Printed blank from Frank Pearce and Co. Shipping and Insurance Agents

Printed blank from Frank Pearce and Co. Shipping and Insurance Agents regarding the bill of landing for the porcelain cask, Oct. 26, 1876.

Oregon directory of fire, automobile (fire), life and miscellaneous insurance agents and companies represented ...

Compiled by the Insurance Commissioner.

The agents key to fire insurance (in two parts) Information for agents, brokers and field men regarding essentials of the business in concise and helpful form,

Mode of access: Internet.

Agents' record.

Description based on surrogate of Vol. 8, no. 3 (Mar. 1913); title from cover.

Selling accident and health insurance,

Mode of access: Internet.

Selling insurance by written program /

Mode of access: Internet.

Marketing life insurance; its history in America,

Mode of access: Internet.

Insurance cluster /

Project staff: Roger Uhe, Tammy Haight.--P. [2] of cover.

Elementary textbook and abridged manual of information and suggestions for field representatives of the Massuchusetts mutual life insurance company,

Mode of access: Internet.

Field notes.

Latest issue consulted: Vol. 80, no. 6 (July-Aug. 1981).

The R & R sales training course.

[v. 1] Plan and action in life underwriting.-[v. 2] The fundamentals of life underwriting.-[v. 3] Life situations and life underwriting.-[v. 4] The sales process of life underwriting.

The Bankers', insurance managers', and agents' magazine.

Separately paged supplements accompany some numbers.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.