Chairship system and decision making by consensus in international agreements : the case of ASEAN

How are different positions reconciled under decision making by consensus in international agreements? This article aims to answer this question. Consensus rule provides each participant a veto, which risks resulting in non-agreement. Taking ASEAN as a case study of international organizations that have adopted consensus rule as the main decision-making procedure, this article presents the chairship system as an analytical scheme to examine how different positions are or are not reconciled under consensus rule. The system is based on conventional knowledge regarding the chair in international conference, which can be defined as an institution where the role of the chair is taken by one member state in an international organization and plays a role in agenda-setting. The agenda-setting power given to the chair varies across organizations. This article assumes that the chair in ASEAN is given a relatively strong agenda-setting power to enable the chair to reach agreements and bias such agreements in its own favor.

The Impact of Brexit on the EU’s International Agreements. CEPS Commentary, 15 July 2016

The prospect of Brexit has kicked up a lot of dust around the now famous Article 50 TEU withdrawal procedure, and the form, scope and sequence of the ‘divorce’ and future framework agreements between the EU and the UK.[1] One issue that has received far less attention is whether the international agreements concluded by the EU will continue to apply to the UK after Brexit, and if so, how.

The Marine Mammal Commission compendium of selected treaties, international agreements, and other relevant documents on marine resources, wildlife, and the environment /

Mode of access: Internet.

United States treaties and other international agreements.

Some vols. issued in parts.

Treaties and other international agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949.

v. 1. Multilateral, 1776-1917.--v. 2. Multilateral, 1918-1930.--v. 3. Multilateral, 1931-1945.--v. 4. Multilateral, 1946-1949.--v. 5. Afghanistan-Burma.--v. 6. Canada-Czechoslovakia.--v. 7. Denmark-France.--v. 8. Germany-Iran.--v. 9. Iraq-Muscat.--v. 10. Nepal-Peru.--v. 11. Philippines-United Arab Republic.--v. 12. United Kingdom--Zanzibar.--v. 13. General index.

The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements

This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollutant and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. Three distinct intervals for the length of the period of commitment are identified, across which the equilibrium and its dynamic behavior differ considerably. Whereas for sufficiently high values of the period of commitment only self-enforcing agreements of two countries are possible, for sufficiently low such values full cooperation can be generated. Lengths of periods of commitment between those two thresholds are characterized by an inverse relationship between the length of commitment and the membership size of the agreement. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.

Non-conventional provisions in regional trade agreements : do they enhance international trade?

The scope of recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) is becoming much wider in terms of including several provisions such as competition policy or intellectual property. This paper empirically examines how far advanced, non-conventional provisions in RTAs increase trade values among RTA member countries, by estimating the gravity equation with more disaggregated indicators for RTAs. As a result, we find that the provision on competition policy has the largest impacts on trade values, following that on government procurement. Our further analysis reveals that the more significant roles of these two provisions can be also observed in the impacts on the intensive and extensive margins.

The use of role-play games in teaching: The International Climate Negotiation Game

This paper presents a role-play game designed by the authors, which focuses on international climate negotiations. The game has been used at a university with students all drawn from the same course and at summer schools with students from different levels (undergraduate, master’s and doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers) and different knowledge areas (economics, law, engineering, architecture, biology and others). We discuss how the game fits into the process of competence-based learning, and what benefits games, and role-play games in particular, have for teaching. In the game, students take on the role of representatives of national institutions and experience at first hand a detailed process of international negotiation concerned with climate change.

Le droit du commerce international des organismes génétiquement modifiés (OGM) agricoles médicaux : les perspectives d'encadrement normatif

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université de Montréal en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"

In search of work. International migration of women in Latin America and the Caribbean. Selected bibliography

Includes bibliography

Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

Clustering Assessment: Enhancing Synergies among Multilateral Environmental Agreements

Against the background of a widely fragmented and diluted international environmental governance architecture, different reform options are currently being discussed. This issue brief considers whether streamlining international environmental regimes by grouping or ‘clustering’ international agreements could improve effectiveness and efficiency. It outlines the general idea of the clustering approach, draws lessons from the chemicals and waste cluster and examines the implications and potentials of clustering multilateral environmental agreements.

Myopic or farsighted : bilateral trade agreements among three symmetric countries

We examine network formation via bilateral trade agreement (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides whether to form a link or not via a BTA depending on the differential of ex-post and ex-ante sum of real wages in the country. We model the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted and analyze the effects on the BTA network formation. First, we find that both myopic and farsighted games never induce the formation of star networks nor empty networks. Second, the networks resulting from myopic game coincides with those resulting from farsighted games.

The role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in facilitating global production networks

This paper examines the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in facilitating international trade flows connecting production networks. We consider over 250 PTAs with trade flows distinguished into parts and components and final goods for the period 1979-2008. The gravity equation estimates suggest that the concurrent year effects of PTA formation on trade in parts and components are unseen, whereas PTAs have positive and pervasive effects on both types of trade flows 6 and 9 years after the PTA formation.