What happens after the central bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

I start presenting an explicit solution to Taylorís (2001) model, in order to illustrate the link between the target interest rate and the overnight interest rate prevailing in the economy. Next, I use Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interest rate by 1%. Point estimates show a four-year accumulated output loss ranging from 0:04% (whole sample, 1980 : 1-2004 : 2; quarterly data) to 0:25% (Post-Real data only) with a Örst-year peak output response between 0:04% and 1:0%; respectively. Prices decline between 2% and 4% in a 4-year horizon. The accumulated output response is found to be between 3:5 and 6 times higher after the Real Plan than when the whole sample is considered. The 95% confidence bands obtained using bias-corrected bootstrap always include the null output response when the whole sample is used, but not when the data is restricted to the Post-Real period. Innovations to interest rates explain between 4:9% (whole sample) and 9:2% (post-Real sample) of the forecast error of GDP.

What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

The Impact of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis on the Relationship between Central Bank Rates and the Corresponding Interbank Interest Rates in 2002-2014

The role of central banks throughout the global financial system has become even more important during and after the events of the financial crisis. In order to stabilize the market conditions and provide solid ground for future development, the central banks use discount rate as their primary monetary policy tool in many developed and emerging economies. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the relationship between central bank rates and corresponding interbank rates has developed before, during and after the crisis period of 2007-2009 in five developed countries and five emerging market countries. The results indicate that during the before-crisis period the interest rate markets reacted diversely but the joint recovery attempts of global economies seem to have stabilized the reactions during and especially after the crisis. The crisis also seems to have highlighted the characteristics of each country’s survival strategy as the role of other policy instruments arose.

Essays on banking theory and history of financial arrangements

Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

Three essays on the interest rate cruve multiplicity in the interbank market

Esta tesis lleva por título ”Tres ensayos sobre la multiplicidad de curvas de tipos de interés en el mercado interbancario” y está compuesta por tres artículos de investigación independientes en los que se analiza la evolución de los diferenciales del mercado interbancario del Euro en el periodo post-crisis. El objetivo es obtener información embebida en las cotizaciones de estos diferenciales emplenado distintas metodologías e identificar las variables que subyacen al fenómeno de la multiplicidad de curvas, caracterizando el papel que juegan a la hora de explicar esta evolución. El análisis se realiza según una aproximación cercana a la práctica de mercado (Capítulo 2), siguiendo técnicas de valoración de activos (Capítulo 3) y finalmente considerando métodos econométricos (Capítulo 4). El Capítulo 2, que incluye el primer ensayo, se centra en la evolución dinámica de las distintas curvas de tipos de interés surgidas a raíz de la crisis -diferenciadas por la periodicidad de pago del tipo de interés subyacente- a través del estudio de sus diferenciales respecto a la curva overnight. La metodología empleada es similar a la de Diebold and Li (2006) y se resume en tres factores principales que se interpretan como nivel, pendiente y curvatura. El análisis de componentes principales de estos factores para distintas periodicidades muestra que existen patrones comunes entre los factores de las diferentes curvas, en particular el primer componente principal explica el 90% de su variación. El estudio de los determinantes de estos factores revela importantes conclusiones sobre las fuentes de este patrón. En concreto, se observa que el nivel tiene una relación muy importante con el riesgo de crédito. Asimismo, el estudio del contenido informacional de los errores residuales del modelo -mediante el cómputo de la medida de ruido de Hu et al. (2013)- nos lleva a concluir que estos residuos tienen relación con la liquidez. El análisis de estos datos empleando téncicas VAR refuerza estos resultados...

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

The interrelationship between monetary policy and the interbank money market during the financial crisis

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus sechs Kapiteln und trägt zur Forschung in den Bereichen der Finanzmarktpolitik und der Geldpolitik bei. Das zweite Kapitel zeigt die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Geldmarktanspannungen und der Stabilität des Finanzsystems auf. Mittels der theoretischen Literatur werden verschiedene Einflussfaktoren einer aggregierten Liquiditätsnachfragefunktion präsentiert. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht den Informationsgehalt der Ergebnisse der Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte für den europäischen Geldmarkt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich seit der Finanzkrise der Informationsgehalt der Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte in zweierlei Hinsicht verändert hat. Im vierten Kapitel untersuchen wir die Wirksamkeit der Geldpolitik während der Finanzkrise europäische Geldmarktzinssätze zu steuern. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine erhebliche Divergenz zwischen den Zinssätzen und den Erwartungen über die zukünftige Geldpolitik hin. Weiterhin finden wir heraus, dass die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen der EZB für einen Rückgang der Euriborsätze von bis zu 60 Basispunkten verantwortlich sind. Das fünfte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit der Funktionsweise des besonderen geldpolitischen Instrumentariums der Schweizerischen Nationalbank.

Interbank Markets under Currency Boards

This paper analyzes interbank markets under currency boards. Under such an environment, problematic endogeneity issues common to other monetary regimes do not arise. Using daily data from the interbank markets in Bulgaria and Lithuania we show, that contrary to the existing literature, overnight interest rates tend to decrease towards the end of the reserve holding period. Empirical results are supported by a finite horizon heterogeneous agents model showing that interest rates tend to decrease in the case of excess aggregate reserves in the banking system. Results contrast with Quir'os and Mendiz'abal (2006) who find that interest rates should be increasing regardless of the outstanding aggregate liquidity in the market. We also show that responsiveness of banks to interest rate changes diminishes as the end of reserve holding period approaches. Under certain circumstances this could lead to multiple equilibria with increasing or decreasing interest rates.

Implicit rating: A potential new method to alert crisis on the interbank lending market

A new measure called “implicit rating” is introduced which might be a component of an early warning system. The proposed methodology relies on the aggregation of experts’ knowledge hidden in the transactional data of the interbank market of unsecured loans. Banks are simultaneously assessing the creditworthiness of each other which is reflected in the partner limits and in the interest rates. In the Hungarian interbank market the overall trading volume and the average interest rate did not show any negative trends before the crisis of 2008, however the average implicit partner limit started to decrease several months earlier, hence it might serve as a stress indicator.

Developmental Rate Of Immatures Of Two Fly Species Of Forensic Importance: Sarcophaga (liopygia) Ruficornis And Microcerella Halli (diptera: Sarcophagidae).

Since insect species are poikilothermic organisms, they generally exhibit different growth patterns depending on the temperature at which they develop. This factor is important in forensic entomology, especially for estimating postmortem interval (PMI) when it is based on the developmental time of the insects reared in decomposing bodies. This study aimed to estimate the rates of development, viability, and survival of immatures of Sarcophaga (Liopygia) ruficornis (Fabricius 1794) and Microcerella halli (Engel 1931) (Diptera: Sarcophagidae) reared in different temperatures: 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 ± 1 °C. Bovine raw ground meat was offered as food for all experimental groups, each consisting of four replicates, in the proportion of 2 g/larva. To measure the evolution of growth, ten specimens of each group were randomly chosen and weighed every 12 h, from initial feeding larva to pupae, and then discarded. Considering the records of weight gain, survival rates, and stability of growth rates, the range of optimum temperature for the development of S. (L.) ruficornis is between 20 and 35 °C, and that of M. halli is between 20 and 25 °C. For both species, the longest times of development were in the lowest temperatures. The survival rate at extreme temperatures (10 and 35 °C) was lower in both species. Biological data such as the ones obtained in this study are of great importance to achieve a more accurate estimate of the PMI.

Electrocardiogram, Heart Movement And Heart Rate In The Awake Gecko (hemidactylus Mabouia).

The electrocardiogram (ECG) is the simplest and most effective non-invasive method to assess the electrical activity of the heart and to obtain information on the heart rate (HR) and rhythm. Because information on the HR of very small reptiles (body mass <10 g) is still scarce in the literature, in the present work we describe a procedure for recording the ECG in non-anesthetized geckos (Hemidactylus mabouia, Moreau de Jonnès, 1818) under different conditions, namely manual restraint (MR), spontaneous tonic immobility (TI), and in the non-restrained condition (NR). In the gecko ECG, the P, QRS and T waves were clearly distinguishable. The HR was 2.83 ± 0.02 Hz under MR, which was significantly greater (p < 0.001) than the HR under the TI (1.65 ± 0.09 Hz) and NR (1.60 ± 0.10 Hz) conditions. Spontaneously beating isolated gecko hearts contracted at 0.84 ± 0.03 Hz. The in vitro beating rate was affected in a concentration-dependent fashion by adrenoceptor stimulation with noradrenaline, as well as by the muscarinic cholinergic agonist carbachol, which produced significant positive and negative chronotropic effects, respectively (p < 0.001). To our knowledge, this is the first report on the ECG morphology and HR values in geckos, particularly under TI. The methodology and instrumentation developed here are useful for non-invasive in vivo physiological and pharmacological studies in small reptiles without the need of physical restraint or anesthesia.