Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2013

Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council Click here to download PDF 179KB  

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2013

This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the insurers support, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers.  All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The Phase 1 report contains 32 recommendations under 9 headings as follows: Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation. Some of the key recommendations to drive down costs are can be summarised as follows: Controlling costs in private health insurance Care settings and use of resources Age structure of the market Clinical audit and utilisation management Industry approach to private psychiatry Fraud, waste and abuse Chronic disease management Claims processing Admission and discharge procedures and processes. Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation.

Report to the Minister for Health and Children on Risk Equalisation in the Irish Private Health Insurance Market

Provision for risk equalisation was first made in the Health Insurance Act, 1994, section 12 of which empowered the Minister to prescribe a scheme for risk equalisation. A Risk Equalsiation Scheme was introduced in 2003. In December 2005, the Minister decided, on the Authorityâ?Ts recommendation, which referred to risks now materialising, to commence risk equalisation payments under the Scheme as from 1 January 2006, but in the event the relevant legislation was overturned by the Courts in 2008. Download document here

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014

5.11.2014 This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the support of the health insurers, and the Health Insurance Authority, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers.  All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The work of the Group has been conducted in two phases, with the first phase report published on 26 December 2013. The Phase 1 report sets out the context, establishment, membership and terms of reference for both phases of the Groups work.  The report also outlines the legislative provisions for private health insurance in Ireland, the objectives of both phases of the review and the approach and methodology followed. Phase 2 of the process focused on the compilation and analysis by the Health Insurance Authority (HIA) of claims data to assess the cost drivers for health insurance, the effects of medical technology and innovations on costs, and claims processing issues.The report and submissions from relevant stakeholders which were examined and considered under the Phase 2 Review can be downloaded below. Download the Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014 -  Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council here. Submissions received HSE Submission to Pat McLoughlin, Chair of Review Group IHAI submission 11 April 2014 IHCA submission to Chair 1 May 2014 Insurance Ireland submission Society of Actuaries in Ireland submission St. Patricks Mental Health Services submission April 2014 St John of Gods Submission        

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Biased selection within the social health insurance market in Colombia

Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación adicional por parte del gobierno.

The health insurance market: lessons on the conflict between equivalence and solidarity

Includes bibliography

The United Kingdom automobile insurance market. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington, D.C.

European community : regulatory issues in creating a single insurance market : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives /

"B-253003"--P. 1.

Essays in macroeconomics: insurance, market power, and inequality

This thesis investigates a broad range of topics related to insurance, market power, and inequality, both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. In the first chapter, I exploit the significant heterogeneity of the shocks hitting Ethiopian households and their heterogeneous response, using relatively recent data (World Bank's LSMS-ISA for households and satellite data for weather shocks). On the one hand, households seem able to insure against most idiosyncratic and mild adverse weather shocks. On the other hand, vulnerability to stronger weather shocks (especially droughts) remains elevated. In the second chapter, starting from firms' individual data, aggregate trends about industry concentration and other proxies of competition are built. This chapter is part of a larger project conducted at the OECD in the Productivity Innovation and Entrepreneurship Division of the STI Directorate The project innovates on the existing literature in its measurement of concentration, aimed at reflecting markets more accurately. On average, aggregate concentration is found to be increasing. In the third chapter, which only lays out some preliminary steps of a more extensive inquiry, I model the heterogeneous effects of aggregate technological progress on individual economic agents and show how this can affect aggregate inequality and other aggregate indicators studied in the macroeconomics literature, such as the entrepreneurship rate and the overall firm distribution. It should be noted, however, that this note is a simple exposition of a possible modelling device rather than a full explanation of these phenomena.

Market discipline by depositors : impact of deposit insurance on the Indonesian banking sector

This paper investigates market discipline by depositors in the Indonesian banking sector. Does depositor discipline fulfill its role in Indonesia? Does deposit insurance affect depositor behavior thereby imposing discipline on banks? These questions are empirically examined using panel data on Indonesian commercial banks from 1998 to 2009. In Indonesia deposit insurance was introduced in 2005. Depositor discipline is examined by two measures: change in the amount of deposits and interest rate. The empirical results show that depositors pay attention to bank soundness and riskiness and select banks based on the bank's condition with particular attention paid to equity ratio. It is found that depositors impose discipline on banks, but it varies according to regulatory and economic circumstances.

White Paper on Private Health Insurance

This White Paper, which arises from commitments in the Action Programme for the New Millennium, sets out the Government’s policy objectives and proposals regarding the role of private health insurance in the overall healthcare system, the regulation of the health insurance market, and the corporate structure and status of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board Download the Report here