Inflation targeting and the consistency of monetary policy decisions in Mexico: an empirical analysis with discrete choice models

This paper examines the nature of monetary policy decisions in Mexico using discrete choice models applied to the Central Bank's explicit monetary policy instrument. We find that monetary policy adjustments in Mexico have been strongly consistent with the CB's inflation targeting strategy. We also find evidence that monetary policy responds in a forward-looking manner to deviations of inflation from the target and that observed policy adjustments exhibit asymmetric features, with stronger responses to positive than to negative deviations of inflation from the target and a greater likelihood of policy persistence during periods when monetary policy is tightened, compared with periods when policy is loosened.

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?

This paper reports graphical and statistical evidence that the inflation targeting regimes in Canada and the UK - but not in Australia, New Zealand, or Sweden - actually resemble price-level targeting. In particular, the price level closely tracks the path implied by the inflation target, and the time-series predictions of the "bygones-are-bygones" version of inflation targeting are rejected by the data in favor of those implied by price-level targeting. These results indicate heterogeneity in the actual application of inflation targeting across countries and, for Canada and the UK, imply that the characterization of inflation targeting as a policy where shocks are accommodated is at odds with the data. Moreover, up to extent that their current policies already resemble price-level targeting, the welfare gains of replacing inflation with (explicit) price-level targeting are likely to be small.

Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Inflation targeting in Brazil: a Keynesian approach

O Regime de Meta de Inflação se Tornou Dominante na Formulação de Políticas dos Bancos Centrais nos Últimos 15 Anos. a Teoria Subjacente, Particularmente a Regra de Taylor, Pode ser Vista como uma Competente Generalização Desse Comportamento. de um Ponto de Vista Keynesiano, Ele Será Aceitável se Encararmos a Taxa de Juros de Equilíbrio como Apenas uma Convenção Variável e se a Combinarmos ou com uma Taxa de Câmbio ou com uma Meta de Emprego. no Caso do Brasil, Porém, Além Dessa Ressalva Teórica e da Condição do Duplo Mandato, o Regime de Metas de Inflação Enfrenta um Problema de Incoerência. esta é uma Política que se Destinava a ser Utilizada na Administração da Política Monetária, não na Mudança do Regime de Política Monetária . a Política de Metas de Inflação foi Introduzida no Brasil em 1999 como um Substituto para a Âncora Cambial, que Havia Sido Usada Desastrosamente entre 1995 e 1998. Durante Muitos Anos, o País Havia Enfrentado uma Armadilha de Alta Taxa de Juros / Taxa de Câmbio Valorizada E, Portanto, Precisava Mudar seu Regime de Política Monetária Antes de Eventualmente Adotar o Regime de Meta de Inflação. Essa Mudança, que Começou com a Flutuação de Janeiro de 1999, Deveria ter Sido Completada com Reformas Específicas (Fim da Indexação dos Serviços Públicos e dos Próprios Juros Básicos). no Entanto, em Lugar de Desenvolver uma Estratégia para Reduzir a Taxa de Juros, o Governo Continuou a Definir a Inflação como o Principal Problema a ser Enfrentado e Adotou uma Política Formal de Metas de Inflação. a Conseqüência é que Desde 1999 Essa Política se Tornou o Obstáculo que a Economia Brasileira Enfrenta para Escapar da Armadilha da Taxa de Juros

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.

Apresentação 10: “Inflation Targeting”, “Currency Regimes with Defaultable Debts” e Sistema Tributário na Presença de Informalidade e Evasão Fiscal…A disseminação internacional das pesquisas aplicadas relacionadas a agenda brasileira

Coordenadora: Goret P. Paulo

Inflation targeting works well in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Financial market reaction to central bank monetary policy communications under an inflation- targeting regime: the case of Brazil

Includes bibliography

Implementing inflation targeting in Brazil: an institutional analysis

The paper shows the advantages and handicaps of implementing an inflation target (IT) regime, from a Post-Keynesian and, thus, an institutional stance. It is Post-Keynesian as long as it does not perceive any benefit in the mainstream split between monetary and fiscal policies. And it is institutional insofar as it assumes that there are several ways of implementing a policy, such that the chosen one is determined by historical factors, as it is illustrated by the Brazilian case. One could even support IT policies if their targets were seen just as “focusing devices” guiding economic policy, notwithstanding other targets, as, in the short run, output growth and employment and, in the long run, technology and human development. Nevertheless, an IT is not necessary, although it can be admitted, mainly if the target is hidden from the public, in order to increase the flexibility of the Central Bank.

Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from Aggregate European Data

This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by comparing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative inflation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simulation findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in Europe.