Perceptions and Preferences of Commercial Fishers for Dedicated Access Privilege Framework in a Multispecies Fishery

The decline of the world's fisheries and the inability of traditional management frameworks to maintain them, has led managers to adopt alternative management frameworks. The use of dedicated access privileges have often been shown to have varying popularity among factions within the commercial fishing industry and managers. Here, we examine commercial fishers' preference for alternative management frameworks in the context of a unique multispecies fisheries of the Florida Keys. By surveying commercial fishers, we find that that the size of operation plays no role in affecting fisher perception regarding dedicated access privileges. Furthermore, fishers who are organized are less likely to support dedicated access privilege frameworks. Overall, we do not find enough support in the fishing industry for the implementation of dedicated access privileges in the Florida Keys. These findings can provide inputs in developing effective management plans in the region.

Catch limits, capacity utilization and cost reduction in Japanese fishery management

Japan's fishery harvest peaked in the late 1980s. To limit the race for fish, each fisherman could be provided with specific catch limits in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The market for ITQs would also help remove the most inefficient fishers. In this article we estimate the potential cost reduction associated with catch limits, and find that about 300 billion yen or about 3 billion dollars could be saved through the allocation and trading of individual-specific catch shares.

A laboratory assessment of the choice of vessel size under individual transferable quota regimes

This paper examines the effect of individual transferable quota regimes on technology choice, such as choice of vessel size, by using the laboratory experiment method. We find that even if vessel sizes change over time, the quota price can converge to the fundamental value conditioned on the vessels chosen. We also find that subjects choose their vessel type to maximise their profits based on the quota trading prices in the previous period. This result implies that the efficiency of quota markets in the beginning period is important because any inefficiency in quota markets may affect vessel sizes in ensuing periods. Moreover, we find that the initial allocations may significantly influence vessel sizes through two channels: first, a higher initial allocation to a subject increases the likelihood that the subject invests in a large-sized vessel; second, the quota price may be higher and more unstable under unequal allocation than under equal allocation; thus, whether the allocation is equal influences subjects' choice of vessel type. © 2014 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc.

Does size matter? An assessment of quota market evolution and performance in the Great Barrier Reef fin-fish fishery

In fisheries managed using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) it is generally assumed that quota markets are well-functioning, allowing quota to flow on either a temporary or permanent basis to those able to make best use of it. However, despite an increasing number of fisheries being managed under ITQs, empirical assessments of the quota markets that have actually evolved in these fisheries remain scarce. The Queensland Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery (CRFFF) on the Great Barrier Reef has been managed under a system of ITQs since 2004. Data on individual quota holdings and trades for the period 2004-2012 were used to assess the CRFFF quota market and its evolution through time. Network analysis was applied to assess market structure and the nature of lease-trading relationships. An assessment of market participants’ abilities to balance their quota accounts, i.e., gap analysis, provided insights into market functionality and how this may have changed in the period observed. Trends in ownership and trade were determined, and market participants were identified as belonging to one out of a set of seven generalized types. The emergence of groups such as investors and lease-dependent fishers is clear. In 2011-2012, 41% of coral trout quota was owned by participants that did not fish it, and 64% of total coral trout landings were made by fishers that owned only 10% of the quota. Quota brokers emerged whose influence on the market varied with the bioeconomic conditions of the fishery. Throughout the study period some quota was found to remain inactive, implying potential market inefficiencies. Contribution to this inactivity appeared asymmetrical, with most residing in the hands of smaller quota holders. The importance of transaction costs in the operation of the quota market and the inequalities that may result are discussed in light of these findings

Quota and Licensing Systems in the VIII Division European Anchovy

Paper presented at 12th Annual Conference of EAERE 2003 Bilbao (Spain)

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries.

Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.