An industrial organisation economic supply chain approach for the construction industry : a review

Understanding industries in terms of the concepts of chains, clusters and networks is becoming increasingly important in economies around the world. Supply chain management for an individual organization is an
emerging field of research in the construction management discipline, but less attention has been devoted to investigating the nature of the construction supply chains and their industrial organizational economic environment. This selected review of construction and mainstream management supply chain literature is organized around four themes; distribution, production, strategic procurement management and industrial
organization economics, and highlights the need to develop an industrial organization economic supply chain framework for construction. The merging of the supply chain concept with the industrial organization model
as a methodology for understanding firm conduct and industry structure and performance is an important contribution to both construction supply chain and construction economic theory. Much of the industrial organization supply chain literature has tended to focus upon manufacturing industries, where typically firms are permanent organizations. This raises issues as to the differences between industries founded upon temporary compared with permanent organizations. There is potential for the development of an industrial organization methodology applicable to the project based industry. Ultimately industrial organization research seeks to have direct implications for industry performance and government policies.

Economic markets and the standard industrial classification /

"October 1990."

The Economics of firm size, market structure, and social performance : proceedings of a conference /

Item 535

Industrial Organization: a Contract Based approach

Industrial Organization, a Contract Based approach (aka IOCB) offers an extensive and an up-to-date panorama of Industrial Organization. It is aimed at advanced undergraduates, graduates, academics and practitioners with an interest in the field. The analysis of market interactions, business strategies and public policy is performed using the standard framework of game theory and the recent advances of contract theory and information economics

Essays in industrial organization

The thesis consists in three papers that investigate two debated topics in industrial organization (in particular in competition policy) through formal models based on game-theory. The first paper deals with potential effects of conglomerate mergers among leading brands in facilitating foreclosure of new suppliers through the retailing channel. The two remaining papers analyze antitrust policy with respect to monopolization of markets of spare parts and aftermarkets by monopolistic equipment manufacturers.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

An Analysis of Colombian Power Market Price Behavior from an Industrial Organization Perspective

We analyze the behavior of spot prices in the Colombian wholesale power market, using a series of models derived from industrial organization theory -- We first create a Cournot-based model that simulates the strategic behavior of the market-leader power generators, which we use to estimate two industrial organization variables, the Index of Residual Demand and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- We use these variables to create VAR models that estimate spot prices and power market impulse-response relationships -- The results from these models show that hydroelectric generators can use their water storage capability strategically to affect off-peak prices primarily, while the thermal generators can manage their capacity strategically to affect on-peak prices -- In addition, shocks to the Index of Residual Capacity and to the HHI cause spot price fluctuations, which can be interpreted as the generators´ strategic response to these shocks

Economic theory informing approaches to phoenix activity in small business: A neo-Schumpeterian analysis

The adequacy and efficiency of existing legal and regulatory frameworks dealing with corporate phoenix activity have been repeatedly called into question over the past two decades through various reviews, inquiries, targeted regulatory operations and the implementation of piecemeal legislative reform. Despite these efforts, phoenix activity does not appear to have abated. While there is no law in Australia that declares ‘phoenix activity’ to be illegal, the behaviour that tends to manifest in phoenix activity can be capable of transgressing a vast array of law, including for example, corporate law, tax law, and employment law. This paper explores the notion that the persistence of phoenix activity despite the sheer extent of this law suggests that the law is not acting as powerfully as it might as a deterrent. Economic theories of entrepreneurship and innovation can to some extent explain why this is the case and also offer a sound basis for the evaluation and reconsideration of the existing law. The challenges facing key regulators are significant. Phoenix activity is not limited to particular corporate demographic: it occurs in SMEs, large companies and in corporate groups. The range of behaviour that can amount to phoenix activity is so broad, that not all phoenix activity is illegal. This paper will consider regulatory approaches to these challenges via analysis of approaches to detection and enforcement of the underlying law capturing illegal phoenix activity. Remedying the mischief of phoenix activity is of practical importance. The benefits include continued confidence in our economy, law that inspires best practice among directors, and law that is articulated in a manner such that penalties act as a sufficient deterrent and the regulatory system is able to detect offenders and bring them to account. Any further reforms must accommodate and tolerate legal phoenix activity, at least to some extent. Even then, phoenix activity pushes tolerance of repeated entrepreneurial failure to its absolute limit. The more limited liability is misused and abused, the stronger the argument to place some restrictions on access to limited liability. This paper proposes that such an approach is a legitimate next step for a robust and mature capitalist economy.

Economic theory and environmental sciences, a historic review : from physiocrats to institutionalists

p.57-70

Economic theory and environmental sciences, a historic review : from physiocrats to institutionalists

p.57-70

Fiscal decentralisation and economic theory

There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: “first generation of theories” and “second generation of theories”.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

The management of innovation under ambiguity

De récents développements en théorie de la decision ont largement enrichi notre connaissance de la notion d'incertitude knightienne, usuellement appelée ambiguïté. Néanmoins ces dévelopement tardent à être intégrés au coeur de la théorie économique. Nous suggérons que l'analyse de phénonèmes économiques tel que l'innovation et la Recherche et Développement gagnerait à intégrer les modèles de décision en situation d'ambiguïté. Nous étayons notre propos en analysant l'allocation des droits de propriété d'une découverte. Les deux premières parties de la présentation s'inspire d'un modèle d'Aghion et de Tirole, The Management of Innovation, portant sur l'allocation des droits de propriété entre une unité de recherche et un investisseur. Il est démontré qu'un désaccord entre les agents sur la technologie de recherche affecte leur niveau d'effort, l'allocation des droits de propriété et l'allocation des revenus subséquents. Finalement, nous examinons une situation où plusieurs chercheurs sont en compétition en s'inspirant du traitement de l'incertitude de Savage. La présence d'ambuïgité affecte le comportement des agents et l'allocation des droits de propriétés de manière qui n'est pas captée en assumant l'hypothèse de risque.