Media, investors and bubbles

We analysed the specific case of how information in the financial press influences economic bubbles. We found considerable flaws in the information market due to several factors: demand, the predominance of what are termed “irrational investors” (herding), and supply, which has the problem that the sources of information are biasedand feeds. A financial bubble is a deviation between real value of a financial asset and its persistent market price in time, which also has a speculative origin fed back by the illusion of the owners of these financial values, who will take benefits because of the future prices, which must be higher than the previous ones. The economical information in the media is submitting three problems. First of all, it is information generated by companies. In second place, the information circuit is fed back. A problem of informative independence becomes created, particularly serious in the case of the banks, which are very were as creditors. And in a third place, some informative biases are manifested for the companies of regulated sectors which are starring the economical information in the media.

Bombolles financeres i confusió informativa. Relació entre la informació econòmica als mitjans de comunicació i la presa de decisions d’inversió

La Teoria Econòmica està construïda sobre la hipòtesis de racionalitat dels agents econòmics. La racionalitat de l’homo economicus consisteix en què maximitza la seva utilitat tractant d’obtenir els majors beneficis amb el menor esforç, si bé l’aplicació d’aquesta hipòtesi a l’ésser humà no és plena ja que la seva motivació no sempreés biològica i de vegades actua empès per aspectes culturals difícils d’associar a un benefici1. Tanmateix, la hipòtesi de racionalitat s’ha considerat una bona representació dels aspectes essencials del comportamenteconòmic de l’ésser humà. El problema es presenta quan la Teoria Econòmica no és capaç d’explicar ni resoldre satisfactòriament problemes tan rellevants com les bombolles especulatives i la causa d’aquesta mancança s’atribueix a una construcció inadequada d’aquesta Teoria...

La confianza en las decisiones de presupuesto de capital: la TIR del comportamiento

En el presente artículo se desarrolla una investigación teórica que permite establecer un modelo matemático para cuantificar la influencia de la confianza de los gerentes en el proceso de presupuesto de capital, en particular sobre la Tasa Interna de Retorno. El Modelo permite concluir que el exceso de confianza es un factor que tiende a elevar esta tasa que esperan recibir los inversionistas tras invertir en determinados proyectos, generando así, en ciertas ocasiones, una toma de decisiones al interior de las empresas basada en cifras sesgadas, comprometiendo así los recursos de la misma.

Irrational schematic beliefs and psychological distress in caregivers of people with traumatic brain injury

Objective: To investigate the relation between irrational schematic beliefs and psychological distress in caregivers of persons with traumatic brain injury (TBI). Design: Cross-sectional mail survey. Participants: One hundred sixteen caregivers of persons with TBI living in the Australian states of Victoria and Queensland who were members of community support groups and brain injury associations. Measures: The Irrational Beliefs Inventory, Brief Symptom Inventory, income satisfaction, degree of personality and behavior change in the TBI individual, and injury severity. Results: Hierarchical regression analyses showed that after controlling for the effects of characteristics of the caregiving situation and the individual with TBI, greater adherence to irrational beliefs was related to higher levels of global psychological distress. Specifically, irrational beliefs related to Worrying were associated with all areas of psychological distress. Conclusion: Results support the cognitive theory proposal that irrational beliefs play an important role in the adaptation to TBI caregiving. Findings suggest the inclusion of cognitive therapy strategies in interventions for caregivers.

The determinants of international equity investment: Do they differ between institutional and noninstitutional investors?

In this paper we investigate whether the determinants of international equity investment differ between investors with different degrees of sophistication. For this purpose, we analyse and compare the determinants of international equity investment of institutional and noninstitutional investors from 20 OECD countries (US not included) in the period 2001-2009. The results show that there are significant differences in the determinants of international equity investment between institutional and noninstitutional investors. In particular, noninstitutional investors tend to exhibit a more pronounced preference for equities of geographical nearby, contiguous and more transparent countries than institutional investors. The preference for more developed equity markets and the contrarian behaviour are also significantly more pronounced for noninstitutional than for institutional investors. These results support the argument that international equity investment of less sophisticated investors is more affected by information costs and familiarity than that of more sophisticated investors. Moreover, business cycles exert an influence on international equity investment decisions of both institutional and noninstitutional investors.

Financing green development: 'Climate Bonds’ as a solution for institutional investors engagement

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

How to bring equity investors to the social sector? A quasi-equity approach through the case study of SPEAK

As nonprofits do not have access to the same capital markets as for-profit enterprises, organizations usually scramble for funding to keep up with their mission. This scenario can be changed through the use of the right financial engineering. This Work Project aims at studying an innovative financing mechanism based on the concept of quasi-equity for organizations devoted to social ends to cope with their capital needs. A quasi-equity investment model is built for the Portuguese social business SPEAK, and an in-depth assessment of its current financial, organizational and impact situations is conducted. This is a pioneer case study in Portugal.

MarketOpolis: A market simulation based on investors decisions

This study aims to replicate Apple’s stock market movement by modeling major investment profiles and investors. The present model recreates a live exchange to forecast any predictability in stock price variation, knowing how investors act when it concerns investment decisions. This methodology is particularly relevant if, just by observing historical prices and knowing the tendencies in other players’ behavior, risk-adjusted profits can be made. Empirical research made in the academia shows that abnormal returns are hardly consistent without a clear idea of who is in the market in a given moment and the correspondent market shares. Therefore, even when knowing investors’ individual investment profiles, it is not clear how they affect aggregate markets.

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefi t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifi ce in choosing peace.

RIC Program Summary Retirement Investors' Club, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; 401 (a) Employer Match Plan, 2005

This Plan is intended to be a qualified plan within the meaning of Code Section 401(a), a plan within the meaning of Code Section 401(a), and a governmental plan within the meaning of Code Section 414(d). This Plan may be referred to as “The State of Iowa’s 401(a) Employer Match Plan”, which is one of two plans that comprise the Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC).

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; 457 Employee Contribution Plan, 2005

This Plan is intended to satisfy the requirements for an “eligible deferred compensation plan” under Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended from time to time, and all other applicable provisions of law and the regulations issued thereunder. This Plan may be referred to as “The State of Iowa’s 457 Employee Contribution Plan”, which is one of two plans that comprise the Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC).

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; Enrollment Brouchure, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Retirement Investors' Club Plan Document; Fund Fees Comparison, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!