La sécurité collective dans l’unipolarité : la crise nucléaire iranienne

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Análisis de las sanciones internacionales en el marco del tratado de no proliferación nuclear. Estudio de caso: energía atómica en Irán (2006-2015)

El presente trabajo de Grado tiene como propósito examinar la incidencia de las sancionesinternacionales en el marco del régimen de no proliferación nuclear en el caso de Irán durante el periodo 2006-2015, teniendo en cuenta factores históricos de años anteriores. Se analiza y explica cómo las sanciones internacionales pueden ser una medida persuasiva por violar ciertos artículos del Tratado de no Proliferación Nuclear. Finalmente identifica y analiza los tipos de sanciones económicas, financieras y comerciales que los Estados y el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas le han impuesto a Irán, así como la manera en que estas han incidido en la esfera política iraní y mundial.

Removing barriers to protection at the exported border : visas, carrier sanctions, and international obligation

Asylum is being gradually denuded of the national institutional mechanisms (judicial, legislative and administrative) that provide the framework for a fair and effective asylum hearing. In this sense, there is an ongoing ‘denationalization’ or ‘deformalization’ of the asylum process. This chapter critically examines one of the linchpins of this trend: the erection of pre-entry measures at ports of embarkation in order to prevent asylum seekers from physically accessing the territory of the state. Pre-entry measures comprise the core requirement that foreigners possess an entry visa granting permission to enter the state of destination. Visa requirements are increasingly implemented by immigration officials posted abroad or by officials of transit countries pursuant to bilateral agreements (so-called ‘juxtaposed’ immigration controls). Private carriers, which are subject to sanctions if they bring persons to a country who do not have permission to enter, also engage in a form of de facto immigration control on behalf of states. These measures constitute a type of ‘externalized’ or ‘exported’ border that pushes the immigration boundaries of the state as far from its physical boundaries as possible. Pre-entry measures have a crippling impact on the ability of asylum seekers to access the territory of states to claim asylum. In effect, states have ‘externalized’ asylum by replacing the legal obligation on states to protect refugees arriving at ports of entry with what are perceived to be no more than moral obligations towards asylum seekers arriving at the external border of the state.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Proposed economic sanctions against South Africa [microform] : hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Africa, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, second session, on H.R. 1590, H.R. 1051, H.R. 2443, H.R. 3317, and H.R. 3328, March 22, 23; April 20, 28; and May 3, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 H381-23

Economic sanctions against Rhodesia [microform] : hearings before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session ....

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Rhodesian sanctions, should the United States lift them? : Hearing and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on S. 2076, December 5 and 11, 1979.

Mode of access: Internet.

Immigration reform : status of employer sanctions after second year and plans for third year : statement of Arnold P. Jones, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives /

"May 17,1989."

The United Nations Security Council Sanctions and International Human Rights

Peer reviewed

Impaired drivers : The need to yoke treatment and sanctions

Objective: To understand the levels of substance abuse and dependence among impaired drivers by comparing the differences in patients in substance abuse treatment programs with and without a past-year DUI arrest based on their primary problem substance at admission (alcohol, cocaine, cannabis, or methamphetamine). Method: Records on 345,067 admissions to Texas treatment programs between 2005 and 2008 have been analyzed for differences in demographic characteristics, levels of severity, and mental health problems at admission, treatment completion, and 90-day follow-up. Methods will include t-tests,??, and multivariate logistic regression. Results: The analysis found that DUI arrestees with a primary problem with alcohol were less impaired than non-DUI alcohol patients, had fewer mental health problems, and were more likely to complete treatment. DUI arrestees with a primary problem with cannabis were more impaired than non-DUI cannabis patients and there was no difference in treatment completion. DUI arrestees with a primary problem with cocaine were less impaired and more likely to complete treatment than other cocaine patients, and there was little difference in levels of mental health problems. DUI arrestees with a primary problem with methamphetamine were more similar to methamphetamine non-arrestees, with no difference in mental health problems and treatment completion. Conclusions: This study provides evidence of the extent of abuse and dependence among DUI arrestees and their need for treatment for their alcohol and drug problems in order to decrease recidivism. Treatment patients with past-year DUI arrests had good treatment outcomes but closer supervision during 90 day follow-up after treatment can lead to even better long-term outcomes, including reduced recidivism. Information will be provided on the latest treatment methodologies, including medication assisted therapies and screening and brief interventions, and ways impaired driving programs and substance dependence programs can be integrated to benefit the driver and society.

Beyond sanctions : is there a need to treat first-time offenders?

Aims: Driving Under the Influence (DUI) enforcement can be a broad screening mechanism for alcohol and other drug problems. The current response to DUI is focused on using mechanical means to prevent inebriated persons from driving, with little attention the underlying substance abuse problems. ---------- Methods: This is a secondary analysis of an administrative dataset of over 345,000 individuals who entered Texas substance abuse treatment between 2005 and 2008. Of these, 36,372 were either on DUI probation, referred to treatment by probation, or had a DUI arrest in the past year. The DUI offenders were compared on demographic characteristics, substance use patterns, and levels of impairment with those who were not DUI offenders and first DUI offenders were compared with those with more than one past-year offense. T tests and chi square tests were used to determine significance. ---------- Results: DUI offenders were more likely to be employed, to have a problem with alcohol, to report more past-year arrests for any offense, to be older, and to have used alcohol and drugs longer than the non-DUI clients who reported higher ASI scores and were more likely to use daily. Those with one past-year DUI arrest were more likely to have problems with drugs other than alcohol and were less impaired than those with two or more arrests based on their ASI scores and daily use. Non-DUI clients reported higher levels of mood disorders than DUIs but there was no difference in their diagnosis of anxiety. Similar findings were found between those with one or multiple DUI arrests. ----------Conclusion: Although first-time DUIs were not as impaired as non-DUI clients, their levels of impairment were sufficient to cause treatment. Screening and brief intervention at arrest for all DUI offenders and treatment in combination with abstinence monitoring could decrease future recidivism.

The Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem?

This report is the third volume in ILAB’s international child labor series. It focuses on the use of child labor in the production of apparel for the U.S. market, and reviews the extent to which U.S. apparel importers have established and are implementing codes of conduct or other business guidelines prohibiting the use of child labor in the production of the clothing they sell. The report was mandated by the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, P.L. 104-134.

Community Sanctions and Measures

This chapter explores the use of community sanctions in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland. It locates this discussion within a wider international landscape, where the numbers of people subject to supervision in the community has risen markedly. It explores some of the reasons for this growth alongside the rationalities that are deployed to promote the use of community sanctions over time. The differing trajectories of the two jurisdictions in respect of the evolution and use of community sanctions are explored, as are some of the factors that explain areas of divergence and commonality. The chapter concludes by critically considering penal reductionism as a point of policy convergence in the two jurisdictions.