Foodborne illness, food inspection policy and restaurants in the U.S.

Objectives. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a literature review of research relating to foodborne illness, food inspection policy, and restaurants in the United States. Aim 1: To convey the public health importance of studying restaurant food inspection policies and suggest that more research is needed in this field, Aim 2: To conduct a systematic literature review of recent literature pertaining to this subject such that future researchers can understand the: (1) Public perception and expectations of restaurant food inspection policies; (2) Arguments in favor of a grade card policy; and, conversely; (3) Reasons why inspection policies may not work. ^ Data/methods. This paper utilizes a systematic review format to review articles relating to food inspections and restaurants in the U.S. Eight articles were reviewed. ^ Results. The resulting data from the literature provides no conclusive answer as to how, when, and in what method inspection policies should be carried out. The authors do, however, put forward varying solutions as to how to fix the problem of foodborne illness outbreaks in restaurants. These solutions include the implementation of grade cards in restaurants and, conversely, a complete overhaul of the inspection policy system.^ Discussion. The literature on foodborne disease, food inspection policy, and restaurants in the U.S. is limited and varied. But, from the research that is available, we can see that two schools of thought exist. The first of these calls for the implementation of a grade card system, while the second proposes a reassessment and possible overhaul of the food inspection policy system. It is still unclear which of these methods would best slow the increase in foodborne disease transmission in the U.S.^ Conclusion. In order to arrive at solutions to the problem of foodborne disease transmission as it relates to restaurants in this country, we may need to look at literature from other countries and, subsequently, begin incremental changes in the way inspection policies are developed and enforced.^

Application of Mixture Models to Survival Data

Survival models are being widely applied to the engineering field to model time-to-event data once censored data is here a common issue. Using parametric models or not, for the case of heterogeneous data, they may not always represent a good fit. The present study relays on critical pumps survival data where traditional parametric regression might be improved in order to obtain better approaches. Considering censored data and using an empiric method to split the data into two subgroups to give the possibility to fit separated models to our censored data, we’ve mixture two distinct distributions according a mixture-models approach. We have concluded that it is a good method to fit data that does not fit to a usual parametric distribution and achieve reliable parameters. A constant cumulative hazard rate policy was used as well to check optimum inspection times using the obtained model from the mixture-model, which could be a plus when comparing with the actual maintenance policies to check whether changes should be introduced or not.

Auditor independence: regulation, oversight and inspection

Much of what auditors do is unobservable. Indeed, what goes on in an audit has been described as ‘secret audit business’. Audits in this context are of financial reports and those financial reports are the representations of the management of those companies, not the auditors. The audits of financial reports are of value in that they provide a competent and independent (of auditee management) attestation of the validity of those management representations. This attestation lowers the ‘information risk’ for the users of these financial reports. There has been a marked increase in activity to regulate matters relating to independence. The proposals outlined in CLERP 9 are one example of this. The requirements in the United States under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are a further example.

Audit firms operate in a highly regulated yet highly competitive market. Evidence exists to suggest that audit firms are active competitors in respect of audit pricing and competency, including specialist industry expertise. Until recently, there has been little or no observable evidence that audit firms compete in respect of independence. The issues as they relate to audit independence are complex. One issue is that threats to independence are frequently subtle and difficult to observe and measure. Hence, controlling the decisions that relate to them cannot rely solely on regulation which itself inevitably relies on crude definitions and imprecise measures. Additionally, further regulation may not achieve the desired end without other processes being but in place in tandem.

This paper argues that:

1. auditors of certain classes of companies (in particular, those that are publicly traded) should be provided with incentives or requirements to have observable processes on independence
2. the means of observability should be in the form of an inspection and review process focussing on issues critical to the audit, such as independence
3. expert persons not having a current or past financial interest in the firm or in the commercial outcomes of the review should be used in the inspection and review process
4. the review process should have wide-ranging powers of inspection to examine the policies, processes, structures and ‘culture’ of audit firms
5. the report of the inspection and review should be made public, unedited and in full, and in a timely fashion. The primary objectives of this proposal are to (1) make more transparent to the market for information the characteristics of the audit firms and their process to ensure audit independence, and (2) provide a rigorous oversight of independence decision-making by persons who have no commercial interest in the outcome of the decision.