902 resultados para Intellectual Property Rights
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This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.
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I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.
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This study critically analyzes the historical role and influence of multinational drug cotpOrations and multinational corporations in general; the u.s. government and the Canadian state in negotiating the global recognition ofIntellectual Property Rights (IPR) under GATT/NAFTA. This process began in 1969 when the Liberal government, in response to high prices for brand-name drugs amended the Patent Act to introduce compulsory licensing by reducing monopoly protection from 20 to seven years. Although the financial position ofthe multinational drug industry was not affected, it campaigned vigorously to change the 1969 legislation. In 1987, the Patent Act was amended to extend protection to 10 years as a condition for free trade talks with the u.s. Nonetheless, the drug industry was not satisfied and accused Canada of providing a bad example to other nations. Therefore, it continued to campaign for global recognition ofIPR laws under GATT. Following the conclusion of the GATTI Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) in 1991, the multinational drug industry and the American government, to the surprise of many, were still not satisfied and sought to implement harsher conditions under NAFTA. The Progressive Conservative government readily agreed without any objections or consideration for the social consequences. As a result, Bill C-91 was introduced. It abandoned compulsory licenses and was made retroactive from December 21, 1991. It is the contention of this thesis that the economic survival of multinational corporations on a global scale depends on the role and functions of the modem state. Similarly, the existence of the state depends on the ideological-political and socioeconomic assistance it gives to multinational corporations on a national and international scale. This dialectical relation of the state and multinational corporations is explored in our theoretical and historical analysis of their role in public policy.
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Non-governmental organizations and transnational networks have been increasingly successful a t gaining influence within issue areas traditionally controlled by the state. In many instances, non-state actors have been instrumental in forcing issues onto the global agenda, have aided in the development or transformation of global regimes, and have participated in securing state compliance for the adoption of new international norms. This paper argues that, consistent with social constructivist theory, ideas are important in influencing state preferences and change may be possible when certain factors are present. I f non-state actors can influence states, it is meaningful to understand how this happens. This paper focuses on a campaign led by Medecins Sans Frontieres that began in the late 1990s to acquire affordable medicines for patients in developing states that could not afford patented drugs. The campaign reached a measure of success in that member states of the World Trade Organization re-negotiated contested terms and meanings within the trade agreement for intellectual property rights and allowed concessions that would benefit lower income states. What factors contributed to the success of the campaign? And what were the most important factors - the issue, the actors or the mechanisms used?
Resumo:
This thesis entitled Exceptions and limitations to intellectual property rights with special reference to patent and copyright law.The study on the limitations and exceptions to copyright and patent was mainly characterized by its diversity and flexibility. The unique feature of limited monopoly appended to intellectual property was always a matter of wide controversy.The historical analysis substantiated this instrumentalist philosophy of intellectual property.the study from a legal space characterized by diversity and flexibility and end up in that legal space being characterized by homogeneity and standardization. The issue of flexibility and restrictiveness in the context of TRIPS is the next challenging task. Before devising flexibility to TST, the question to be answered is whether such a mechanism is desirable in the context of TRIPS.In conclusion it is submitted to reorient the intellectual property framework in the context of the noble public interest objectives.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School’s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, “instant scalability”, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR “will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.”1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories’ perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!