Internal Capital, External Knowledge, and Random Draws: Three Drivers of Organizational Structure

This dissertation explores the complex interactions between organizational structure and the environment. In Chapter 1, I investigate the effect of financial development on the formation of European corporate groups. Since cross-country regressions are hard to interpret in a causal sense, we exploit exogenous industry measures to investigate a specific channel through which financial development may affect group affiliation: internal capital markets. Using a comprehensive firm-level dataset on European corporate groups in 15 countries, we find that countries

with less developed financial markets have a higher percentage of group affiliates in more capital intensive industries. This relationship is more pronounced for young and small firms and for affiliates of large and diversified groups. Our findings are consistent with the view that internal capital markets may, under some conditions, be more efficient than prevailing external markets, and that this may drive group affiliation even in developed economies. In Chapter 2, I bridge current streams of innovation research to explore the interplay between R&D, external knowledge, and organizational structure–three elements of a firm’s innovation strategy which we argue should logically be studied together. Using within-firm patent assignment patterns,

we develop a novel measure of structure for a large sample of American firms. We find that centralized firms invest more in research and patent more per R&D dollar than decentralized firms. Both types access technology via mergers and acquisitions, but their acquisitions differ in terms of frequency, size, and i\ntegration. Consistent with our framework, their sources of value creation differ: while centralized firms derive more value from internal R&D, decentralized firms rely more on external knowledge. We discuss how these findings should stimulate more integrative work on theories of innovation. In Chapter 3, I use novel data on 1,265 newly-public firms to show that innovative firms exposed to environments with lower M&A activity just after their initial public offering (IPO) adapt by engaging in fewer technological acquisitions and

more internal research. However, this adaptive response becomes inertial shortly after IPO and persists well into maturity. This study advances our understanding of how the environment shapes heterogeneity and capabilities through its impact on firm structure. I discuss how my results can help bridge inertial versus adaptive perspectives in the study of organizations, by

documenting an instance when the two interact.

The paradox of transparency : short-termism and the institutionalisation of Australian capital markets

As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being 'captured' by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter-intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short-termism.

Capital Markets Union and ending short-termism: lessons from the European Commission's public consultation

The European Commission’s initiative to establish a Capital Markets Union is in sharp conflict with the more radical goals of downsizing significantly certain financial activities and firms that have become too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-govern and of ending or at least drastically limiting extreme speculation and short-termism in finance and the real economy in order to increase financial stability. The recent public consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union gives evidence of how weak such demands are compared to calls for deeper capital markets with more ‘shadow banking’ and rebuilding (sound) securitisation. The consultation is an example of how framing the problem and the refined better regulation agenda influence post-crisis financial reregulation and help to marginalize more radical ideas demanding a return to a more traditional banking model and transforming finance back to serving the real economy.

Mercados internos de capital: uma questão de sobrevivência

Procuramos apresentar neste trabalho a importância e os efeitos dos mercados internos de capitais, e as conseqüências quando da sua aplicação. Para isso, aplicamos inicialmente um modelo básico de mercados internos de capitais, avaliando os pontos atingidos e algumas idéias não abrangidas por ele. Exemplificamos com uma situação de aplicação de recursos entre divisões de uma pequena empresa diversificada e seu fracasso devido à má alocação desses recursos. Na seqüência, identificamos modelos que, quando aplicados às situações em que os mercados internos de capitais não funcionaram, foram capazes de apontar o porquê, indicando possíveis interferências e impedimentos. Por fim, aplicamos um modelo que permite comprovar a ineficiência na transferência de recursos quando esses vão na direção das divisões com as piores oportunidades de investimento.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

Beyond ‘best practices': the international regulation of capital markets

It is widely acknowledged that there is considerable international pressure for international ‘best practices’ to be adopted via national legislation. This would occur either by means of model laws or through the passing of country specific legislation that closely replicates foreign legal formats, administrative rules, and or regulation. These attempts to spread the implementation of ‘best practices’ have gained importance in the international debate due to the liberalization of international capital flows. The oversight, country reports, and technical assistance carried out by international organizations along with the growing internationalization of investors have also contributed to this growing pressure. In this respect, due to the constant evolution of transactions and the end objective of making sure that capital markets are developed with just rules, structures, and methods, this article looks to analyze the adoption of standardized models of capital market regulation. Furthermore it looks to examine the motivation and interest of states and other ‘stakeholders’ at the international level.

Study of capital markets and Caribbean trade

Includes bibliography

A study of capital markets and Caribbean trade

Includes bibliography