The Legacy of Iraq: from the 2003 War to the ‘Islamic State’

In March 2003, a US-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ launched a pre-emptive intervention against Iraq. The nine long years of military occupation that followed saw an ambitious project to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy, underpinned by free-market capitalism and constituted by a citizen body free to live in peace and prosperity. However, the Iraq war did not go to plan and the coalition were forced to withdraw all combat troops at the end of 2011, having failed to deliver on their promise of a democratic, peaceful and prosperous Iraq. The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the ‘Islamic State’ seeks to not only reflect on this abject failure but to put forth the argument that key decisions and errors of judgment on the part of the coalition and the Iraqi political elite set in train a sequence of events that have had devastating consequences for Iraq, for the region and for the world. Today, as the nation faces perhaps its greatest challenge in the wake of the devastating advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and another US-led coalition undertakes renewed military action in Iraq, understanding the complex and difficult legacies of the 2003 war could not be more urgent. To ignore the legacies of the Iraq war and to deny their connection to contemporary events means that vital lessons will be ignored and the same mistakes will be made.

Conclusion : The Iraq legacies and the roots of the ‘Islamic State’

With the deadly ISIS advance, the sudden rousing of Shia militias and the threat of Kurdish secession, Iraq faces a host of deep-seated and intractable problems. Together, these events raise a number of serious questions, not just for Iraq and its future but also for the broader Middle East, the United States and its Coalition partners and the international community. While these challenges and questions will drive much academic debate, political analysis and media discussion in the months and years ahead, they are not the central purpose of this chapter. While there is always a risk in commenting on unfolding events, including the potential to overstate their significance and likely long-term impact, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the deadly ISIS advance and all that has happened since. This chapter argues that key to understanding these events is coming to terms with the three varied and complex legacies of the 2003 Iraq War. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led Coalition before, during and immediately after the 2003 intervention. The second legacy addressed here is the fact that the 2003 war shattered – perhaps irreversibly - Iraqis fragile cultural mosaic and its rich and complex history of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies and narratives. The third and final legacy of the 2003 Iraq War detailed in this chapter is its significant regional and global consequences – from spiralling sectarianism across the Middle East to a profound challenge to America’s status as the last remaining superpower and its use of military power for ‘humanitarian’ ends. The argument here is that these three important legacies set in train a sequence of events that have served as the collective catalyst for the expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ from mid-2014.

The Middle East in the shadow of the Islamic State. OSW Point of View Number 52, August 2015

Since June 2014, Islamic State (IS) has been regarded as the principal security threat in the Middle East and one of the most important problems for European and global security. Islamic State, which for many years was just one of many terror organisations with links to al-Qaeda, has succeeded in achieving much more than other similar organisations: it has taken over control of large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq by military means, created its own para-state structures in that area, and become the greatest civilisational challenge for the region in a century as it established a self-proclaimed caliphate and credibly pledged to expand further on a global scale. Those successes have been accompanied by widely publicised acts of systemic brutality which meets the definition of crimes against humanity. One outcome of these developments is the emergence of an exotic informal alliance to combatthe Islamic State, which has brought together all the states from the Middle East and many from beyond the region. However, contrary to what could have been predicted, after almost a year of the declared war against IS, the Caliphate still holds most of the ground it gained in 2014.

My enemy’s enemy–Turkey’s stance on Islamic State. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 198/24.02.2016

In the context of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has been accused of intense co-operation with Islamic State. The accusations have been coming for some time from the West, and also from the Turkish opposition and the Kurds. The Russian government has also joined in the accusations over the past few months.

Facing the fourth foreign fighters wave. What drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic state? Insights from the Belgian case. Egmont Paper 81, March 2016

‘A bizarre phenomenon,’ Der Spiegel concluded, after trying to figure out why young people left Germany to become foreign fighters in Syria. The magazine painted a portrait of two thirty-somethings with similar backgrounds and the same hobby – martial arts. One became director of a martial arts school in Hamburg, the other became a terrorist poster boy in Syria.2

The origins of the Islamic state, being a translation from the Arabic, accompanied with annotations, geographic and historic notes of the Kitâb fitûh al-buldân of al-Imâm abu-l Abbâs Ahmad ibn-Jâbir al-Balâdhuri,

Pub. also as thesis (Ph. D.) Columbia university, 1915.

Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: A comparative study of the Jihadi narratives

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Funding the ‘Islamic State’: looting antiquities and the international black market

A key revenue stream for various militant groups across the Middle East, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is the illicit looting and trafficking of antiquities which are sold on the international black market. Various heritage sites are being looted by ISIS and others with devastating efficiency and on an industrial scale. While exact figures are difficult to ascertain, the profits from these looting operations are estimated to be the second largest revenue stream for ISIS after the illegal sale of crude oil. The illicit trafficking of antiquities is therefore financing the devastating advance of ISIS and any effort, including that by the Australian Department of Defence, to defeat ISIS must address this significant issue. More research is urgently needed to understand the precise nature, scope and variety of antiquities looting across the Middle East, the extent to which it is funding groups like ISIS, and to consider Australia’s role in international strategies to stanch this ongoing problem.

The `Ulama' and the State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority and Sovereignty in Contemporary Pakistan

This dissertation is an account of how contemporary Pakistani ulama grapple with their political realities and the Islamic state of Pakistan. The central conceptual question that scaffolds my dissertation is: How do Pakistani ulama negotiate tradition, authority and sovereignty with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan? In engaging with this issue, this dissertation employs a methodology that weds ethnography with rigorous textual analysis. The ulama that feature in this study belong to a variety of sectarian persuasions. The Sunni ulama are Deobandi and Barelvi; the Shia ulama in this study are Ithna Ashari.

In assessing the relationship between Pakistani ulama and their nation-state, I assert that the ulama's dialectical engagements with the state are best understood as a dexterous navigation between affirmation, critique, contestation and cultivation. In proposing this manner of thinking about Pakistani ulama's engagements with their state, I provide a more detailed and nuanced view of the ulama-state relationship compared to earlier works. While emphasizing Pakistani ulama's vitality and their impact on their state, this dissertation also draws attention to the manners in which the state impacts the ulama. It theorizes the subject formation of the ulama and asserts the importance of understanding the ulama as formed not just by the ethico-legal tradition in which they are trained but also by the state apparatus.

Succeeding and seceding in Iraq: the case for a Shiite State

The US project to democratize Iraq has given way to a dramatic upsurge in ethno-religious factionalism in which a series of groups have sought to use ‘democracy’ to create or exacerbate division. Among these divisive political elements a relatively fringe idea held mostly by power-hungry elites has become a central driving force of much political debate within Iraq: separatism. Although there are many examples of political factions within Iraq which have called for territorial separatism since 2003 (such as some Kurdish, Sunni, Assyrian and Turcoman political parties), this chapter focuses on the less known case for a Shiite state. Specifically, it concentrates on the Shia Arab Islamist political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which differs from other Shia political factions in their calls for a decentralized federal Iraq with an autonomous Shia Islamic state in the south.

State-building in Iraq since 2003: the Challenges and Lessons. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 12/2014

Introduction. In 2003, Iraq was invaded by the US coalition forces that ousted Saddam Hussein’s regime from power before occupying the whole country. The intension, declared by the then American George W. Bush, was to ‘build a decent and democratic society at the centre of the Middle East’ that ‘will become a place of progress and peace.’1 In 2014, three years after the withdrawal of the last American soldier, however, it is difficult to overestimate or exaggerate what is at stake. National unity and territorial integrity have never been so seriously threatened since the country is experiencing the internal fighting in its modern history. Many parts of Iraq, including the northern oil city of Kirkuk, long claimed as an integral part of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, are out of the control of the central government. Large areas in the north including the strategic city of Mosul were seized by the fighters of the Islamic State, an Al-Qaeda offshoot, formerly known as ISIS, who threatened to invade the Kurdistan region before being attacked by airstrikes by the US. They proclaimed a caliphate on both sides of the border with Syria, where they also control vast territory.

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Sectarianism and the prevalence of ‘othering’ in Islamic thought

The current sectarian conflicts in the Middle East did not arise solely from renewed geopolitical rivalries between regional powers. They are also rooted in a solid, theological articulation proposed by classic Islamic political theology. The exclusivist approach, which is a decisive part of the political, social and religious reality of today’s Middle East, benefits from a formidable theological legacy. Coining the notion of ‘othering theology’, this paper not only explores the ideas of leading classical theologians who have articulated a puritanical understanding of faith, but also explicates the politico-historical context in which these theologians rationalised their quarrels. Given the pervasive presence of these theologies in the contemporary sectarian polemics, the study of classical othering theology is highly relevant and, indeed, crucial to any attempt to overcome sectarianism in the region.