Nature, fiabilité et rôle des intuitions utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine

Ce mémoire porte sur les intuitions utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine. Les intuitions sont interrogées sur trois aspects : leur nature, leur fiabilité et leur rôle. Concernant la nature des intuitions, celles-ci sont présentées comme des jugements spontanés ayant une valeur épistémique « à première vue ». Concernant la fiabilité des intuitions, trois grands types de raisons de douter de leur fiabilité sont considérés, à savoir les résultats de certaines études scientifiques montrant de diverses manières leur instabilité, les études réalisées par le mouvement de philosophie expérimentale afin d'illustrer le phénomène du désaccord intuitif, et enfin, le problème de l'origine douteuse des intuitions. Aucune de ces raisons n'est jugée efficace afin de discréditer l'usage des intuitions en philosophie. Concernant le rôle des intuitions, une distinction est proposée entre deux grands types d'usage philosophique contemporain. D'une part, ce qu'on peut appeler la méthodologie standard en philosophie morale contemporaine consiste en une combinaison d’expériences de pensée et de la méthode de l’équilibre réfléchi. Différentes manières d'aborder la méthode de l'équilibre réfléchi sont présentées, et le modèle de l'équilibre réfléchi large développé par Norman Daniels est jugé le plus efficace. D'autre part, les intuitions sont parfois utilisées en philosophie morale contemporaine dans le cadre de la théorie de l'intuitionnisme éthique. La théorie est défendue contre diverses objections, et elle est montrée compatible avec la méthode de l’équilibre réfléchi.

A slugfest of intuitions: contextualism and experimental design

This paper considers ways that experimental design can affect judgments about informally presented context shifting experiments. Reasons are given to think that judgments about informal context shifting experiments are affected by an exclusive reliance on binary truth value judgments and by experimenter bias. Exclusive reliance on binary truth value judgments may produce experimental artifacts by obscuring important differences of degree between the phenomena being investigated. Experimenter bias is an effect generated when, for example, experimenters disclose (even unconsciously) their own beliefs about the outcome of an experiment. Eliminating experimenter bias from context shifting experiments makes it far less obvious what the “intuitive” responses to those experiments are. After it is shown how those different kinds of bias can affect judgments about informal context shifting experiments, those experiments are revised to control for those forms of bias. The upshot of these investigations is that participants in the contextualist debate who employ informal experiments should pay just as much attention to the design of their experiments as those who employ more formal experimental techniques if they want to avoid obscuring the phenomena they aim to uncover

Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.

Intuitions, disagreement and referential pluralism

Mallon, Machery, Nichols and Stich (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356, 2009) argue that the use of intuitions in the philosophy of reference is problematic as recent studies show intuitions about reference vary both within and between cultures. I use some ideas from the recent literature on disagreement and truth relativism to shed light on the debate concerning the appropriate reaction to these studies. Mallon et al. argue that variation is problematic because if one tries to use intuitions which vary to find the correct theory of reference one will end up endorsing an absurd position: referential pluralism. I argue that there is hope for intuition-based philosophy of reference. One can avoid endorsing referential pluralism (as Mallon et al. understand it). Furthermore, referential pluralism may not be so absurd after all.

Intuitions in the Face of Diversity

In recent decades, intuitions' role in philosophy has been hotly debated. Many claim intuitions play an important role. Others, some armed with data, challenge the use of intuitions. This thesis reflects on this debate and advances the debate in two main ways. Having a clear understanding of the challenge which intuition-use in philosophy faces is important. Part I focuses on this. Chapters 1-2 introduce the topic of intuitions, motivate the methodological study of intuitions, and present the historical background to recent empirical challenges to intuition-use. Chapters 3-5 concern the contemporary challenge. I present the empirical evidence the challenge uses, present what I argue to be the strongest version of the challenge, and defend that challenge against some objections. How one characterises intuitions is incredibly important in philosophical methodology. If we are to properly evaluate philosophical methods vis-a-vis their use of something called intuitions { if we are to assess the empirical challenge { it is important to be clear exactly what we mean by `intuitions'. Part II focuses on this. Chapter 6 argues there is little consensus among philosophers as to what intuitions are and their role in philosophy. Chapter 7 questions whether philosophers have developed an idiolect in which `intuition' has distinctive meaning | as frequently supposed. Chapter 8 points out a common misunderstanding about intuitions in philosophy; using quantitative tools to challenge the idea that an increased use of `intuition' in philosophy is the result of an increased use of intuition. So, the developing picture is one of confusion, without a clear idea of what sense of `intuition' is important. Fortunately, Chapter 9 sets us back on the right track. It sets out a positive programme for evaluative methodology: methodologists should adopt a permissive conception of intuitions and make fine distinctions between different intuitions, so long as we can track those distinctions while philosophising.

Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: a reply to Feltz and Millan

In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (2015) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that Feltz and Millan’s error-theory rests on a conceptual confusion: it is perfectly acceptable for a certain brand of compatibilist to judge free will and fatalism to be compatible, as long as fatalism does not prevent agents from being the source of their actions. We then present the results of two studies showing that laypeople’s intuitions are best understood as following a certain brand of source compatibilism rather than a “free-will-no-matter-what” strategy.

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

The intuitions of the mind inductively investigated /

Includes index.

The intuitions of the mind inductively investigated.

Mode of access: Internet.

A phenomenological explication of dream interpretation among rural and urban Nguni people

Psychologists investigating dreams in non-Western cultures have generally not considered the meanings of dreams within the unique meaning-structure of the person in his or her societal context. The majority of dream studies in African societies are no exception. Researchers approaching dreams within rural Xhosa and Zulu speaking societies have either adopted an anthropological or a psychodynamic orientation. The latter approach particularly imposes a Western perspective in the interpretation of dream material. There have been no comparable studies of dream interpretation among urban blacks participating in the African Independent Church Movement. The present study focuses on the rural Xhosa speaking people and the urban black population who speak one of the Nguni languages and identify with the African Independent Church Movement. The study is concerned with understanding the meanings of dreams within the cultural context in which they occur. The specific aims of the study are: 1. To explicate the indigenous system of dream interpretation as revealed by acknowledged dream experts. 2. To examine the commonalities and the differences between the interpretation of dreams in two groups, drawn from a rural and urban setting respectively. 3. To elaborate upon the life-world of the participants by the interpretations gained from the above investigation. One hundred dreams and interpretations are collected from two categories of participants referred to as the Rural Group and the Urban Group. The Rural Group is made up of amagqira [traditional healers] and their clients, while the Urban Group consists of prophets and members of the African Independent Churches. Each group includes acknowledged dream experts. A phenomenological methodology is adopted in explicating the data. The methodological precedure involves a number of rigorous stages of expl ication whereby the original data is reduced to Constituent Profiles leading to the construction of a Thematic Index File. By searching and reflect ing upon the data, interpretative themes are identified. These themes are explicated to provide a rigorous description of the interpretative-reality of each group. Themes explicated w i thin the Rural Group are: the physiognomy of the dreamer's life-world as revealed by ithongo, the interpretation of ithongo as revealed through action, the dream relationship as an anticipatory mode-of-existence, iphupha as disclosing a vulnerable mode-of-being, human bodiliness as revealed in dream interpretations and the legitimation of the interpretative-reality within the life-world. Themes explicated within the Urban Group are: the phys iognomy of the dreamer's life-world revealed in their dream-existence, the interpretative-reality revealed through the enaction of dreams, tension between the newer Christian-based cosomology and the traditional cultural-based cosmology, a moral imperative, prophetic perception and human bodiliness, as revealed in dream interpretations and the legitimation of the interpretative-reality within the life-world. The essence of the interpretative-reality of both groups is very similar and is expressed in the notion of relatedness to a cosmic mode-of-being. The cosmic mode-of-being includes a numinous dimension which is expressed through divine presence in the form of ancestors, Holy Spirit or God. These notions cannot be apprehended by theoretical constructs alone but may be grasped and given form in meaning-disclosing intuitions which are expressed in the lifeworld in terms of bodiliness, revelatory knowledge, action and healing. Some differences b e tween the two groups are evident and reveal some conflict between the monotheistic Christian cosmology and the traditional cosmology. Unique aspects of the interpetative-reality of the Urban Group are expressed in terms of difficulties in the urban social environment and the notion of a moral imperative. It is observed that cul tural self-expression based upon traditional ideas continues to play a significant role in the urban environment. The apparent conflict revealed between the respective cosmologies underlies an integration of the aditional meanings with Christian concepts. This finding is consistent with the literature suggesting that the African Independent Church is a syncretic movement. The life-world is based upon the immediate and vivid experience of the numinous as revealed in the dream phenomenon. The participants' approach to dreams is not based upon an explicit theory, but upon an immediate and pathic understanding of the dream phenomenon. The understanding is based upon the interpreter's concrete understanding of the life-world, which includes the possibility of cosmic integration and continuity between the personal and transpersonal realms of being. The approach is characterized as an expression of man's primordial attunement with the cosmos. The approach of the participants to dreams may not b e consistent with a Western rational orientation, but neverthele ss, it is a valid approach . The validity is based upon the immediate life-world of experience which is intelligible, coherent, and above all, it is meaning-giving in revealing life-possibility within the context of human existence.

Wonder and method

In this paper, my aim is to address the twin concerns raised in this session - models of practice and geographies or spaces of practice - through regarding a selection of works and processes that have arisen from my recent research. Setting up this discussion, I first present a short critique of the idea of models of creative practice, recognising possible problems with the attempt to generalise or abstract its complexities. Working through a series of portraits of my working environment, I will draw from Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis as a way of understanding an art practice both spatially and temporally, suggesting that changes and adjustments can occur through attending to both intuitions and observations of the complex of rhythmic layers constantly at play in any event. Reflecting on my recent studio practice I explore these rhythms through the evocation of a twin axis: the horizontal and the vertical and the arcs of difference or change that occur between them, in both spatial and temporal senses. What this analysis suggests is the idea that understanding does not only emerge from the construction of general principles, derived from observation of the particular, but that the study of rhythms allows us to maintain the primacy of the particular. This makes it well suited to a study of creative methods and objects, since it is to the encounter with and expression of the particular that art practices, most certainly my own, are frequently directed.

Life storytelling at the ABC: Challenges of 'giving the audience a voice' in the context of public service media

Life storytelling projects have become an important means through which public service media institutions such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation are seeking to foster audience participation and involve particular cohorts in the creation and distribution of broadcast content. This paper contributes to the wider conversation on audience participation within public service media intuitions (PSMs), and focuses on the opportunities and challenges that arise within life storytelling projects that are facilitated by these institutions, and that aim to ‘give voice’ to members of ‘the audience’. In particular, it focuses on two of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s current life storytelling projects: ABC Open and Heywire.