A ipseidade na ética argumentativa de Paul Ricoeur

A ipseidade na ética argumentativa de Paul Ricoeur é a referência básica da hermenêutica do si ao qual sempre retorna. Ela estabelece a constante mediação reflexiva em oposição à pretensa posição imediata do sujeito. A mesmidade do si tem como contrapartida o outro. Na comparação, a mesmidade é sinônimo de identidade-idem em oposição à ipseidade-ipse que inclui a alteridade. Esta inclusão questiona a capacidade do si construtivo da ética e, portanto, responsável jurídica e moralmente nas várias injunções do outro. O projeto ético de Ricoeur é compreensível a partir e dentro de sua peculiar metodologia que ele denomina de dialética entre a ética teleológica e a moral deontológica. Esta dialética se fundamenta na tríade do desejo, do dever e da sabedoria prática em recíproca atividade, privilegiando a dimensão teleológica do desejo da vida boa com o outro e para o outro em instituições justas. A ética argumentativa tem a função de dar conteúdo as duas dialéticas pela inclusão do outro no si mesmo sem o qual a reflexão sobre a ipseidade perderia o sentido. A sabedoria prática da ética e do julgamento moral em situação inclui a discussão porque o conflito é insuperável e determina o argumento para o consenso eventual. Nossa tese é a afirmação da capacidade do si mesmo atuar ações construtivas. Além da critica à ideologia e à utopia, Ricoeur fundamenta a dialética entre o princípio-esperança e o princípio de responsabilidade mediante a via utópica do futuro e a via realista da preocupação com o presente diante dos casos inéditos em que a vida e o ecossistema se associam. A imputação pessoal e coletiva desde o passado, no presente para o futuro é devida à responsabilidade. A ipseidade constrói o futuro no presente através de decisões éticas.

Before identity, gender and human rights

This is the beginning of an exploration of before as the thesis ‘before’ (temporally) and ‘be-fore’ (spatially) difference. Before denotes the origin and the desired destination. Before (in the double sense of ‘before’ and ‚be-in-the-fore’) opens up a space of pre-difference, of origin and of forgotten memory, as well as a space of desire, objective, illusion of teleology, unity, completion. Applied to the two domains of Human Rights and Sex/Gender, the space of ‘before’ yields two slightly different vistas: in human rights, a premodern, functionally undifferentiated society which had to invent human rights as its safeguards of functional differentiation. In Sex/Gender, 'before' brings a self-referential construction: that of ipseity, as the form of identity beyond comparison that does not play with id but with ipsum. Ipseity is inoperable but not useless. It is inoperable because it cannot be observed from anywhere without suffering rupture. It is not useless because it offers a ground for the reconceptualisation of difference, both through awe and desire.

Monumental vision : a confrontation with the image of the Eternal Return

"Monumental Vision” is a nuanced summary of Nietzschean nihilism and the Eternal Return as rite of passage for free subjects and as condensed image of speculative intelligence proper. Utilizing Gerhard Richter’s “Sheet 692” from Atlas, a series of photographs of the mountains and lake at Sils Maria, Switzerland, as summary judgment of the limit imposed by this condition on all systems of representation, this form of vision discloses the chiasmus embedded in consciousness itself. In constantly revisiting Sils, the very location where Nietzsche “suffered” the vision of the Eternal Return, Richter has engaged repeatedly this origin for what has come into his work via Nietzsche – that is, an elective veil that refuses all compromises with transcendence until such is merged with immanence.

As situated amidst modernist “ideology as intellection”, and subsequent nascent forms of anti-modernism, the Eternal Return as image also signals the return of the Kantian “aesthetic-teleological” synthesis in non-discursive or purely visual agency. As an elective form of aesthetic vision, and as image of time insofar as it registers an overwhelming externality (Other) that nominally swallows and empowers the subject at once, this excoriating sense of universal praxis underwrites artistic and architectural production of the highest order, renegotiating concepts of the paradigmatic.

Utilizing Georg Simmel’s late work on Rembrandt (1916) and his encounter with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (1907), the essay suggests that by the 1920s the avant-garde premises of modernism had already come under attack by an ahistorical and synoptic vision here denoted “monumental vision,” which also contains the imprint of eschatological time (invoking a schism present in rationality as such). The two readings of this image perpetrated by Karl Löwith in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same (Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 1935), or the cosmological and the ethical, while considered irreconcilable by Löwith, have since the 1960s been recalibrated through the figure of the event to pose possible scenarios out of the stalemate of the confrontation between Self and Other (ipseity and alterity) buried within this image as limit. In this manner, the image of the Eternal Return stands at the boundary between two forms of time (or two worlds) and signals the irreducible confrontation present in speculative thought and the necessity of closure through an aesthetic vision that produces a unitary field for all creative acts.

Notably, Nietzsche’s startling vision from Zarathustra suggests that the limit imposed by the Eternal Return is also a mask for an austere condition within subjectivity closely resembling the conundrum of Fichte’s I facing I, or thought turned toward thought itself (absolute subjectivity as cipher for Being). In Alenka Zupančič’s reading, in The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (2003), the Eternal Return effectively contains a secret formal function that grinds all “error” to dust – a highly suggestive interpretation that also neutralizes the schism introduced by Löwith between the cosmological and the ethical.

El problema de la identidad narrativa en la filosofía de Paul Ricoeur

El artículo analiza el problema de la "identidad narrativa" como el punto nodal a partir del cual se erige la filosofía de Paul Ricoeur. En abierta oposición a las "filosofías del cogito" en las cuales el yo se define como "yo empírico" o como "yo trascendental", el filósofo francés propone el concepto de sí mismo como otro aunando las nociones de mismidad e ipseidad en un mismo centro al que sólo accede el sujeto por medio de un rodeo narrativo dado en llamar "hermenéutica del sí". Se intentará comprender la noción de sujeto que esta filosofía delinea.

El problema de la identidad narrativa en la filosofía de Paul Ricoeur

El artículo analiza el problema de la "identidad narrativa" como el punto nodal a partir del cual se erige la filosofía de Paul Ricoeur. En abierta oposición a las "filosofías del cogito" en las cuales el yo se define como "yo empírico" o como "yo trascendental", el filósofo francés propone el concepto de sí mismo como otro aunando las nociones de mismidad e ipseidad en un mismo centro al que sólo accede el sujeto por medio de un rodeo narrativo dado en llamar "hermenéutica del sí". Se intentará comprender la noción de sujeto que esta filosofía delinea.

El problema de la identidad narrativa en la filosofía de Paul Ricoeur

El artículo analiza el problema de la "identidad narrativa" como el punto nodal a partir del cual se erige la filosofía de Paul Ricoeur. En abierta oposición a las "filosofías del cogito" en las cuales el yo se define como "yo empírico" o como "yo trascendental", el filósofo francés propone el concepto de sí mismo como otro aunando las nociones de mismidad e ipseidad en un mismo centro al que sólo accede el sujeto por medio de un rodeo narrativo dado en llamar "hermenéutica del sí". Se intentará comprender la noción de sujeto que esta filosofía delinea.

Humanism is a violence typical of the beasts. Philosozing with a Hammer, using Levinas and Derrida, the Measure of the Human and the Human as a measure

Levinas’s reflections arose as a critique of traditional philosophy which, since it was based on presence and identity, leads to the exclusion of the other. Instead of an onto-logical thought the Lithuanian proposes that the ipseity of the human being be constituted by alterity, and that it be so ethically, because the subject is sub-ject, that is, that which upholds, responsibility. In an attempt to take the obligatory attention to the otherness of the other even further, Derrida would develop a radical critique of the Levinasian posture. Deconstruction of every trace of ipseity and sovereignty in the relationship with the other, the reading that we have done of the work of Derrida opts for a no definable understanding of the human. That is why every de-limitation of an ethical field as a properly human implies a brutal violence that the levinasian humanism of the other tried to exceed.