Abduction Convention

This article explores the outcomes experienced by abducting primary carer mothers and their children post-return to Australia under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.1 The circumstances faced by families that experience international parental child abduction are examined by considering how part VII of the Australian Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is applied to resolve parenting disputes post-return. At present, the statutory criteria found in part VII encourage an equal shared parental responsibility and shared care parenting approach.2 This emphasis aligns children’s best interests with collaborative parenting3 and their parents living within close geographical proximity of each other to facilitate the practicalities of the approach.4 Arguably, these statutory criteria guide the exercise of judicial discretion to determine a child’s best interests towards a parenting arrangement that is incompatible with the lifestyle and functional characteristics of these families.

Due to her tender age: Black girls and childhood on trial in South Carolina, 1885-1920

Drawing on local criminal court records in western and central South Carolina, this dissertation follows the legal experiences of black girls in South Carolina courts between 1885 and 1920, a time span that includes the aftermath of Reconstruction and the foundational years of Jim Crow. While scholars continue to debate the degree to which black children were included in evolving conversations about childhood and child protection, this dissertation argues that black girls were critical to turn-of-the century debates about all children's roles in society. Far from invisible in the courts and jails of their time, black girls found themselves in the crosshairs of varying forms of power --including intraracial community surveillance, burgeoning local government, Progressive reform initiatives and military policy -- particularly when it came to matters of sexuality and reproduction. Their presence in South Carolina courts established boundaries between early childhood, adolescence and womanhood and pushed legal stakeholders to consider the legal implication of age, race, and gender in criminal proceedings. Age had a complicated effect on black girls' legal encounters; very young black girls were often able to claim youth and escape harsher punishments, while courts often used judicial discretion to levy heavier sentences to adolescents and violent girl offenders. While courts helped to separate early childhood from the middle years, they also provided a space for African-American children and family to engage a legal system that was moving rapidly toward disenfranchising blacks.

Hillsborough: The Truth

Hillsborough: The Truth was first published in 1999 to universal acclaim. Established as the definitive, unique account of the disaster, in which 96 men, women and children died, hundreds were injured and thousands traumatised, it details the appalling treatment endured by the bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath and the inhumanity of the identification process. It reveals the inadequacies of the police investigations, official inquiries and inquests, uncovering the systematic review and alteration of South Yorkshire police statements conducted with the approval of police investigators and Lord Justice Taylor’s inquiry. It examines in depth the subsequent private prosecution and trial of two senior police officers in 2000. Using verbatim accounts, Scraton's detailed analysis demonstrates the inadequacy of legal processes and the remarkable breadth of judicial discretion, undermining and inhibiting such cases.

Powerful, disturbing and harrowing, Hillsborough: The Truth exposes the institutional complacency that made a tragedy on this scale inevitable. It shows the law’s failure to provide appropriate means of access, disclosure and redress for those facing the consequences of institutional neglect and personal negligence. And it tells how ordinary people suffer when those in authority sacrifice truth and accountability to protect their reputations. In this new edition Scraton reflects critically on two decades of policy and legal reform including crowd safety and inquest procedure and on the continuing struggles of the bereaved and survivors who have campaigned relentlessly for truth, acknowledgment and justice.

¿Pueden los juzgadores penales inaplicar el Código Penal? (Tema Central)

¿Un juez penal puede inaplicar una disposición del código penal o del procedimiento penal? En general, por el principio de legalidad, no. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia y la doctrina han demostrado que sí se puede inaplicar normas penales, cuando éstas no están adecuadas a los principios constitucionales. El desarrollo del derecho constitucional ha modificado sustancialmente los presupuestos de la teoría del derecho. Entre otros, el juez crea derecho y puede, interpretativamente, inobservar normas legales. Este poder, que se llama control difuso y tiene que ser utilizado de forma prudente y de acuerdo a preceptos de argumentación jurídica. En este ensayo se describen estos preceptos y se presentan y comentan algunos casos en que principios de la Constitución (derechos humanos) han prevalecido sobre tipos penales, cuando la aplicación de la ley penal lleva a un resultado injusto.

Sentencia de casación respecto de las actuaciones de las administraciones tributarias vinculadas a actos administrativos impugnados judicialmente (Jurisprudencia)

En ocasiones las administraciones tributarias han errado en la comprensión del contenido y alcance de la facultad determinadora. Al constituir una actividad reglada, la determinación tributaria debe observar rigurosamente las normas relativas a materia, oportunidad y competencia. La sentencia materia de la presente recensión se refiere precisamente al ejercicio de la facultad determinadora en lo que hace relación con los actos administrativos que se encuentran impugnados judicialmente. Considerando que uno de los efectos de la judicialización del acto administrativo es abstraerlo de la órbita competencial de la administración tributaria, esta no puede ejercer sobre él ninguna de sus facultades, entre ellas, la verificadora. El criterio de juzgamiento analizado confirma este particular, dejando en claro las consecuencias que la impugnación judicial comporta tanto para los actos administrativos como para la administración tributaria.