The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia’s future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process. On 16 March 2012, an Exposure Draft and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum outlining the proposed amendments to implement the first stage of the transfer pricing reforms were released. Within the proposed changes is the explicit embedding of the use of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations to help determine the arm’s length price. Does this mean that Australia engages in an international tax regime?

Australia's adoption of an international tax regime : to engage or not to engage?

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia's future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

Neither an international tax, nor an international taxing body exists. Rather, there are domestic taxing rules adopted by jurisdictions which, coupled with double tax treaties, apply to cross-border transactions and international taxation issues. International bodies such as the OECD and UN, which provide guidance on tax issues, often steer and supplement these domestic adoptions but have no binding international taxing powers. These pragmatic realities, together with the specific use of the word ‘regime’ within the tax community, lead many to argue that an international tax regime does not exist. However, an international tax regime should be defined no differently to any other area of international law and when we step outside the confines of tax law to consider the definition of a ‘regime’ within international relations it is possible to demonstrate that such a regime is very real. The first part of this article, by defining an international tax regime in a broader and more traditional context, also outlining both the tax policy and principles which frame that regime, reveals its existence. Once it is accepted that an international tax regime exists, it is possible to consider its adoption by jurisdictions and subsequent constraints it places on them. Using the proposed changes to transfer pricing laws as the impetus for assessing Australia’s adoption of the international tax regime, the constraints on sovereignty are assessed through a taxonomy of the level adoption. This reveals the subsequent constraints which flow from the broad acceptance of an international tax regime through to the specific adoption of technical detail. By undertaking this analysis, the second part of this article demonstrates that Australia has inherently adopted an international tax regime, with a move towards explicit adoption and a clear embedding of its principles within the domestic tax legislation.

Incentivising private health insurance through the income tax regime : Capitalising on behavioural models

The Australian income tax regime is generally regarded as a mechanism by which the Federal Government raises revenue, with much of the revenue raised used to support public spending programs. A prime example of this type of spending program is health care. However, a government may also decide that the private sector should provide a greater share of the nation's health care. To achieve such a policy it can bring about change through positive regulation, or it can use the taxation regime, via tax expenditures, not to raise revenue but to steer or influence individuals in its desired direction. When used for this purpose, tax expenditures steer taxpayers towards or away from certain behaviour by either imposing costs on, or providing benefits to them. Within the context of the health sector, the Australian Federal Government deploys social steering via the tax system, with the Medicare Levy Surcharge and the 30 percent Private Health Insurance Rebate intended to steer taxpayer behaviour towards the Government’s policy goal of increasing the amount of health provision through the private sector. These steering mechanisms are complemented by the ‘Lifetime Health Cover Initiative’. This article, through the lens of behavioural economics, considers the ways in which these assorted mechanisms might have been expected to operate and whether they encourage individuals to purchase private health insurance.

The implementation of social and economic policy through the tax regime : a review of Australia's tax expenditures program

Each year the Australian Federal Treasury releases its Tax Expenditures Statement providing details of concessions, benefits, and incentives delivered through the tax regime to Australian taxpayers. The current Tax Expenditures Statement, released on 25 January 2008, lists approximately 300 tax expenditures and reports on the estimated pecuniary value in terms of revenue foregone, estimated to be a total of $50.12 billion for the 2006-07 financial year. Apart from the annual Tax Expenditures Statement, and despite the recurring fiscal impact, there is very little other scrutiny of Australia’s Federal tax expenditures program. This is despite tax expenditures often being seen as an alternative to direct expenditures with similar impact on the Federal budget. The object of tax expenditures is to provide government assistance and meet government objectives, and, as such, tax expenditures are departures from the revenue raising aspect of the tax regime. Within this context, this article examines the fundamental concept of tax expenditures as contrasted with direct expenditures and considers the role they play in the current tax regime.

The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.

International tax cooperation in the Post-GFC era

Over the last five years we have observed the fallout from the global financial crisis (GFC). International cooperation and jointly adopted policies have dominated many of the solutions to the problems which have arisen. Initially, many nations in response to the GFC, implemented a two pronged short term solution by undertaking fiscal intervention and delivering rescue packages aimed at first, bailing out financial institutions and second, preventing or minimising the impact of a recession. Both programs involved large amounts of domestic spending. It was difficult in early 2007 to foresee the reduction that nations were about the face in domestic revenue collected. Five years on, not only have the first line effects of the GFC reduced the revenue raised by governments around the world, but the consequential costs associated with the rescue packages have also depleted domestic revenue bases. The response by stakeholders has been to attempt to secure domestic revenue bases through fiscally sustainable measures. Domestic sovereignty allows the levying of taxes as a nation chooses. However, rather than raise domestic taxes, revenue may also be increased by stemming the flow of income and capital to low and no-tax jurisdictions. The intervening five-year period since the GFC allows a unique insight into the response by nations and international organisations to tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax competition through the cross border flows of capital and the resulting affect that the GFC has had on international tax cooperation. By investigating the change in the international tax landscape over the last five years, which reveals the work done by stakeholders in developing fiscally responsible responses to the problems that have arisen, it may be possible to predict the trajectory of the international tax landscape over the next five years.

International tax and the Australian wine industry: Is your client’s product destined to sail the seven seas?

The export market for Australian wine continues to grow at a rapid rate, with imported wines also playing a role in market share in sales in Australia. It is estimated that over 60 per cent of all Australian wine is exported, while 12 per cent of wine consumed in Australia has overseas origins. In addition to understanding the size and direction (import or export) of wines, the foreign locales also play an important role in any tax considerations. While the export market for Australian produced alcohol continues to grow, it is into the Asian market that the most significant inroads are occurring. Sales into China of bottled wine over $7.50 per litre recently overtook the volume sold our traditional partners of the United States and Canada. It is becoming easier for even small to medium sized businesses to export their services or products overseas. However, it is vital for those businesses to understand the tax rules applying to any international transactions. Specifically, one of the first tax regimes that importers and exporters need to understand once they decide to establish a presence overseas is transfer pricing. These are the rules that govern the cross-border prices of goods, services and other transactions entered into between related parties. This paper is Part 2 of the seminar presented on transfer pricing and international tax issues which are particularly relevant to the wine industry. The predominant focus of Part 2 is to discuss four key areas likely to affect international expansion. First, the use of the available transfer pricing methodologies for international related party transactions is discussed. Second, the affects that double tax agreements will have on taking a business offshore are considered. Third, the risks associated with aggressive tax planning through tax information exchange agreements is reviewed. Finally, the paper predicts future ‘trip-wires’ and areas to ‘watch out for’ for practitioners dealing with clients operating in the international arena.

The Rise of the BASIC Group Within the International Climate Regime : The Challenge of Ensuring Equitable Mitigation Obligations

The chapter examines the current emission reduction obligations within the climate regime. It looks at the formation and rise of the BASIC negotiation group within the international climate COP negotiations and examines the role that BASIC nations are now playing shaping international mitigation policy.

A nation’s role in addressing base erosion and profit shifting : balancing sovereignty with international collaboration and coordination

The notion of sovereignty is central to any international tax issue. While a nation is free to design its tax laws as it sees fit and raise revenue in accordance with the needs of its citizens, it is not possible to undertake such a task in isolation. In a world of cross-border investments and business transactions, all tax regimes impact on one another. Tax interactions between sovereign states cannot be avoided. Ultimately, the interactions mean that a nation must decide whether to engage in both collaboration and coordination with other nations and supranational bodies alike or maintain an individualised stance in relation to its tax policy. Whatever the decision, there is arguably an exercise in national sovereignty in some form. In the context of an international tax regime, whether that regime is interpreted broadly as meaning international norms generally adopted by nations around the world or domestic regimes legislating for cross-border transactions, rhetoric around national fiscal sovereignty takes on many different forms. At one end of the spectrum it is relied upon by financial secrecy jurisdictions (tax havens) as a defence to their position on the basis that ‘other’ nations cannot interfere with the fiscal sovereignty of a jurisdiction. At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that profit shifting and international tax avoidance if not stopped is, in and of itself, a threat to a nation’s fiscal sovereignty on the basis that it threatens the ability to tax and raise the revenue needed. This paper considers a modern conceptualisation of sovereignty along with its role within international tax coordination and collaboration to argue that a move towards a more unified approach to addressing international base erosion and profit shifting may be the ultimate exercise of national fiscal sovereignty. By using the current transfer pricing regime as a case study, this paper posits that it is not merely enough to have international agreement on allocation rules to be applied, but that the ultimate exercise of national sovereignty is political agreement with other states to ensure that it is governments which determine the allocational basis of worldwide profits to be taxed. In doing so, it is demonstrated that the arm’s length pricing requirement of the current transfer pricing regime, rather than providing governments with the ability to determine the location of profits, is providing multinational entities with the ultimate power to determine that location. If left unchecked, this will eventually erode a nation’s ability to capture the required tax revenue and, as a consequence, may be deemed a failure by nation states to exercise their fiscal sovereignty.

The desirability of depoliticization: Compliance in the international climate regime

The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable among global multilateral environmental agreements for its efforts to depoliticize compliance. However, attempts to create autonomous, arm’s length and rule-based compliance processes with extensive reliance on putatively neutral experts were only partially realized in practice in the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. In particular, the procedurally constrained facilitative powers vested in the Facilitative Branch were circumvented, and expert review teams (ERTs) assumed pivotal roles in compliance facilitation. The ad hoc diplomatic and facilitative practices engaged in by these small teams of technical experts raise questions about the reliability and consistency of the compliance process. For the future operation of the Kyoto compliance system, it is suggested that ERTs should be confined to more technical and procedural roles, in line with their expertise. There would then be greater scope for the Facilitative Branch to assume a more comprehensive facilitative role, safeguarded by due process guarantees, in accordance with its mandate. However, if – as appears likely – the future compliance trajectories under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will include a significant role for ERTs without oversight by the Compliance Committee, it is important to develop appropriate procedural safeguards that reflect and shape the various technical and political roles these teams currently play.

Developing nations need more than words from G20 tax reform

Tax reform is squarely on the agenda for the G20 Brisbane summit in November. The current international tax regime is broken and it’s going to take significant effort on a global scale to fix it. In a recently released CEDA Report on securing the G20’s future, I recommended the role Australia could play in ensuring real and substantive progress is made in international tax reform. There’s a very real need to ensure the Brisbane summit is not just a “talkfest”. One group that stands to significantly win or lose from reform, or lack of it, is developing nations.